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THE "NEW DIPLOMACY" OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By FELIX GILBERT

I

EVER since Woodrow Wilson, in the course of his attempts to lay a new and secure basis for peace after the First World War, proclaimed the necessity for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," the methods of diplomacy have been regarded as having had their part in bringing about the outbreak of the First World War, and the demand for a "new diplomacy" has been raised. Although this concept has come into frequent use only in our century, it was soon realized that its history could be traced back into the nineteenth century, but its exact provenance[1] has never been fully established. This article will show that the term can be found even earlier than is generally assumed, namely as early as 1793.[2] As in all such disputes about the origin of a term, it would be ridiculous to maintain that this was definitely the first time this concept made its appearance, but it seems justified to propose that the concept definitely belongs to the second part of the eighteenth century. Prior to that period the rules and methods of diplomacy were not yet fixed. Diplomacy was so young a science that the demand for a "new diplomacy" could scarcely have had meaning. On the other hand, the spirit of criticism against the institutions of the *ancien régime* which developed in the eighteenth century extended also to the customary methods of handling foreign affairs. Thus, in the second part of the eighteenth century, there existed a whole body of

[1] On this question, see Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, "Geneva and the Evolution of a New Diplomacy," *World Organization: A Balance Sheet of the First Great Experiment*, Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, pp. 14-29.

[2] In an article by Ducher, see below p. 37. Ducher's political and literary activity has been described and analyzed by F. L. Nussbaum, *Commercial Policy in the French Revolution*, Washington, D.C., 1923. Every reader of Nussbaum's book could have found the expression there, but since this book was written before the postwar interest in the concept of a "new diplomacy" had arisen, the author naturally gave no special attention to Ducher's importance for the history of this concept.

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reformist thinking out of which the concept of a "new diplomacy" could naturally develop. In providing an analysis of this body of thought, this article hopes to place the discussion of the origin of the term "new diplomacy" on solid ground and thereby to direct attention to features of eighteenth-century thought of which neither the ideological content nor the practical importance have been fully appreciated.

II

The center of interest of eighteenth-century political reformers—be they literary men, economists, scientists, or pure philosophers—was domestic policy.[3] It is only natural, therefore, that this aspect of their political ideas has been examined more intensively than have their views on foreign policy.[4] Yet this is probably not the only reason for the prevalence of interest in the domestic aspects of their political theories; our view inclines towards this side because we look back on their ideas from the vantage point of a later century. Aware of the immense changes in the political, economic, and intellectual spheres which have swept over Europe since the French Revolution, we naturally

[3] In the following, the terms "radicals" and "*philosophes*" are used rather loosely for all those writers who were concerned with plans of political and social reform in the eighteenth century. Since this article is interested in working out certain basic ideas which they all had in common, such rather general and indiscriminate use of these terms seemed justified. For the same reason, no special attention will be given to differences and nuances in the ideas of the various writers, though I am quite aware that, from identical basic premises, they frequently arrived at very different recommendations about practical measures and details.

[4] See such standard works as Henri Sée, *Les Idées Politiques en France au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, 1920; Kingsley Martin, *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, Boston, 1929 (which has only a rather brief and spotty chapter on "Peace, Fraternity and Nationalism"); J. Salwyn Schapiro, *Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism*, New York, 1934; or the brief treatment of these issues in George Weulersse, *Le Mouvement Physiocratique en France de 1756 à 1770*, 2 vols., Paris, 1910. A number of special studies have touched upon the problems with which this article is concerned; two recent ones are Edmond Silberner, *La Guerre dans la Pensée Economique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle* (Etudes sur l'histoire des théories économiques, Vol. VII), Paris, 1939, and Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France*, New York, 1941; this article is obligated to these two studies in various ways, and their bibliographies make a detailed bibliographical apparatus superfluous, but the approach used in these studies is different from the approach of this article; they follow the development of the ideas on peace and war through the centuries, while this article will attempt to place these ideas into the system of eighteenth-century thought.

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evaluate the importance of eighteenth-century political theorists —of Rousseau and Condorcet, of the physiocrats and Adam Smith, of Diderot and D'Alembert—mainly from the point of view of the contribution which they made to the social and political developments of the nineteenth century. To us, the historical importance of the reformers and radicals of the eighteenth century lies in the support they gave to the emancipation of the forces which shaped the future of the modern world and we are mainly interested in those aspects of their theories which can be directly connected with the trends of our own time.

The *philosophes* of the eighteenth century did not regard themselves as prophets to whose eyes a new promised land appeared only in vague outline. They saw themselves at the end of a development, resolving the contrasts and conflicts of the past in a great synthesis and taking the final steps for accomplishment of a permanent order.[5] Though each new generation of society feels itself placed at the final stage of world historical development, it should be recognized that the confidence of the *philosophes* in the near approach of the golden age had its foundation in a peculiar constellation of historical factors.

At the beginning of the century the Peace of Utrecht had ended a long period of conflicts and wars and established the basis of a new political system.[6] The stipulations of the treaty extended over the non-European world, and, thereby, the treaty had shown to what extent the great European powers, though they remained of central importance, drew their strength from the resources of the entire world. This is reflected in Turgot's statement that the trend of the time was to make "the boundaries

[5] Le Trosne, *De l'Ordre Social*, Paris, 1777, p. 367: "En effet, le système de l'Europe a pris une consistence qui semble devoir en maintenir la durée et conserver à peu près chaque puissance dans l'état où elle se trouve"; also the remarks by Diderot on the new situation in Europe in "Fragments Politiques," *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1875, IV, 41-42, or by Mably in his "Droit Public," *Collection Complète des Oeuvres*, ed. by Guillaume Arnoux, Paris, 1794-95, VII, 128.

[6] Although the Abbé de Saint-Pierre wrote his project for an eternal peace prior to Utrecht, its publication at the time of the conclusion of the Peace certainly strengthened its influence; see Joseph Drouet, *L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, L'homme et l'oeuvre*, Paris, 1912, pp. 107 ff.

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of the political world become identical with those of the physical world."[7]

This feeling that one civilization now encompassed the whole world was reinforced by the astounding growth of economic interdependence. In the centers of European civilization people could rely on having a regular supply of goods from all over the world: sugar from the West Indies, tea and china from the Far East, coffee and chocolate from the Americas and Africa. The barriers that existed seemed artificial and ephemeral in comparison with the finely meshed net by which the merchants tied the individuals of the different nations together like "threads of silk." As Sedaine says in his famous comedy, the merchants—whether they are English, Dutch, Russian, or Chinese—do not serve a single nation; they serve everyone and are citizens of the whole world.[8] Through the religious wars, the common religious basis of political society had been undermined and the idea of a Christian civilization within which the single political units lived had been destroyed; the impossibility of eliminating the sectarian differences had resulted in a fading of religious emphasis per se, and the vacuum which was left was now filled by the idea that commerce bound the nations together and created not only a community of interests but also a distribution of labor among them—a new comprehensive principle placing the isolated sovereign nations in a higher political unit. In the eighteenth century, writers were likely to say that the various nations

[7] Turgot, "Plan d'un ouvrage sur la géographie politique," *Oeuvres*, ed. by G. Schelle, Paris, 1913, Vol. I, particularly pp. 262-63: "Réflexions générales sur la manière dont les nations, d'abord isolées, ont porté leurs regards autour d'elles . . . qu'il s'est formé plusieurs de ces mondes dans toute l'étendue du globe, indépendants les uns des autres et inconnus réciproquement; qu'en s'étendant sans cesse autour d'eux, ils se sont rencontrés et confondus, jusqu'à ce qu'enfin la connaissance de tout l'univers, dont la politique saura combiner toutes les parties, ne formera plus qu'un seul monde politique, dont les limites sont confondues avec celle du monde physique." See also Turgot's speech in the Sorbonne of December 11, 1750, *ibid.*, pp. 214 ff.

[8] Sedaine, *Le philosophe sans le scavoir*, crit. ed. by Th. E. Oliver (University of Illinois Studies, Vol. IV), Urbana, 1913, pp. 105-6: "Ce n'est pas un peuple, ce n'est pas une seule nation qu'il sert; il les sert toutes, et en est servi; c'est l'homme de l'univers. . . . La guerre s'allume; tout s'embrace; l'Europe est divisée; mais ce Négociant Anglois, Hollandois, Russe ou Chinois, n'en est pas moins l'ami de mon coeur; nous sommes sur la superficie de la terre autant de fils de soie qui lient ensemble les nations et les ramènent à la paix par la nécessité du commerce."

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belonged to "one society"; it was stated that all states together formed "a family of nations," and the whole globe a "general and unbreakable confederation."[9]

A decisive factor strengthening the belief that history had reached a new and final stage was the increased importance of the class to which the economic progress was due, namely of the bourgeoisie—a greater importance because of increase in numbers, in wealth, and in significance for the entire social structure. The members of the bourgeoisie became conscious of being the main prop of social life and of being entitled to an elimination of all obstacles to their development. Thus happened what always occurs when a new and rising class wants to break the restraints which keep it in a subordinate and sheltered position: its members identified their cause with the cause of the human race in general and believed that they were fighting for freedom against all tyranny rather than for their special interests against feudal privileges and suppression. The victory which seemed to be almost in their grasp appeared to them to be a victory of humanity, the final solution of all historical conflicts.[10]

In an analysis of the utopian ideas of eighteenth-century *philosophes*, our main concern will be with French writers. This is entirely natural. France was not only the most powerful nation of Europe in the eighteenth century, she was the central theater where the issues of the century were fought out: the contrast between nobility and bourgeoisie, between the forces of the old order and of the new, were there revealed in sharper relief than in the economically less advanced countries of central and eastern Europe on the one hand, or on the other in England where, as a result of the civil wars and revolutions of the previous century, the door had been opened for a steadily increasing influence of the commercial classes on policy decisions. Moreover, though the wars of Louis XIV had brought France to the zenith

[9] For instance, Le Mercier de la Rivière, *L'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, 1767, publié avec une notice par Edgard Depitre (Collection des Economistes et des Réformateurs Sociaux de la France), Paris, 1910, pp. 251, 249, 354; Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, pp. 355, 393; Gaillard, *Mélanges*, Paris, 1806, p. 66, etc.

[10] See Georges Lefebvre, "La Révolution Française et le Rationalisme," *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française*, XVIII (1946), 18 ff.

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of power in Europe, they had eventually threatened to carry her beyond that zenith. The French people had entered this century exhausted and dispirited. The traditional policy of territorial expansion on the continent and the drive for European hegemony had lost much of their glamour. An attempt in an entirely different direction, taking the economic interests of France as guide and aiming at the enlargement of the French colonial empire and the promotion of overseas trade, was the natural reaction. French foreign policy wavered between the two poles of a territorial-continental and commercial-maritime foreign policy.[11] Thus, in France, political problems were posed with particular sharpness because the issues cut immediately and deeply into the fabric of the existing political structure. Moreover, inasmuch as France was the hub in the wheel of European policy, a radical change in the French political system was expected to be of the greatest importance for all of Europe and to bring about a new era in the entire world.[12] The chief interest of the *philosophes* was the presentation of a new program of interior policy, first to be adopted in France, then to spread over other parts of Europe.

We have said that the ideas of the *philosophes* on foreign policy have been relatively neglected as compared with the attention which their views on problems of domestic policy have received, because only the latter had obviously far-reaching effects. One should perhaps add that this one-sidedness of the modern interest in the ideas of the *philosophes* was fostered by the *philosophes* themselves in that they subordinated foreign affairs to domestic issues. For an analysis of their ideas on foreign policy, it is important to realize that to them the main importance of diplomacy consists in its functional relationship to domestic policy. Their main thesis is that the great role which foreign affairs played in the political life of their time was one of

[11] See Dietrich Gerhard, "Kontinentalpolitik und Kolonialpolitik im Frankreich des Ausgehenden Ancien Regime," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXXXVII (1932), 21-31.

[12] Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, pp. 430-31: "Ô France! Ô ma patrie! Voilà le rôle qu'il te convient de remplir en Europe. . . . Il ne faudroit pour opérer cette révolution si heureuse, que l'exemple d'une grande nation. . . ."

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the most fundamental evils of the existing political system. D'Argenson has most succinctly formulated this basic attitude of the *philosophes* with regard to the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. "Flatterers assure the princes that the interior is there only to serve foreign policy. Duty tells them the opposite. . . . The true purpose of the science called politics is to perfect the interior of a state as much as possible."[13]

The *philosophes* directed a quite systematic attack against the view which regarded foreign policy as the center and culmination of political activities. They assailed the entire concept of man underlying this philosophy of power politics. The high evaluation of military virtues is a "dangerous prejudice, a carry-over from barbarism, a remnant of the former chaos."[14] "True fame consists not in the glory which the stupidity of the people connects with military conquests and which the still more stupid historians love to praise to the point of boring the reader."[15] If the right name were to be given to conquests "which for so long have been praised as heroism," they would be called crimes.[16]

Beyond assailing the scale of values in which heroic military virtues occupied a pre-eminent place, the *philosophes* also tried to close every avenue of escape for those who attempted to justify the existing methods of diplomacy by maintaining that they

[13] D'Argenson, *Considérations sur le Gouvernement Ancien et Présent de la France*, Amsterdam, 1765, p. 18: "Tel est cependant le véritable objet de la science qu'on appelle Politique, perfectionner le dedans d'un Etat de tous les degrés de perfection dont il est susceptible. . . . Les flatteurs persuadent aux Princes que le dedans ne doit servir qu'aux affaires du dehors; le devoir leur dit le contraire." Also Le Trosne, *op cit.*, p. 420; Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 252; Rousseau, *Political Writings*, ed. by C. E. Vaughan, Cambridge, Mass., 1915, I, 381-82, etc.

[14] D'Argenson, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-20: "A-t-on toujours exactement calculé, combien il en coûtoit à l'abondance des anciennes Provinces pour en acquérir une nouvelle? . . . Voilà pourtant les grand objets qu'on attribue ordinairement à la Politique; voilà l'éclat des Règnes et le sujet des monuments Historiques: fâcheux préjugés! reste de Barbarie! vestiges de l'ancien chaos."

[15] Condillac, *Le Commerce et le Gouvernement*, Amsterdam, 1776, pp. 407-8: ". . . cette gloire que les peuples, dans leur stupidité, attachent aux conquêtes, et que les historiens, plus stupides encore, aiment à célébrer jusqu'au point d'ennuyer le lecteur; quel sera leur avantage?" Or Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, pp. 377, 387-89; Mirabeau, *L'Ami des Hommes ou Traité de la Population*, 3me partie, Avignon, 1756, pp. 399-400; and, of course, the third chapter of Voltaire's *Candide*.

[16] Condorcet, "Discours de réception à l'Académie Française," *Oeuvres*, Paris, O'Connor and Arago, 1847-49, I, 396: ". . . cette fureur des conquêtes si longtemps décorée du nom d'héroisme."

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served best to achieve the opposite aim, namely, peace. All the ideas on which such claims were based were subjected to biting criticism. The main target of the *philosophes* in this respect was the assumption that the only possibility and guarantee of peace lay in the maintenance of a balance of power among the states. There is hardly a *philosophe* and reformer who does not inveigh against the idea of balance of power, "this favorite idea of newspapers and coffee-house politicians."[17] This idea, "reducing the whole science of politics to knowledge of a single word, pleases both the ignorance and the laziness of the ministers, of ambassadors and their clerks."[18] In contrast to the ostensible aim of promoting peace, balance of power had, it was said, always done harm to the system of lasting peace and was opposed to it. The reason was that "the system of balance of power is a system of resistance, consequently of disturbance, of shocks and of explosions."[19] With the overthrow of this central concept of eighteenth-century diplomacy, the other concerns of the traditional diplomacy also were re-evaluated and shown up in their futility and dangerousness. According to the *philosophes*, the conclusion of treaties and alliances, the most significant activity of eighteenth-century diplomacy, does not serve the establishment of friendly relations among states; treaties are nothing but "temporary armistices"[20] and alliances "preparations for treason."[21] Even when they are called defensive alliances, they are "in reality always of an offensive nature."[22] Diplomatic activity, thus being identical with double-dealing and pursuing different purposes from those it openly avows, needs to wrap itself in secrecy and

[17] Mirabeau, *op. cit.*, p. 404: "Idée favorite des gazettes et des caffés politiques . . ."; or Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 244; Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 394; Mirabeau, *op. cit.*, p. 116; and the particularly detailed, somewhat later analysis of Godwin, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, facsimile ed. by F. E. L. Priestley, Toronto, 1946, pp. 155-57.

[18] Mably, "Principes des Négociations," *Oeuvres*, V, 66: ". . . réduisant toute la science de la politique à ne savoir qu'un mot, elle flattoit également l'ignorance et la paresse des ministres, des ambassadeurs et de leurs commis."

[19] Gaillard, *op. cit.*, I, 79: "Le système de l'équilibre est un système de résistance, par conséquent d'agitation, de choc et d'explosion."

[20] Rousseau, *op. cit.*, I, 369; also Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 374, etc.

[21] Raynal, *Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Etablissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*, Genève, 1781, VI, 284: "trahisons préparées. . . ."

[22] D'Argenson, *op. cit.*, p. 327: "Les ligues défensives qu'ils contractent sont toujours offensives au fond."

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has become an "obscure art which hides itself in the folds of deceit, which fears to let itself be seen and believes it can exist only in the darkness of mystery."[23] Secrecy, therefore, is not—as the diplomats pretend—necessary for the efficient fulfillment of their functions; it only proves that they are conspirators planning crimes. Diderot in a brief satirical piece entitled "Political Principles of Rulers" has summarized the views of the *philosophes* on the diplomacy of their time. "Make alliances only in order to sow hatred. Incite wars among my neighbors and try to keep it going. Have no ambassadors in other countries, but spies. . . . To be neutral means to profit from the difficulties of others in order to improve one's own situation."[24]

Though different writers made different aspects of diplomacy —secrecy or formality of etiquette—the chief butts of their criticism, they were all in agreement that diplomacy could not be reformed by redressing any single abuse. The evil inherent in diplomacy could be removed only by a complete reform of the political system. The criminal manner in which foreign affairs were conducted was regarded as one of the most characteristic manifestations and a chief consequence of the basic misconstruction of political life; it was proof that, in contrast to other fields of study, "the science which is called politics" had not yet been reduced "to definite and fixed principles" and had not become a servant of "the rule of reason."[25] Foreign affairs showed most clearly and most strikingly the evil of a world not yet ruled by

[23] Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 395: "Cet art obscur qui s'enveloppe dans les plis et les replis de la dissimulation, qui craint de se laisser entrevoir, et croit ne pouvoir réunir qu'à l'ombre du mystère." Also p. 421; or Mably, *Oeuvres*, V, 182.

[24] This is an extract of Diderot's "Principes de Politique des Souverains," as given in J. Oestreicher, *La Pensée Politique et Economique de Diderot*, Vincennes, 1936, p. 70: "Ne former des alliances que pour semer des haines.—Allumer et faire durer la guerre entre mes voisins.—Point des ministres au loin, mais des espions.— . . . Etre neutre, ou profiter de l'embarras des autres pour arranger ses affaires, c'est la même chose." The whole will be found in Diderot, *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1875-77, II, 461 ff.

[25] Mably, "Entretiens de Phocion," *Oeuvres*, X, 172: "Mon cher Aristias, poursuivit Phocion, j'ai tâché de ramener à des principes fixes et certains cette science qu'on nomme politique, et dont les sophistes nous avoient donné une idée bien fausse. Ils la regardent comme l'esclave ou l'instrument de nos passions; de-là l'incertitude et l'instabilité de ses maximes; de-là ses erreurs, et les révolutions qui en sont le fruit. Pour moi, je fais de la politique le ministre de notre raison, et j'en vois résulter le bonheur des sociétés." Also D'Argenson, *op. cit.*, p. 20; or Rousseau, *op. cit.*, pp. 510-11.

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reason. "The blind passions of the princes"[26] were the cause of wars, conquests, and all the miseries accompanying them. A favorite story[27] of the eighteenth century illustrating the arbitrariness which dominated foreign policy was the story of the palace window: Louvois, fearing disgrace because Louis XIV had expressed displeasure with Louvois' arrangements concerning the construction of the windows of the Trianon, instigated the king to a renewal of the war against the Hapsburgs in order to divert his attention from architectural matters. As long as foreign policy continued to be determined by passions, by whims and arbitrary proclivities, diplomacy could be nothing else but "the art of intrigue."[28]

According to the *philosophes,* instead of the whims and moods of an individual, the interests of the state ought to become the guiding factor. They are steady and lasting, composed of definable and calculable elements such as geographical situation, size of population, economic interests. By following them, men will be able to keep events on a calculable, well-charted course.[29] In pursuing its "true interest," each state will become—to use another favorite expression of the eighteenth century—"master of its own fortune."[30] Of course, the doctrine of the reason of state —indicating that not personal decisions but supra-individual factors determine the policy of a state—has a long history, but it received a special turn in the eighteenth century, because the true interest of a state was regarded as definable and calculable; it was believed that it could be grasped by reason. Moreover, if the interests of the states were correctly gauged, it would emerge that they were not opposed to one another, but compatible and

[26] Diderot, art. "Paix" in "Encyclopédie," *Oeuvres,* XVI, 188: "Les passions aveugles des princes les portent à étendre les bornes de leurs états. . . ."

[27] Characterized as "anecdote connue" in the debates of May 16, 1790, of the Assemblée Nationale, *Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860,* première série, ed. by Maridal et Laurent, Paris, 1883, XV, 188.

[28] Mably, *Oeuvres,* V, 17.

[29] For instance, Mably, *Oeuvres,* V, 19-20: "Chaque état tient de ses lois, de ses moeurs et de sa position topographique, une manière d'être qui lui est propre et qui décide seule de ses intérêts."

[30] For instance, Mirabeau, *op. cit.,* p. 427: ". . . le seul arbitre des ses desseins." Or Mably, *Oeuvres,* V, 17: "Maîtresse de la fortune."

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complementary.[31] War and conflict would then be at an end.

If one wants to reduce this whole complex of eighteenth-century ideas on diplomacy to a simple formula, it can be summarized as the establishment of a rule of reason.[32] It is the same solution which the *philosophes* had for the problems of domestic policy; in view of the pre-eminence which they give to domestic over foreign affairs, they consider the introduction of a new and peaceful era in foreign policy as dependent on a reorganization of domestic policy. There is no need to be particularly concerned about the problems of foreign policy; they are only a partial aspect of the wider problem of placing domestic affairs on a rational basis.[33] Yet how can this be effected? As much as the eighteenth-century reformers agree on the basic concepts which we have sketched above, they differ when their views on the realization of their ideas are examined; it emerges that this complex of reformist ideas comprised at least two separate elements, one predominantly conservative, the other radical democratic.

A most important trend of thought in the system of eighteenth-century ideas was physiocracy—with which a great number of thinkers were connected—some in a more, others in a less orthodox way. The physiocratic school cannot be clearly and definitely distinguished from other contemporary trends of thought because although today it is mainly seen as propounding a new and important economic doctrine, in the eighteenth century the significance of physiocratic theories seemed to reach far beyond the economic sphere and to range over the entire structure of social and political life. The physiocrats called their political theory "economic policy" not because they were concerned solely with economic questions, but because, to them, economics and politics were identical. They believed that all political problems

[31] Mirabeau, *op. cit.*, p. 84: ". . . malheureux principe renfermé dans ce proverbe: Nul ne perd que l'autre ne gagne, principe barbare autant que faux; et moi je dis, soit dans le physique, soit dans le moral: Nul ne perd qu'un autre ne perde. . . ." Or Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

[32] For instance, Condorcet, "Eloge de Franklin," *Oeuvres*, III, 420: "Sa politique était celle d'un homme qui croit au pouvoir de la raison et à la réalité de la vertue. . . ." Or Mably, *Oeuvres*, XIII, 139; Turgot, *op. cit.*, III, 683-86.

[33] For instance, Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 252, or Mirabeau, *op. cit.*, pp. 82 ff.

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would be solved if the right economic principles were followed, the right economic measures adopted. The contrast to "economic policy" was the "old policy," "the false policy," or "power politics"—all these terms were alternately used.[34] "The essence of power politics consists of divergence of interests, that of economic policy of unity of interests—the one leads to war, frustrations, destruction, the other to social integration, co-operation, and free and peaceful sharing of the fruits of work.[35] The physiocrats elaborated this contrast between "the old policy" and "the economic policy," between an "artificial" and a "natural" political situation, with great gusto and especially emphasized that, as a result of the artificiality of the "old policy," dealings had to be shrouded in secrecy and mystery.[36] The diplomats had to be actors—"competitors in grimaces"[37]—and each nation was barricaded behind its own frontiers, intent on making commercial treaties to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of its neighbor. In contrast, the new world in which the "economic policy" was to be realized would have an unrestricted exchange of goods. From mutual interdependence would emerge the realization that increase in one nation's wealth means increased wealth for all other nations, and that the interests of all nations are identical; consequently, there would be no advantage in enlarging one's own territory and combating one's neighbor. A single measure, namely, the establishment of free trade, would bring about this miraculous change; it was up to the rulers of the states to take this one decisive measure. The physiocrats were favorites of many princes, and their faith in the power of reason

[34] For instance, Condorcet, *Oeuvres*, IX, 93: "Vieille Politique"; Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 244: "fausse politique."

[35] Baudeau, *Première Introduction à la Philosophie Economique*, 1767, publié avec notice et table analytique par A. Dubois, Paris, 1910, p. 99: "L'opposition des intérêts fait l'essence de la politique usurpatrice. L'unité d'intérêt fait l'essence de la politique économique. Les relations de l'une sont de guerre, d'empêchement, de destruction. Les relations de l'autre sont de société, de combinaisons des travaux, de partage amical et paisible des fruits de ces travaux."

[36] For this and the following, see Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, pp. 417-29; Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-53; Baudeau, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-99.

[37] Mirabeau, *op. cit.*, p. 31: "Oh! quand les deux arlequins se rencontrent, c'est à qui surpassera son compétiteur en grimaces, et voilà la politique des prétendus hommes d'Etat qui ont voulu bannir de leur science l'équité."

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was so strong that they believed in the probability of persuading the rulers of the states to make this change. They were no opponents of despotism; on the contrary, they were confident that the new order could be introduced quite easily with and even by means of the prince's absolute power.[38]

In their support of absolute monarchy the physiocrats were by no means representative of all eighteenth-century thought. To many *philosophes,* despotism was an integral part of the old order, which had to be overcome. To this way of thinking the decisive step in establishing the new order was a change in political leadership; the people themselves had to take over control of political life. Accordingly, the conduct of foreign affairs in a reformed world assumed a rather different aspect. For instance, Condorcet who gave this question extended consideration was concerned with creating a mechanism through which the people could make themselves felt in foreign affairs.[39] No convention between nations should be valid without approval of the legislative body; moreover, as a further safeguard, he demanded that political treaties should be ratified by the single districts of a state; in case of an enemy attack, war might be declared, but only by the legislative, and a declaration of war would have to be followed immediately by new elections, which would give the people opportunity of expressing their views on the war. Evidently Condorcet had no doubt that the people would always be peace-loving, and he was definitely concerned with the removal of all obstacles in the way of the people's directly expressing their will. Thus diplomats appeared to him mainly as intermediaries who might prevent the people from making their voice heard; he had no use for diplomats in general or for diplomatic arrangements establishing automatic obligations by which the freedom of action of a nation would be bound. "Alliance treaties seem to me so dangerous and so little useful that I think it is better to abolish them entirely in time of peace. They are only means

[38] See Heinz Holldack, "Der Physiokratismus und die absolute Monarchie," *Historische Zeitschrift,* CXXXXV (1931/2), 517-49.

[39] See Condorcet, "Lettres d'un Bourgeois de New Haven à un citoyen de Virginie," *Oeuvres,* IX, 41-42, 45-46; and, in general, Schapiro, *op. cit.,* pp. 145-47.

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by which the rulers of states precipitate the people into wars from which they benefit either by covering up their mistakes or by carrying out their plots against freedom, and for which the emergency serves as a pretext."[40]

Although Condorcet was probably the most logical and most influential representative of a strictly democratic approach to the questions of diplomacy in the eighteenth century, another representative of the democratic point of view, namely, Rousseau, must still be discussed, because although he too feels the necessity of giving the people control over foreign affairs, he adds a new element to this way of thinking. Like other eighteenth-century thinkers, he considered the prevailing customs and methods of diplomacy as anarchical and obsolete, but in contrast to them he saw necessity in the existing diplomatic forms; diplomatic manners reflected the historical development which the relations among nations had reached. The time when states lived in isolation had passed. They were now interconnected by common historical experiences and heritage, by tradition and interest; they had come to be dependent upon each other in many regards, yet because their relations were not yet brought into a fixed and permanent form, the fact of their co-existence expressed itself in the unsatisfactory form of shocks and countershocks, of tensions and conflicts. A flexible balance of power was the best possible solution of this situation. The anarchic struggle of man against man had ended only through the social contract. Unlike individuals, states still lived in a state of nature, though the increasing interdependence of the states indicated that this period was coming to a close. Governments would soon realize the necessity of ending the state of nature among nations through the conclusion of a pact which, in Rousseau's opinion, would take the form of a federation of nations and would thus assure peace. The tempo of this process would depend on the progress of republicanism, be-

[40] Condorcet in the work quoted in the previous note, p. 45: "Les traités d'alliance me paraissent si dangereux et si peu utiles, que je vois qu'il vaut mieux y renoncer en temps de paix. . . . Ce n'est qu'un moyen donné aux chefs des nations de les précipiter dans des guerres dont ils profitent pour couvrir leurs fautes, ou pour porter à la liberté des atteintes sourdes, et aux quelles la nécessité sert alors de prétexte." It is likely that Condorcet's distrust of entangling alliances was somewhat influenced by the unpopularity of the Austrian Alliance in France.

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cause governments controlled by the people would be more willing to subordinate themselves to a world federation.[41]

It is almost superfluous to discuss the kind of diplomacy which the *philosophes* envisaged for the era when the rule of reason had been established; their views about the diplomacy of the future are implied in their attacks against existing diplomacy. The future diplomacy would be the reverse of the diplomacy of the past.[42] Relations among nations should follow moral laws. There should be no difference between the "moral principles" which rule the relations among individuals and "moral principles" which rule the relations among states.[43] Diplomacy should be "frank and open."[44] Formal treaties would be unnecessary; political alliances should be avoided particularly.[45] Commercial conventions should refrain from all detailed regulations establishing individual advantages and privileges; they should limit themselves to general arrangements stating the fundamental rules and customs of trade and navigation.[46] In such a world the connection among the different states would rest in the hands not of governments but of individuals trading with each other. If the *philosophes* failed to give a very detailed description of the diplomatic system which would exist in the world of the future, there is—quite aside from the fact that the outlines of the utopia which

[41] This analysis of Rousseau's views is based on his "Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre"; see Rousseau, *op. cit.*, I, 364-96. It should be kept in mind that Rousseau had some reservations about the project of the Abbé; see Georges Lassadru-Duchêne, *Jean Jacques Rousseau et le Droit des Gens*, Paris, 1906.

[42] Bentham's "Principles of International Law," written 1786-1789, published in his *Works* (ed. by John Bowring, Edinburgh, 1843, II, 535 ff.), can be considered as a summation of the reformist program.

[43] For instance, see Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 250, or Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

[44] Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, p. 421: "Sa politique sera aussi franche et aussi ouverte que sa conduite avec ses sujets"; also p. 419. Against secret diplomacy in general, Mably, *Oeuvres*, VII, 89 ff., and Bentham, *op. cit.*, pp. 554-60, etc.

[45] Le Trosne, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-29: "Il ne cherchera point à se faire des alliés; sa politique fraternelle le rendra nécessairement l'ami de toutes les nations. . . . Et que pourroient lui servir des alliances? . . ."

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 426: "Aucune nation n'aura chez lui de privilège ni de faveur par le commerce, et les Negocians domiciliés chez lui n'en auront pas davantage. Son code, a cet egard, sera aussi simple et aussi court que ses principes. . . . On entrera chez lui, on en sortira de meme: on traversera son territoire sans y rencontrer ni tarif, ni preposés, ni barrieres." Mably, *Oeuvres*, V, 194-95: "Jamais elles n'auroient parle, dans leur traités de commerce, que des conventions générales propres à assurer la liberté des mers et de la navigation."

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radical reformers imagine usually remain rather vague and general—a special reason. As we have seen, foreign policy and diplomacy were regarded as typical phenomena of the *ancien régime*; they owed their importance to the fact that the rulers followed false ideals and egoistic passions instead of reason. The logical consequence was that in a reformed world, based on reason, foreign policy and diplomacy would become unnecessary,[47] that the new world would be a world without diplomats.

III

The eighteenth century was less aware of the distance which lies between reality and idea than is the present age and, therefore, less doubtful about the possibilities of realizing a utopia. To the *philosophes*, the logical and ethical correctness of an idea guaranteed that it could be carried out in practice. With regard to their ideas of diplomacy, the *philosophes* liked to point out as an additional confirmation that in many respects these ideas had guided the policy of two eminently successful states. Venice and the Netherlands—states entirely different from the usual pattern of early modern absolutism—were objects of fascinated curiosity and interest throughout the eighteenth century.[48] The *philosophes* liked particularly to direct attention to the fact that these republics owed their success to the policy of keeping away from political alliances and of following exclusively their commercial interests, trusting to the bonds which trade would establish between them and their neighbors. One of the great literary successes of the eighteenth century was a book which was presumed to be the political testament of the Dutch statesman, Jan de Witt. There the successes of Holland's foreign policy were characterized as the fruit of the observance of those principles recommended by the *philosophes*. Holland had avoided "all wars and alliances founded upon conquest and glory" and had "not meddled with the parting of princes." In placing commercial

[47] Rousseau, "Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne," *op. cit.*, II, 510: "Ne vous ruinez pas en ambassadeurs et ministres dans d'autre cours."

[48] For instance, concerning Venice, see Mably, *Oeuvres*, V, 34, or Voltaire's article in the *Dictionnaire Philosophique*: "Venise, et, par occasion, de la liberté"; concerning the Netherlands, see Diderot, "Voyage de Hollande," *Oeuvres*, XVII, 390-91.

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interests above all others she had attracted the friendship of all political powers. "He that loves himself aright is a friend to all the world."[49]

There were several attempts by statesmen influenced by the *philosophes* to conduct foreign affairs in accordance with such principles.[50] D'Argenson made a rather futile and clumsy attempt to harmonize the traditional hegemonial policy of France with a policy of selflessness and renunciation of conquest.[51] Though vainly, Turgot fought against Vergennes for abandonment of all efforts to avenge the French defeat in the Seven Years' War and for concentration on domestic affairs instead of wasting France's strength in enterprises of foreign policy.[52] Leopold of Tuscany, one of the most loyal disciples of the physiocrats, abjured all power policy, dissolved the army, made Leghorn, Tuscany's main harbor, a free port, and declared his country neutral.[53] Although Catherine II's Armed Neutrality was mainly determined by considerations of anti-English power policy and aimed to free Russia from the pressure of English maritime domination, it could be regarded as an attempt to humanize war and was claimed by the *philosophes* to be inspired by their ideas.

It is evident, however, that the real test could only come when a country had broken all ties with the past. It is in the American and French revolutions that the most significant attempts were made to put the ideas of eighteenth-century *philosophes* into practice. Thus the history of eighteenth-century attempts to reform diplomacy and to introduce new principles into the conduct of foreign affairs has a second aspect; beyond the analysis of the ideas themselves we have to consider the attempts to realize them in America and France.

[49] John de Witt (the real author was Pierre de la Court), *Political Maxims of the State of Holland*, London, 1743, pp. 214-15.

[50] The admiration for Walpole and Fleury as ministers of peace is interesting in Gaillard, *op. cit.*, I, 63, or in Raynal, *op. cit.*, V, 202.

[51] On the "quixotic policy of d'Argenson," see Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire* (The Rise of Modern Europe series, Vol. IX), New York, 1940, pp. 159 ff.

[52] See Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution*, New York, London, 1935, pp. 26 ff.

[53] See Heinz Holldack, "Die Neutralitaetspolitik Leopolds von Toskana," *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift*, XXX (1935/6), 732-56.

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IV

In the sequence of events which led to the foundation of an independent United States, an irrevocable step was taken when, on June 7, 1776, Congress entered upon the consideration of R. H. Lee's resolution "that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; that it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign Alliances; that a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation."[54]

A pivot of this motion was the urgent need for foreign assistance.[55] The stoppage of all export and import trade which had come into force in the fall of 1775 had done more damage to the colonists than to the British.[56] Rising prices, the impossibility of disposing of the tobacco and indigo harvests on which the economic life of the southern colonies depended, and the needs of the army—all combined to make a failure of the economic blockade by which Congress had hoped to force the British government to a change of its policy. Thus on April 6, Congress had reversed its stand and ordered the opening of American ports to the ships of all nations except Great Britain. Because of the British supremacy on the seas and the lack of an American navy, the success of this measure depended on the willingness of foreign powers not only to receive American trade, but also to protect it. Political observers were aware, however, that no foreign power could dare to take the risky step of assisting the American rebels without having a definite guarantee that some stable regime would be created on the North American continent and that return to the British rule would be made impossible. "Con-

[54] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, ed. by W. C. Ford, Washington, 1906, V, 425 (in the future quoted as *Journals*).

[55] See Edmund Cody Burnett, *The Continental Congress*, New York, 1941, pp. 170-71.

[56] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776* (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. LXXVIII), New York, 1918, especially chapter XV.

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federation" and "independence" were the necessary prerequisites for securing "foreign alliances."[57]

But what did the Americans understand by "foreign alliances"? This question is of central importance in determining the relationship of the American revolutionaries to enlightenment ideas on foreign policy; the question can be answered only by an examination of the general diplomatic terminology of the time and of the views of such key figures as Franklin and Adams with regard to these issues; on the basis of an understanding of the contemporary meaning of the term, it will then be necessary to explain the meaning of the two important documents in which the colonists first formulated their ideas about the role of the United States in the state system: namely, the draft treaty of an alliance with France, and the accompanying instructions, given to the commissioners entrusted with these negotiations.

The meaning of the term "foreign alliances" as it is used by the colonists at this time is by no means unequivocal. John Adams who had been so active in promoting the cause of independence that he had earned for himself the title of "Atlas of Independence," reviewed a few years later the events of the summer and declared that in the debates of the fall of 1776 on the application to foreign powers he had laid it down as a first principle that "we should calculate all our measures and foreign negotiations in such a manner, as to avoid a too great dependence upon any power of Europe—to avoid all obligations and temptations to take any part in future European wars: that the business of America with Europe was commerce, not politics or war."[58] Since, in 1776, Adams had been a zealous supporter of Lee's resolution, this would suggest that at that time the word "alliance" was understood rather differently than we understand it today, when it is regarded as denoting the establishment of cooperation among the contracting parties in the political sphere. An examination of the manner in which the term was used in the

[57] See Burnett, *op. cit.*, p. 141; although some "feared to burn the bridges behind them without having made sure of European aid," cf. John C. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution*, Boston, 1943, p. 483.

[58] Letter to Secretary Livingston, Paris, 5 February 1783, *The Works of John Adams*, ed. by Charles Francis Adams, Boston, 1850-56, VIII, 35.

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eighteenth century in general and by the colonists in particular shows that indeed this is the case. The term did not necessarily have the meaning of creating a political bond.

It can probably be said that our identification of alliance with political or even political-military commitments derives from the fact that in the modern world diplomatic instruments which contain political or political-military arrangements are sharply separated from those concerned with regulations of trade, tariffs, etc. Yet this separation of political treaties from commercial treaties began only in the eighteenth century. The Peace of Utrecht, ending the hostilities of the War of Spanish Succession between England and France, for the first time dealt with political and commercial arrangements in separate documents. Even this example was followed only slowly. Political, commercial, or economic settlements still were frequently dealt with in the same document. Thus there are many nuances in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between the most opposite types of the "traité d'alliance offensive et défensive," clearly designating a political-military bond, and the "traité de commerce," exclusively concerned with trade. Such names[59] as "traité d'alliance et de commerce," "traité de paix, de navigation et de commerce," "traité de navigation et commerce," "traité de marine," suggest the variety of content which could be contained in a single diplomatic document.

There is a similar general lack of clear distinctions in diplomatic terminology in the use of such expressions as "commercial connections" and "political connections," so frequently applied by the colonists to their relations with outside powers. When, in the fall of 1775, the great debate on the opening of the ports took place, the view was expressed that with the separation of the American colonies from Britain's imperial system, the possibility of trading with the colonies would be enough attraction to the French to undertake the protection of the trade with America.[60] When Franklin wrote about the possibility of ex-

[59] These names are quite cursorily picked from the relevant volumes of Baron Jean Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique de Droit des Gens*, Amsterdam, 1726-31.

[60] See the "notes of debates," published in *Journals*, III, 471 ff.

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changing "commerce for friendship," however, he seems to have felt that a somewhat more substantial inducement in the form of some monopoly must be offered to France.[61] The French agent even reported from Philadelphia that Franklin and other members of the Continental Congress had mentioned to him the possibility of offering France "un commerce exclusif" for a limited period,[62] and Silas Deane when he arrived in France felt entitled to suggest a tobacco monopoly for a definite term.[63] The expression "political connections," too, had varied shadings. The bond which before the War of Independence had joined the colonies with Britain was sometimes characterized as a mere exchange of military protection for commercial advantages and called an "alliance."[64] It was considered a possible dangerous consequence of the conclusion of an alliance with an outside power that "an expedient of this kind" would lead the colonists into "having their allies at last for their masters"[65]; it would produce the exchange of domination by one power for domination by another. To avoid this danger, it was suggested that the alliance be re-

[61] To Priestley, 7 July 1715: "We have not yet applied to any foreign power for assistance, nor offered our commerce for their friendship," in *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress*, ed. by E. C. Burnett, Washington, 1921-36 (hereafter cited as *Letters*), I, 156; see also Franklin to Dumas, 19 December 1775, in *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States*, ed. by Francis Wharton, Washington, 1889, II, 65.

[62] Bonvouloir's report of December 28, 1775: ". . . qu'ils ignoraient si, en cas que cela en vint aux propositions, la France se contenterait d'avoir chez eux pendant un temps limité un commerce exclusif pour l'indemniser des frais que lui occasionnerait leur cause . . .," in Henri Doniol, *Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'Etablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique*, Paris, 1886, I, 290.

[63] Deane's "Memoir on the Commerce of America": "The importance of improving the present for possessing this single branch of commerce of the United Colonies is very great, but to have a preference of the whole, is an offer which may not ever be made again," in *Deane Papers* (*New York Historical Society Collections*, Vol. XIX), New York, 1887, I, 184.

[64] Thomas Paine speaks in *Common Sense* of "alliance" (*Complete Writings*, ed. by P. S. Foner, New York, 1945, I, 20); John Adams writes in "Novanglus": "The colonies were considered formerly . . . as allies rather than subjects" and, also in "Novanglus," characterizes the bond existing between England and the American colonies as "a treaty of commerce, by which distinct states have been cemented together in perpetual league and amity" (*Works*, IV, 110, 114). Of course, this is the chief idea in Franklin's "Vindication" of the summer of 1775 (*Writings*, ed. by A. H. Smyth, New York, 1905-07, IV, 412-19). Interesting also is the frequent use of the expression "commercial alliance," in, for instance, *Letters*, I, 368, or Peter Force, *American Archives, 4th series*, Washington, 1844, V, 1209.

[65] Cato's "Letter to the People of Pennsylvania," March 1776, in Force, *op. cit.*, V, 542-43.

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stricted to "external assistance,"[66] in other words, a distinction between co-operation on land and co-operation at sea was envisaged. While the French navy should be allowed to play a part on the sea, no assistance by a French army should be accepted.

Aside from showing the vagueness of diplomatic terminology in the eighteenth century, these remarks also indicate how little the thinking of the colonists had crystallized around any definite conception of what a foreign alliance implied when Lee proposed his resolution on June 7, 1776. Only when as a result of this resolution the members of Congress began to deliberate on the treaty to be proposed to France and on the instructions to the American agents did their ideas begin to take a definite and—it may immediately be said—a most interesting shape, showing the influence of eighteenth-century radical thought on the beginnings of American foreign policy.

The external story of these events is clearly established. On June 11, 1776, in consequence of Lee's resolution, a committee was appointed to prepare the model of a treaty to be proposed to the French court.[67] This committee handed in its report on July 18 and the report was discussed in the Continental Congress on August 22, 27, and 29. Then it was referred back to the committee for amendment and for preparation of instructions to be given to the American agents. On September 17, this final report of the committee was made to Congress and the latter's agreement to the prepared instructions was given on September 24. Two days later, Franklin, Deane, and Jefferson were appointed commissioners to France.[68]

The internal story behind these factual events is much more difficult to disentangle. Because of the lack of accounts of the

[66] R. H. Lee to Landon Carter, 2 June 1776: "Supplies of Military Stores and Soldiers, clothing, Ships of War to cover our Trade and open our Ports, which would be an external assistance altogether, could never endanger our freedom by putting it in the Power of our Ally to Master us" (*Letters*, I, 469); or see, in the letter by Cato mentioned in the previous note, p. 544: "Nor let it be said that the wished-for assistance is not that of armies, but of fleets for trade, and commercial protection. . . ."

[67] In future, the draft treaty will be called "model treaty," but it should not be confused with the famous model treaty of 1784.

[68] *Journals*, V, 575 ff., 696, 709-10, 718, 768 ff., 813 ff., 827; in general, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-48, and Burnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-10, though my interpretation of the facts differs somewhat from that given in these two studies.

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discussions in Congress, it has to be reconstructed from a few documents—the model treaty and the instructions—and from brief references in the letters and memoirs of the main actors.

There can be no doubt that John Adams played a most decisive role in these discussions. He was a member of the committee entrusted with the preparation of the model treaty, and the task of drafting this document fell mainly on him. Thus it is of importance to understand the attitude with which he approached this task.[69] Adams had been one of the earliest protagonists of independence and as such had early realized the necessity of foreign alliances. In March 1776, evidently influenced by Paine's *Common Sense*, he had set down on paper his ideas as to the "connection we may safely form with France" and arrived at the following formula: "1. No political connection. Submit to none of her authority, receive no governors or officers from her. 2. No military connection. Receive no troops from her. 3. Only

[69] The following analysis omits John Adams' claim to have advocated as early as the fall of 1775, in a speech on a motion by Chase for sending ambassadors to France, that "we should make no treaties of alliance with any European power; that we should consent to none but treaties of commerce; that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible, from all European politics and wars" (*Works*, I, 200, Letter to Benjamin Rush, 30 September 1805); this claim was repeated in his Letters, published in the *Boston Patriot* in 1809, and in his Autobiography (*Works*, IX, 243, and II, 505). This would have made Adams an advocate of a complete system of isolationist foreign policy as early as 1775. G. Chinard (*Honest John Adams*, Boston, 1933, p. 88) writes that "it is very doubtful that this principle appeared so clearly at the time to the mind of Adams, and unfortunately all traces of the deliberations of Congress on the matter seem to have disappeared." A confirmation of the existence of Chase's motion can be found, however, in Adams' letter to Chase of 9 July 1776: "Your motion last fall for sending ambassadors to France with conditional instructions, was murdered; terminating in a committee of secret correspondence, which came to nothing" (*Works*, IX, 421). The casual manner in which Adams mentions the outcome of Chase's motion confirms rather than invalidates Chinard's suggestion that, in his later years, Adams deceived himself about what happened to Chase's motion; he would have hardly needed to remind Chase of what happened to this motion if a long and important debate had taken place, as he later maintained. Moreover, such detailed suggestions about the future system of foreign policy would have been entirely inappropriate in the fall of 1775, when independence still seemed far off. Such views do not even correspond to Adams' ideas at that time; as the following discussion shows, he then still had great hopes for a complete change of the foreign policy of all powers, to be achieved by a "reformation" of the commercial system. Adams' views hardened into a rigid isolationism only during his stay in Europe. Adams' efforts in his later years to appear as the originator and inventor of all the important ideas determining the course of American policy have done great injustice to himself; he now strikes us as a rather doctrinaire and arid thinker, while actually, he had a great gift for absorbing experience and learning from it, and he underwent an interesting development in his thinking—a development which probably was representative of a whole generation.

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a commercial connection; that is make a treaty to receive her ships into our ports; let her engage to receive our ships into her ports; furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre, powder, duck, steel."[70] How fundamental these ideas were for him can be deduced from the fact that they also appear in letters which he wrote in the spring of 1776. He urges the necessity of sending ambassadors to foreign ports "to form with them, at least with some of them, commercial treaties of friendship and alliance,"[71] and when the dangers to American freedom of an alliance with a foreign power was pointed out to him, he stressed that in recommending foreign alliances he was thinking only of a contractual safeguard of America's trade relations. "I am not for soliciting any political connection or military assistance or indeed naval from France. I wish for nothing but commerce, a mere marine treaty with them."[72]

The model treaty can be regarded as Adams' work, and an analysis of this document shows that it was intended to realize the ideas which he had previously developed—namely, that alliance did not imply a political bond and that America's contacts with outside powers should be limited to trade relations. In his autobiography, Adams wrote that when he started to work on the draft of this model treaty, Franklin put into his hand "a printed volume of treaties" in which he had made some pencil marks beside certain articles. Adams found "some of these judiciously selected, and I took them, with others which I found necessary, into the draught."[73] In comparing the model treaty with earlier documents it emerges that Adams relied heavily on two particular treaties: the treaty between James II and Louis XIV of November 16, 1686, concerning the neutrality of the American

[70] John Adams, *Works*, II, 488-89; characterized as "notes for speeches," dated 1 March 1776, but in *Letters* (I, 371, No. 6), it is suggested that they are personal memoranda because no discussion of the subject indicated took place on March 1st and 4. Just at this time, however, Deane received his instructions for his mission to France; a connection of Adams' notes with this event seems possible.

[71] John Adams to W. Cushing, 9 June 1776, *Letters*, I, 478.

[72] John Adams to J. Winthrop, 23 June 1776, *Letters*, I, 502.

[73] This passage comes from Adams' Autobiography, *Works*, II, 516; since this statement is confirmed by external evidence, I felt entitled to use this passage, though, in general, Adams' Autobiography must be considered a most questionable historical source.

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colonies in case of a conflict between England and France, and the commercial treaty between England and France of 1713. Most of the stipulations of the model treaty concerned with the regulation of trade, navigation, and fishing—which is to say, the greater part of the model treaty—are taken from these treaties.[74] In other words, the agreements which regulated the commercial relations between England and France were used as patterns and the United States took the place of England. It seems likely, however, that the commercial treaty between England and France of 1713 was chosen not only because it was an obvious model, but also because its commercial regulations were of a most liberal nature; its progressive character probably was a chief attraction to the Americans, whose entire draft is dominated by this spirit. The liberal principles of the American draft emerge particularly from the articles dealing with trade in wartime.[75] The model treaty contained a precisely circumscribed list of contraband goods which was extremely limited, even foodstuffs and naval stores being excluded from it. It provided that neutrals

[74] The "Plan of Treaties" will be found in *Journals*, V, 768-79; the "instructions," *ibid.*, 813-17. Of the thirty articles of the "Plan of Treaties," eighteen are concerned with the rules of trade, navigation, etc. The remaining twelve articles (Nos. 1-5, 7-9, 11-14) are of a somewhat different character; some of them (Articles 1 and 2) deal with the most basic principles of commerce (see below, p. 26), one (Article 14) with the French *droit d'aubaine*, others (Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7) with special problems arising out of the independence of the United States: fishery in Newfoundland, conveying of American ships, protection against Barbary States; others with consequences of France's participation in the war (Articles 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, see below, p. 26). Because these twelve articles refer to specific issues arising out of the relations of France to the United States, only the remaining eighteen articles can have had direct models in previous treaties. Of these eighteen articles, twelve are derived from the Treaty of 1713 (Article 15 of the "Plan of Treaties" corresponds to Article 25 of the Treaty of 1713, 16 to 26, 17 to 27, 18 to 28, 19 to 35, 20 to 36, 25 to 15, 26 to 17, 27 to 18-20, 28 to 21, 29 to 22-23, 30 to 24-25); four are derived from the Treaty of 1686 (Article 10 of the "Plan of Treaties" corresponds to Article 5 of the Treaty of 1686, 21 to 7, 22 to 6, 24 to 15); the remaining two (Articles 6 and 23) seem to have been taken from other treaties (I found a pattern of Article 6 in the Treaty between England and the Netherlands of 21 July 1667); in general, see the statement of Bemis (*op. cit.*, p. 46) that "the general principles of the model 'Plan of 1776' were picked by the committee out of eighteenth-century practice, as reflected in the treaty of Utrecht and generally in the treaties of the small-navy powers . . ."; but the treaties of the small-navy powers can have played only a very subordinate role, if any role at all. Aside from the tendency towards commercial toleration, the motif of placing the American merchants into the position which English merchants had seems to have determined the choice of the models.

[75] Articles 26 and 27, corresponding to Articles 17-20 of the Treaty of Utrecht.

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should have the right to trade with belligerents and asked for the acceptance of the principle that free ships make free goods. Moreover, France was to be offered either reciprocity or the most-favored-nation treatment[76]—certainly because the colonists wanted to point out the great advantages that would accrue to France from a support of the colonies, but also in all probability because these concepts corresponded to the colonists' aim of a general liberalization of trade.

It was not possible, however, to limit the model treaty exclusively to questions of trade and navigation; a number of political questions had to be taken up.[77] Thus French protection was to replace the former English protection of American ships against the attacks of the Barbary States. Moreover, a number of articles were concerned with the problems which had arisen from the war against the British and had forced the colonists into "their application to foreign powers." It was stipulated that American ships should be protected and convoyed by their allies and that France should give up any claim to territories of the North American continent, while the Americans would not oppose a French conquest of the West Indies.

But would the fact that both countries—France and the United States—were moving in a sharply anti-English direction not make it desirable that they agree on common action for war and peace and that their co-operation would be given a definite form which we would now call a political alliance? There can be no doubt that the purpose of the approach to France was involvement of France in the war against England; hence some statement about the reciprocal obligations of the two powers fighting against the same enemy was necessary. However, the manner in which the colonists dealt with this question in Article 8 was both surprising and striking, as it revealed their disinclination to be forced into any political bond with an outside power even under the pressure of war. Article 8 states that in case the alliance with the United States should involve France in war with England, the United

[76] Articles 1 and 2, and the instructions concerning these articles (see below, p. 27).

[77] Articles 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13; see above, note 74.

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States would not assist England in such a war. The promise which was offered in this article—namely, that America would not use the opportunity of an Anglo-French war for coming to an understanding with England—was little more than a matter of course; its striking aspect is how little was offered; clearly the colonists planned to avoid political and military co-operation with France even if France should enter the war against England.

A number of the members of Congress seem to have felt that such love of principle defeated its own purpose and that a somewhat more realistic approach was necessary to obtain French participation in the war. The clash of minds to which this article led is reflected in the instructions accompanying the model treaty. The article evoked a large number of comments.[78] It was admitted at the outset that this "article will probably be attended with some Difficulty." The group which felt most urgently the necessity of French participation in the war suggested a more direct inducement.[79]

> If the Court of France cannot be prevailed on to engage in the War with Great Britain for any consideration already proposed in this Treaty, you are hereby authorized to agree as a further inducement, that these United States will wage the war in union with France—not make peace with Great Britain until the latter France shall gain the possession of those Islands in the West Indies formerly called Nieutral, and which by the Treaty of Paris were ceded to G. Britain: provided France shall make the conquest of these Islands an early object of the War and prosecute the same with sufficient force.

The proponents of this statement were defeated, as is shown by the fact that this suggestion was omitted from the final form of the instructions, but the commissioners were entitled to make one additional offer, namely, that the United States was willing to guarantee that she would never return to the allegiance of Great Britain and that she would grant to no other power privileges in trade which she had not granted to the French king; furthermore, in case France should become involved in the present war, neither France nor the United States would conclude peace without notifying the other power six months ahead.[80]

From these various suggestions on the form which the relations

[78] *Journals*, V, 814-15. [79] *Ibid.*, p. 817. [80] *Ibid.*, p. 815.

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between the United States and France should take, it emerges that—in contrast to those who believed that the war against England made it necessary for the United States to have recourse to all the customary methods of power politics—the majority of the Congress was not willing to pay the price of concluding a political alliance despite the urgent need of maneuvering France into the war. Instead, they clung to the principle that future relations of the United States with outside powers should be limited to commercial questions. This attitude of the majority of Congress has generally been explained as an early manifestation of American isolationism. Though the existence of such inclinations towards isolationism doubtless played a part in this decision, an interpretation which considers the result of these negotiations to have been the exclusive result of an isolationist outlook considers this early period too much from the point of view of later developments. As our analysis of the ideas of the *philosophes* on diplomacy has shown, the colonists in attempting to eliminate power politics and to place the relations among nations on a purely commercial basis acted entirely in accordance with radical eighteenth-century thought. In modern terms, it was no less an internationalist than an isolationist attitude which prompted their action.[81]

The strong influence which the eighteenth-century ideas of a reform of diplomacy had on the beginnings of American foreign policy is also reflected in other parts of the model treaty and sections of the instructions, particularly in the suggestions regard-

[81] In emphasizing this point, this article deviates from the prevailing view about the approach of the colonists to foreign affairs. This does not mean that the article is not obligated to studies examining the origin of American isolationism; for instance, the material assembled in a study such as J. Fred Rippy and Angie Debo, *The Historical Background of the American Policy of Isolation* (Smith College Studies in History, Vol. IX, Nos. 3 and 4), Northampton, Mass., 1924, has been invaluable. Nor is it the author's intention to deny the existence of an isolationist outlook in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, as can be seen from his article "The English Background of American Isolationism in the Eighteenth Century," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d series, I (1944), 138-60. But I maintain that the isolationist features of early American foreign policy have been overemphasized, and that, in the years of the beginnings of American independence, isolationist and internationalist elements are by no means clearly separated, but are mixed, and the course which American foreign policy would take was by no means fixed. These two contradictory trends could go hand in hand, because both placed decisive importance on commerce.

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ing the basic principles of the future commercial relations between France and the United States. As already noted, the very liberal treaties between England and France of 1686 and 1713 had been the models for the paragraphs on trade and navigation in the draft treaty. But the first two articles of the draft treaty went beyond its models; there it was suggested that the French should treat the inhabitants of the United States with regard to duties and imports like natives of France and vice versa; moreover, they "shall enjoy all the other Rights, Liberties, Priviledges, Immunities and Exemptions in Trade, Navigation and Commerce, in passing from one port (Part) thereof to another, and in going to and from the same, from and to any Part of the World, which the said natives or Companies enjoy."[82] The "instructions" added that, only if "His Most Christian Majesty shall not consent to these articles," the commissioners should try to get the French agreement to the most-favored-nation clause.[83] The fundamental concepts behind these treaty proposals are evident and, as far as the practical policy of the period is concerned, striking[84]: in drafting the model treaty the colonists were thinking not only of France but also of other powers. They were in effect creating a general pattern for future commercial treaties. Whereas usually commercial conventions were causes of friction and instruments of power politics reinforcing political alliances and blocks by commercial preferences, the Americans wanted to establish a commercial system of freedom and equality which would eliminate all cause for tension and political conflicts.

[82] *Journals*, V, 769. [83] *Ibid.*, p. 813.

[84] In modern terms, the original suggestion of the model treaty would be named a Reciprocity Clause. See Gottfried von Haberler, *The Theory of International Trade*, London, 1936, pp. 361 ff. While the most-favored-nation clause had come into use in the seventeenth century, the reciprocity clause was not usual (among European states, I found it in the *Pacte de Famille* between France and Spain of 1761, where its aim seems to have been to create a solid bloc against the outside world). Because, in modern times, reciprocity is attached to persons and not to goods, reciprocity and most-favored-nation clauses are not mutually exclusive, but can exist side by side in the same treaty. This was not the view of the Americans. The fact that the Americans considered a reciprocity clause and most-favored-nation clause as alternative, and that they considered reciprocity more difficult to obtain than most-favored-nation treatment, is proof that they regarded the articles, in which they suggested reciprocity, as of extreme significance; they must have expected thereby to secure complete equality for the merchants of different nations, a real emancipation of trade from all shackles of customs, tariffs, etc.

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Ten years later, after John Adams had gained diplomatic experience in Paris, The Hague, and London and had acquired the arrogance of a nearsighted realism which is the professional vice of the diplomats of all times, he abandoned all "hope for a 'reformation,' a kind of protestantism in the commercial system of the world."[85] He writes that "the philosophical visions of perpetual peace, and the religious reveries of a near approach of the millennium, in which all nations are to turn the weapons of war into implements of husbandry will, in a few years, be dissipated."[86] His countrymen should abandon "delusive dreams of peace."[87] "We have hitherto been the bubbles of our own philosophical and equitable liberty—I hope we shall be the dupes no longer than we must."[88]

As contemptuous as these sentences are toward those who believe in the perfectibility of the world, they are valuable testimony to the influence which the ideas of a reform of the diplomatic system had at the time of the beginnings of an independent American policy.[89] It must be added that if Adams soon sloughed off the garb of an idealist, this development was not shared by many of those who had co-operated with him on the model treaty in 1776. The ideas out of which the model treaty had sprung did not vanish when the negotiations with France resulted in an alliance different in character from the one originally envisaged by the colonists and more in keeping with traditional diplomatic institutions. As soon as independence had been achieved and the need for foreign assistance in the struggle against Britain had disappeared, the French alliance lost its at-

[85] John Adams to Secretary Jay, 10 August 1785, *Works*, VIII, 298.

[86] John Adams to Secretary Jay, 23 September 1787, *ibid.*, p. 454.

[87] John Adams to Franklin, 17 August 1780, *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*, IV, 35.

[88] In the letter quoted in note 85, p. 299.

[89] It is superfluous to give any detailed proof for the acquaintance of the leading American statesmen with the thoughts of the *philosophes*; for it is obvious. It may be mentioned, however, that, in 1782, John Adams had a meeting with Mably, in which they discussed "open diplomacy." See J. Adams, *Works*, III, 350. The study of Michael Kraus, *The Atlantic Civilization: Eighteenth-Century Origins* (Ithaca, 1949), is chiefly concerned with a problem diametrically opposite to the one discussed in this article, namely, with "the impact of the New World upon the Old," but the work bears upon our subject in pointing out the intimate intellectual connection between the two worlds.

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traction[90] and complete neutrality and independence from all powers became the aim. The view that "the true interest of the States requires that they should be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations"[91] re-emerged as the fundamental principle of American foreign policy; as a definite corroboration of America's wish to keep away from the European political scene, one might consider the suggestion that America should not aim at the establishment of diplomatic missions at the various European courts but should content herself with consular representation.[92]

It was not only the negative aspect of the eighteenth-century approach to foreign affairs which remained a factor in American foreign policy. The Americans also clung to the positive aspects of the *philosophes'* thought by continuing their attempts to remove the causes of political conflicts by "bringing together all nations for a free communication of happiness."[93] They renewed their attempts to transform the customary power politics into a new and peaceful world by a "total emancipation of commerce." This is the meaning of their suggestions concerning the form of future commercial treaties as well as their attempts to humanize war and limit its impact on commerce.[94] The efforts to place foreign affairs on a new base where power politics would become unnecessary were not simply produced by the state of mind of a

[90] An early reflection of this appears in John Adams' letter to Jay, 13 April 1785, on the "supposition that we are independent of France, in point of moral and political obligation" (*Works*, VII, 235).

[91] This is the famous statement of principle regarding the American attitude to Armed Neutrality, 12 June 1783, *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*, VI, 482.

[92] See Jefferson's letter to William Short, 23 January 1804, *American Historical Review*, XXXIII (1927/8), 832-35: "I have ever considered diplomacy as the pest of the world, as the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are manufactured. On coming into the administration I dismissed one half of our missions and was nearly ripe to do so by the other half. The public opinion called for it, and would now be gratified by it: and as we wish not to mix in the politics of Europe, but in her commerce only, Consuls would do all the business we ought to have there, quite as well as ministers." And, for Jefferson's practice, see his Memorandum made to a Committee of the Senate on the subject of diplomatic nominations, 4 January 1792, *Writings*, ed. by P. L. Ford, New York, 1892, I, 170-73.

[93] This and the following quotation are from a statement of the Commissioners entrusted with negotiations of a Commerce Treaty with Prussia, 14 March 1785, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States from 1783 to 1789*, Washington, 1832, I, 555.

[94] Outlined in the "Plan of 1784" and carried into practice in the Commercial Treaty with Prussia; see S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, New York, 1936, pp. 66 ff.

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nation which, new and unexperienced in foreign policy, was making its first steps in this field. Rather they were the expression and reflection of currents of thought prevailing in all reformist political programs of the eighteenth century, and they remained guiding principles of American foreign policy even after it had become clear that their realization was a complicated process requiring more than that one nation should enter upon this new road.

The persistence with which the Americans continued their attempts at introduction of new principles and methods in foreign affairs shows that the failure of their first efforts along these lines in 1776 was not considered a refutation of the whole system of thought which eighteenth-century radicalism had evolved on diplomacy and foreign affairs. Since belief in the validity of these ideas was not shaken, it was only natural that the attempt to put them into practice should be renewed when another nation broke away from the traditions of the *ancien régime*. When in May 1790 the French National Assembly for the first time discussed problems of foreign policy, radicals like Robespierre, Rewbell, and Volney were the chief advocates of a new departure in foreign affairs in accordance with the ideas of the *philosophes*. Their speeches and proposals sound like a brief summation of the ideas of the reformers on diplomacy. They explained that the main purpose of the traditional methods of handling foreign affairs was war and that for this reason secrecy played such a role in diplomacy. "Secrecy only furthers injustice; it only produces mistakes. All our evils must be attributed to such shady procedures, to the clandestine operations of the ministers."[95] Thus, they recommended keeping away from all alliances and involvements in the European system of power politics. "Alliance treaties lead only to the right of levying new taxes and of ruining the

[95] Speech of Pétion de Villeneuve, 17 May 1790, *Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, première série*, ed. by L. Mavidal et Laurent, Paris, 1883, XV, 541: "C'est à cette marche ténébreuse de l'administration, à ces opérations clandestines du ministère que nous devons attribuer ces déprédations, ces iniquités et cette foule de maux enfin qui désolent le royaume"; and (p. 540): "Le secret, dit-on, est l'âme de la politique. . . . Et moi, je soutiens que ce mystère dont on fait tant de cas, auquel on attache de si précieux avantages, ne sait, au fond, qu'à cacher les passions, les fautes et les erreurs de ceux qui gouvernent."

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treasury. . . . A great nation should have no other allies but providence, its power and justice."[96] Although the radicals who expressed these ideas represented only a small minority in the assembly, their arguments directed the whole debate toward the question whether France should have political connections or whether "France should isolate herself from the political system of Europe."[97] Even if the majority did not believe that the time had come for a complete break with traditional power politics, they did not want to deny the importance of these ideas for the future. Mirabeau probably summed up the *communis opinio* when he said that "undoubtedly the time will come when we shall have only friends and no allies, when there will be universal freedom of trade and when Europe will form one great family." But at present, when the other powers still clung to the old power policy, it would be inadvisable "to trust to chance the influence which other powers exert on us and which we can exert on other powers."[98]

But the radicals who had formed a small minority in 1790 were in power two years later and now they made the attempt to put their ideas into practice. Dumouriez, the new foreign minister, had outlined his views in a memorandum to the Jacobins: "A great nation, a free and just nation is the natural ally of all nations and does not need to conclude particular alliances which tie her to the fate, the interests and passions of this or that nation."[99] As foreign minister, he enunciated the same principles

[96] Speech of Rewbell, 18 May 1790, *ibid.*, p. 564: "Les traités d'alliance ne sont autre chose que le droit de lever des impôts et de ruiner le Trésor de l'Etat. . . . une grande nation ne doit avoir d'alliés que la providence, sa force et la justice."

[97] Speech of Cazalès, 21 May 1790, *ibid.*, p. 640: "Je ne réponds pas sérieusement à ceux qui ont dit que la France doit s'isoler du système politique de l'Europe. . . ."

[98] Speech of Mirabeau, 20 May 1790, *ibid.*, p. 621: "Je me suis demandé d'abord à moi-même si nous devions renoncer à faire des traités, et cette question se réduit à savoir si, dans l'état actuel de notre commerce, et de celui de l'Europe, nous devons abandonner au hasard l'influence des autres puissances sur nous, et notre réaction sur l'Europe. . . . Le temps viendra sans doute où nous n'aurons que des amis et point d'alliés, où la liberté du commerce sera universelle, où l'Europe ne sera qu'une seule famille."

[99] "Un grand peuple, un peuple libre et juste est allié naturel de tous les peuples, et ne doit point avoir d'alliances particulières qui le lient au sort, aux intérêts, aux passions de tel ou tel peuple" (quoted after Frédéric Masson, *Le Département des Affaires Étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804*, Paris, 1877, p. 151); the memorandum was written in 1791, Dumouriez became Foreign Minister in March 1792.

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to the American minister, to whom he explained that "his system of politics was extremely simple, that a Power so great as France stood in no Need of Alliances and therefore he was against all Treaties other than those of Commerce."[100] Dumouriez tried to emphasize his break with secret diplomacy and his intention of carrying out a program of open diplomacy by communicating to the Committee of Foreign Affairs the entire diplomatic correspondence and by informing even the ministers of the foreign powers of the contents of the instructions which he sent out.[101]

Yet the pursuit of these principles clashed with the exigencies of the political situation in which France found herself when the radicals had come to power. France was at war. A strengthening of the French position by rallying around France as many allies as possible seemed necessary for reasons of practical policy. Talleyrand found an ingenious way to reconcile the principle of refraining from all alliances with the necessity of getting the support of other nations.[102] A distinction was drawn between the bonds which could be established among free nations and those by which France could tie herself to a government of the *ancien régime*. With free nations, Talleyrand explained, France could conclude "solemn treaties of friendship in which the interests of a common defense are established and determined in an unchangeable manner, and through which new resources of trade and industry will be open to the needs and enterprises of the entire human race."[103] The contractual relation which could be established with those countries which had not yet freed them-

[100] Gouverneur Morris, *A Diary of the French Revolution*, ed. by Beatrix Cary Davenport, Boston, 1939, II, 439.

[101] See Jean Belin, *La Logique d'une idée-force, L'Idée sociale et la Révolution Française (1789-1792)*, Paris, 1939, pp. 186-87: "Dumouriez écrit, par exemple, à un agent français à Berlin: 'Comme le système politique que j'ai adopté en entrant dans le ministère est franc, loyal et constitutionnel, M. Bays communiquera cette instruction toute entière à M. Hertzberg, comme un hommage!'"

[102] Talleyrand, "Mémoire sur les rapports actuels de la France avec les autres Etats de l'Europe," 25 November 1792, published in G. Pallain, *Le Ministère de Talleyrand sous le Directoire (Correspondence Diplomatique de Talleyrand)*, Paris, 1891, pp. xlii-lvi.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. xlix: "La France formera entre elle et tous ces peuples des traités solennels de fraternité où les intérêts de la défense commune soient établis et déterminés d'une manière immuable, et où de nouvelles sources de commerce et d'industrie soient ouvertes avec libéralité aux besoins et à l'activité de l'espèce humaine."

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selves from the chains of the *ancien régime* had to take a very different form. The bond between them and France ought not to be "a permanent treaty of alliance and friendship, but a temporary convention concerning political and commercial interests as they arise from circumstances."[104] By this formula the way was opened for a return to traditional power politics without directly betraying the principles which inspired the revolution.

Under the Directorate France returned to the usual methods of diplomacy.[105] Yet before this happened there was a brief return to a foreign policy of pure idealistic principles: in 1792 when Talleyrand had first made his ingenious justification for gaining allies among the states of the *ancien régime*, it had not been followed by immediate success; the objective situation had not been changed: France had remained isolated, involved in war with Holland, England, and Spain. Under these circumstances, for a short time at least, the French found it possible and even useful again to appear as protagonists of a new world order and to hoist the banner of a revolutionary foreign policy. These principles were explained in a series of articles which appeared in the *Moniteur* and were written by Ducher, an official of the French foreign office.[106] After the war, he wrote, France would

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 1: "Elle doit se lier à eux, non par des traités permanents d'alliance et de fraternité, mais par des conventions passagères sur les intérêts politiques et commerciaux qui naîtront des circonstances."

[105] See Raymond Guyot, *Le Directoire et la Paix de l'Europe*, Paris, 1911; in particular, chapter 6, "Le Grand Dessein du Directoire," pp. 187-95, and the last section on the contrast between "la politique des frontières naturelles" and "la politique impériale, au sens romain du mot" (p. 902).

[106] On Ducher's relationship to the French Foreign Ministry, see Masson, *op.cit.*, pp. 240 ff.; but for a real exhaustive analysis of his political views and influence, see F. L. Nussbaum, *Commercial Policy in the French Revolution*, Washington, D.C., 1923, which has the subtitle "A Study of the Career of G. J. A. Ducher," and contains (pp. 322-28) a list of Ducher's articles in the *Moniteur*. Nussbaum's study shows the importance of Ducher for the development of a protectionist policy in the French Revolution, and this may seem to place him in contrast to those trends in diplomacy which this article has discussed. But he is connected with these trends because of his emphasis on the necessity of a commercial diplomacy in contrast to traditional power politics, and, perhaps for propagandistic reasons, he presents, in later years, the protectionist policy as a temporary weapon, through which England's "commercial monarchy" over the globe could be broken, and through which France could achieve "freedom of the seas, for herself, and for all other peoples, neutral and enemy" (pp. 295-98). This aspect of Ducher's views is particularly significant in our context and is exclusively emphasized here.

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be able to stand by herself. "She will need no guarantees, her natural strength will place her above the need for any ally whatsoever." She would take no part "in the intrigues of all the European cabinets"; "by preserving an absolute neutrality in the wars among the monarchs, she will exist in a different hemisphere," "free, peaceful, the friend of all peoples, not being tied by any of those treacherous treaties that are contradictory in themselves and which, through their formulations of clauses about defensive and aggressive assistance and about commerce, arbitrarily open the door to those who seek pretexts for conflicts and wars."[107] Yet Ducher's program also had a positive aspect, as it was expected to usher in a new and better world order. There would be no "other diplomacy than the diplomacy of commerce which forms the natural bond among people, the most solid foundation of their prosperity and the most powerful means of maintaining or recovering their political freedom."[108] These commercial agreements must be of a general nature, should abolish all preferences, and give to each nation equality and independence.[109] In introducing these new principles into the conduct of

[107] Article, "Attribution de la régie des Douanes extérieures au ministre des affaires étrangères," *Moniteur*, 7 May 1793: "Il n'est pas de la dignité ni des intérêts du peuple Français de conclure avec aucune puissance étrangère aucun traité particulier d'alliance ni de commerce. . . . La République Française existe par elle-même; elle n'a besoin d'aucune garantie, sa force naturelle la met au-dessus du secour d'un allié, quel qu'il soit. . . . Hors des atteintes des intrigues de tous les cabinets de l'Europe, elle ne sera jamais en guerre que pour elle-même; gardant une neutralité absolue dans toute guerre entre les rois, elle sera dans un autre hémisphère; libre, paisible, amie de tous les peuples, sans être liée par aucun de ces traités insidieux dont l'ensemble est contradictoire, dont les clauses de secours offensif et défensif, et les conditions commerciales sont, à volonté, des prétextes de rupture et de guerre, où les rois regrettent peu le sang du peuple, s'il doit augmenter leur autorité."

[108] Article, "Diplomatie Commerciale," *Moniteur*, 5 December 1793: "La République Française se déshonorerait en naissant, si elle n'abjurait pas toute politique autre que celle du courage, toute autre diplomatie que celle du commerce, le lien naturel des peuples, la base la plus solide de leur prospérité, le plus puissant moyen pour maintenir ou recouvrer leur liberté politique."

[109] Article, "De la Paix et des Traités de commerce," *Moniteur*, 20 September 1795: "Il y aurait pusillanimité et déraison à rentrer dans nos anciennes limites commerciales. Les traités actuels de commerce sont le territoire de l'Angleterre; un traité général fondé sur l'égalité et l'indépendance des Nations sera une vraie conquête pour chacune d'elles sur l'insulaire ennemi de la paix et des manufactures des continentaux. . . . Vous qui avez conspiré contre la liberté du peuple français, voulez-vous sincèrement la paix du continent de l'Europe: unissez-vous à lui par un traité de commerce qui rende à chaque Nation égalité et indépendance. Qu'il n'y ait plus de distinction de nation; s'il y en a une plus favorisée, il y a jalousie, haine, cause de guerre. . . ."

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foreign affairs, France would become, as Ducher writes, the protagonist of a "new diplomacy."[110]

V

The eighteenth-century attempts to carry the program of a "new diplomacy" into practice are related to the isolated position in which the United States and France found themselves in the society of states. The United States were in revolt against the subordinate place which the non-European world held in the international system; France had broken away from the economic and social order in which the bourgeoisie was dominated by a small ruling group. In both cases, the adoption of a "new diplomacy," partly at least, served the function of gaining the support of elements dissatisfied with the existing order and of overcoming the isolation in which the outsiders found themselves.

At the beginning of our analysis, we referred to the revival which the idea of a "new diplomacy" had in twentieth-century politics. It occurred in two forms; for it should not be overlooked that Wilson's Fourteen Points were only the answer to the "new diplomacy" which the new communist leaders of Russia were proclaiming. The parallel between the "new diplomacy" of the French Revolution and the "new diplomacy" of the Soviet leaders is obvious. In both cases the proclamation of the necessity of a new departure in foreign policy was a concomitant of the complete break with the social and economic order existing in the outside world.

But what were the reasons for Wilson's "new diplomacy"? Intellectually, a straight line leads from the enlightenment to Wilson's concept. His ideas about a "new diplomacy" were definitely dependent on and influenced by the ideas which the eighteenth century had developed on this subject.[111] It can be ques-

[110] His article in *Moniteur*, 9 June, 1793, is called "Nouvelle Diplomatie"; "new diplomacy" means a "Diplomatie Régenerée" (title of article in *Moniteur*, 24 October 1794) and is identical with a "Diplomatie Commerciale" (title of article in *Moniteur*, 5 December 1793); it is the opposite of the "vieille diplomatie" (title of article in *Moniteur*, 3 October 1793: "Déroute de la vieille diplomatie").

[111] Though Wilson's interest was strengthened by British attempts to secure fuller parliamentary and popular control of foreign affairs, see Hajo Holborn, *The Political Collapse of Europe*, New York, 1951, p. 105.

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tioned whether the statesman of any other country could have taken his ideas so directly and clearly from a previous century; this is a striking manifestation of the strong hold which, in general, eighteenth-century ideas have over the American mind. But it must be kept in mind that, since the United States, even after formal acceptance as a member of the state system, still remained outsiders because of their geographical position, the ideas with which their foreign policy had started had never been fully tested and readjusted in the process of political give-and-take. Did these ideas re-emerge in their pristine form because of their enduring strength or because of their having led a sheltered existence throughout the nineteenth century? The history of the concept of a "new diplomacy" points to an inherent problem in the American approach to foreign affairs: namely, that of being ahead or behind, but not in real contact with, the outside world.

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THE POLE OF POWER AND THE POLE OF INDIFFERENCE

By ARNOLD WOLFERS

IN international relations, two opposing schools of thought have fought each other throughout the modern age. Ever since Machiavelli published the *Prince*, his "realistic" views have shocked "idealist" thinkers. As a battle of the mind, fought by and large outside the political arena, the dispute between the two schools was of great concern to philosophers and moralists; but not until Woodrow Wilson set out to bring Utopia down to earth did it become a political issue of the first magnitude. For the first time, the responsible head of one of the leading powers acted as though the world were on the verge of crossing the threshold from sordid "power politics" to a "new era" in which the admonitions of the idealist philosophers would suddenly become the political order of the day.

No amount of disillusionment has been able to wipe out the deep marks left by the outburst of idealist enthusiasm which Woodrow Wilson's leadership evoked. Today more than ever American statesmen and the American public find themselves torn between the conflicting pulls of idealist and realist thought. Often the same event—as the war in Korea has vividly demonstrated—is interpreted simultaneously in terms of both schools, as an incident in the age-old struggle for power on the one hand, as a great venture in community action against an aggressor on the other.

This puts the theoretical analyst in something of a predicament. When interest in a theory of international politics became alive in the United States in the mid-thirties, it did so as part and parcel of a reaction which set in at the time against the prevailing optimistic Wilsonian school.[1] Machiavelli rather than Wilson became the patron saint of the new venture. But, today, the "realist"

[1] See William T. R. Fox, "Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience," *World Politics*, II, No. 1 (October 1949), pp. 67-79.

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engaged in theoretical pursuits finds himself swimming against the stream, and a powerful stream it is when leaders of both political parties insist that American foreign policy centers on the United Nations and collective security. There is little in realist thought—beyond the tools to debunk many popular idealist notions—to suggest that organizations and ideologies transcending national boundaries deserve more than marginal attention. He has all the more reason, then, to reassess his own position in relation to the two schools and to seek to discover whether there may not be some unexplored terrain that lies beyond their controversy.[2]

The realist image of the world has been presented in its essential features by a number of authors concerned with the theory of international politics. In its pure form it is based on the proposition that "states seek to enhance their power." In this brief statement are implicit the major assumptions of realist thought.

States are conceived as the sole actors in the international arena. Operating as a group of sovereign entities, they constitute a multistate system. The analogy of a set of billiard balls or chess figures comes to mind. All the units of the system behave essentially in the same manner; their goal is to enhance if not to maximize their power. This means that each of them must be acting with a single mind and single will; in this respect they resemble the Princes of the Renaissance about whom Machiavelli wrote. Like them, too, they are completely separate from each other, with no affinities or bonds of community interfering with their egotistical pursuit of power. They are competitors for power, engaged in a continuous and inescapable struggle for survival. This makes them all potential if not actual enemies; there can be no amity between them, unless it be an alignment against a common foe.

Under these conditions the expectation of violence and even

[2] Not all authors can be classified as belonging clearly to one of the two schools, because the views which will be presented in sharp contrast are often found to shade over into each other. However, it is not difficult to discover in what direction a writer's main inclination lies. E. H. Carr (*The Twenty Years' Crisis*, London, 1941) makes a deliberate attempt to synthesize the tenets of both schools, which he calls Utopian and Realist. (See particularly p. 125.) I think it can be said, however, that he lets the realist come out on top.

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of annihilation is ever present. To forget it and thus to fail in the concern for enhanced power spells the doom of a state. This does not mean constant open warfare; expansion of power at the expense of others will not take place if there is enough counter-power to deter or to stop states from undertaking it. Though no state is interested in a mere balance of power, the efforts of all states to maximize power may lead to equilibrium. If and when that happens, there is "peace" or, more exactly, a condition of stalemate or truce. Under the conditions described here, this balancing of power process is the only available "peace" strategy.

While few would deny that the picture presented in these sweeping generalizations resembles the world we are living in at this time, it would not have passed for more than a caricature at other times. International relations within the Western world in the twenties or within the inter-American system today cannot be fully understood in terms either of balanced power or an all-out struggle for survival. This does not preclude the possibility that the "pure power model" of the realists can render service at least as an initial working hypothesis. The actual world might never fully comply with the postulates of the model, yet to the extent to which it did, consequences deduced within its context would apply to the real world. Countries engaged in a race to enhance their power could, for example, be expected to align themselves in disrespect of earlier "friendships" or ideological affinities; expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.

Of course, no such approximation of reality to "pure power conditions" can be taken for granted. It presupposes that the basic "realist" contention about state behavior is truly realistic. If an insatiable quest for power were not the rule, but represented instead an abnormality or marginal case, developments in the world might deviate drastically from those which the model leads one to expect. Peace strategies other than the balancing process might have a chance of success.

Realist scholars have sought to explain why it is that states do in fact behave as postulated or why they are compelled to do so. They have offered two different explanations. According to the

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first, human nature is such that men, as individuals and as nations, act like beasts of prey, driven by an insatiable lust for power or *animus dominandi*. Their will to power, moreover, when transferred from small and frustrated individuals to the collectivity of the state, takes on greater dimensions and generates an all-round struggle for survival.[3]

According to the second explanation, which is gaining adherents, the quest for power is due not to any desire for power as such, but to a general human craving for security.[4] The insecurity of an anarchical system of multiple sovereignty places the actors under compulsion to seek maximum power even though it run counter to their real desires. By a tragic irony, then, all actors find themselves compelled to do for the sake of security what, in bringing about an all-round struggle for survival, leads to greater insecurity. This "vicious circle theory" makes statesmen and people look less vicious than the *animus dominandi* theory; what it does is to substitute tragedy for evil and to replace the "mad Caesar," as Lasswell calls the *homo politicus* of the pure power model, by the "hysterical Caesar" who, haunted by fear, pursues the will-o'-the-wisp of absolute security.

The validity of these explanations of an alleged uniform behavior of states toward power need not be discussed here, because the realist scholars who started out with the assumption of such uniformity have not stuck to it after descending from the high level of abstraction of their initial propositions to the lower levels where the shape of actual things can be apprehended. All of them have found it necessary to "deviate" from their original assumption to the point of distinguishing between at least two categories of states with different attitudes toward power.

Few have stated more emphatically than Morgenthau that in international relations "power is pitted against power for

[3] See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, Chicago, 1946, especially in the chapter on "selfishness and lust for power," pp. 191-201.

[4] John H. Herz (*Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Chicago, 1951), who expounds the theory of what he calls the "security dilemma" with much skill and vigor, says that "Basically it is the mere instinct of self-preservation which . . . leads to competition for ever more power" (p. 4). This is the view held by Thomas Hobbes, which C. J. Friedrich discusses in *Inevitable Peace*, Cambridge, 1948, p. 126.

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survival and supremacy."[5] But more recently he has drawn a sharp distinction between two types of states, the "status quo powers" and the "imperialist powers." Of the former, he says that their policy tends "toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power"; of the latter, that they aim "at acquiring more power."[6] Similarly, Frederick Schumann starts out with the assertion that in international politics "power is sought as an end in itself," but then goes on to differentiate between "satiated" and "unsatiated" states. His statements that "each state left to itself tends to extend its power over as wide a field as possible" and that "enhancement of state power is always the goal" are contradicted, it would seem, by his subsequent contention that states which benefit from the established status quo naturally seek "to preserve that from which they benefit," in contrast to those "which feel humiliated, hampered and oppressed by the status quo."[7] The authors of another recent text, Strausz-Hupé and Possony, follow a similar line. After stating at the outset that "foreign policy aims at the acquisition of optimum —and sometimes of maximum—power," the optimum remaining undefined, they go on to define, as a special type, the "natural aggressors" who in contrast to other states are "driven by a particularly pronounced dynamism, i.e., urge toward power accumulation."[8] Finally, Spykman, who did much to introduce the pure power hypothesis into the contemporary American discussion, deviates from his opening statement, according to which "the improvement of the relative power position becomes the primary objective of the . . . external policy of states," by speaking of the "dynamic state" which, as he puts it, "rarely sets

[5] Morgenthau, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

[6] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York, 1948, p. 21. Actually, he adds a third type, described as a nation pursuing a policy of prestige. Prestige, however, in contrast to maintenance and acquisition of power, "is but rarely an end in itself," he says (p. 50); "it is rather an instrument through which the other two ends can be achieved."

[7] Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 3d ed., New York, 1941, pp. 262-63, 274-75, 279.

[8] Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations*, New York, 1950, pp. 2, 9.

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modest limits to its power aims."[9] This implies that nondynamic states, on the contrary, do set such "modest limits."[10]

One consequence of distinctions such as these is worth mentioning. They rob theory of the determinate and predictive character that seemed to give the pure power hypothesis its peculiar value. It can now no longer be said of the actual world, e.g., that a power vacuum cannot exist for any length of time; a vacuum surrounded by "satiated" or "status quo" states would remain as it is unless its existence were to change the character of these states and put them in the category of "imperialist," "unsatiated," or "dynamic" states.

The idealist model, if such there be, cannot be as easily derived from writings or statements of exponents of the idealist school itself. This school has been anything but theory-minded. Its attention has been focused on peace strategy and on blueprints for a better world. However, it would have made no sense for idealists to proffer advice on policy if they had held no general views about the existing world which permitted them to regard as practical the policies they sought to promote. As a matter of fact, Woodrow Wilson himself, with his predilection for broad generalizations, has expressed on one occasion or another all the main tenets of the "Wilsonian" school.

One feature of the idealist image strikes the eye because of its contrast to the realist view. Here the basic propositions deal not with states, but with individuals, with peoples or with mankind. The idealist seems to be looking out not on a multistate system with its separate national entities, but on a nascent world community and the people who make it up. This precludes from the start that the emphasis be placed on national quests for power or

[9] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, 1942, pp. 18, 20.

[10] Max Weber emphasizes the difference between more "isolationist" and more "expansive" powers, as well as their changing attitudes in his respect. (See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and G. Wright Mills, New York, 1946, chapter VI on "Structures of Power," p. 159b.) "For general reasons of power dynamics *per se*," he writes, "the Great Powers are often very expansive powers." "But," he continues, they "are not necessarily and not always oriented toward expansion." See also William T. R. Fox (*The Super-Powers*, New York, 1944) who distinguishes between the "quest for security (power not to be coerced)" of some nations and the "quest for domination (power to coerce)" of others.

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on the struggle for power among nations. Instead, the accent is either on the "common purpose of enlightened mankind"[11] or on the common values which men hold as individuals. Because the vast majority of men are assumed to value the same things—such as individual freedom, the right to govern themselves, the safety of their homeland, and above all the absence of violence—it is concluded that there can exist no basic conflict between them even as nations. If it were not for extraneous interference—and a remediable measure of ignorance and misunderstanding—there would be harmony, peace, and a complete absence of concern for national power. "I sometimes think," said Wilson, "that . . . no people ever went to war with another people." But he goes on to say that "governments have gone to war" with one another, thereby pointing to the darker side of the idealist picture.[12]

Only a dreamer could mistake for the existing order the vision of a world of independent nations in which there is no conflict, nor any drives for power. The idealist school does not do so. It not only fully recognizes the continued presence or threat of "power politics," but considers this discrepancy between "what is" and "what should and will be" as the crucial moral and political issue of international relations. The explanation for it is believed to lie in the operation of evil forces which violate the peace and law of the community.

There is no doubt about the character of these forces. They are conceived as anachronistic remnants of an age—now coming to an end—in which autocratic rulers rather than the peoples themselves controlled the destiny of nations. It was these rulers who were "playing the game of power," as Woodrow Wilson puts it; their ambitions, not the interests of their peoples, were in conflict and plunged the world into power politics and the struggle for survival. Whenever and wherever such autocracy asserts itself—or reasserts itself through a relapse into a bygone age—the

[11] *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, ed. by Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, New York, 1927, p. 259.

[12] *President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses*, introd. by Albert Shaw, New York, 1918, p. 177.

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community of peace-loving nations falls victim to the onslaught of aggressive power and violence.

One might suspect that when such aggression occurs, the world would return to conditions very much like those portrayed by the pure power model. The only difference would seem to be that now the power of aggressors would be pitted against the collective power of peace-loving nations. The idealist denounces such a comparison as superficial and dangerously misleading. It would be no less inappropriate, he maintains, to speak of a struggle for power or a balancing of power process when describing the defense of international peace and lawfulness than it would be to apply these same terms to the actions of a national police force engaged in fighting individual criminals.

According to idealist thought, then, the quest for collective international police power has taken the place of the obsolete quest for national power as far as the majority of the actors is concerned. One would be tempted, by way of contrast, to call this idealist image by some such name as the "pure solidarity model" were it not for the emphasis placed on the continued threat or presence of aggressive antisolidarity forces.

The idealist school has been taken to task by its critics for the illusory character of much of its interpretation of the existing world, especially for its *a priori* optimistic assumptions concerning human nature and the harmony of interest, as well as for its narrow explanation of the phenomenon which it terms aggression.[13] The validity of such criticism should become clearer, at least by implication, from what will be said later. It is more important, here, to point to some of the insights which the idealist approach suggests to the theoretical analyst.

By distinguishing from the outset between two types of behavior toward power, rather than introducing discrimination as an afterthought or deviation, the idealist has been more aware of the problems arising from this lack of uniformity.—If anything, he may be too much inclined to take the lack of uniformity for

[13] For criticism of idealist thought in international relations, see Carr, *op.cit.*; Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*; Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, New York, 1944.

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granted, for example, when asserting categorically that democracies behave differently in foreign affairs than dictatorships.—Because of the important role he assigns to individuals and their values as well as to bonds of community transcending national boundaries, he has an eye for aspects of reality—such as the relative ease with which the English-speaking world has learned to collaborate—which are hard to reconcile with the image of a "billiard ball world."[14]

These remarks are not intended as a recommendation to scholars to take the "pure solidarity model" as their initial hypothesis. If they did, they would find themselves in all probability in the position of an economist who sought to gain an understanding of the Soviet economy by starting with the *laisser faire* assumptions of the classical economists. He might reach his goal in the end, but only by an arduous detour.

The two schools are obviously far apart, if not diametrically opposed on many issues. Yet, despite striking differences, their views are closely related to each other, at least in one significant respect. Both approach international politics on the same level—which might briefly be called the power level—though they approach it from opposite ends.[15] By way of simplification, it can be said that while the realist is primarily interested in the quest for power—and its culmination in the resort to violence—as the essence of all politics among nations, the idealist is concerned above all with its elimination. On this level there can be no

[14] Frederick S. Dunn (*War and the Minds of Men*, New York, 1950) emphasizes the importance of supplementing the picture of international affairs that reveals itself when attention is focused on interstate relations by one that places social or human relations between individuals in the center of the scene (p. 12). He warns, however, against the illusion that a shift to the goals and values of individuals will help us to escape "from the sickening recurrence of international crises and war." "Political conflicts," he rightly insists, "arise from the existence of competing values among sovereign states."

[15] The term "power" is used here and throughout this article in the restricted sense in which it occurs in the popular use of such word combinations as "power politics" or "struggle for power," meaning to cover the ability to coerce or, more precisely, to inflict deprivations on others. This leaves out other ways of exerting influence, e.g., by bestowing benefits which are not ordinarily connected with or condemned as "power politics." (See Harold and Margaret Sprout, in the new 2d rev. edition of *Foundations of National Power*, New York, 1951, p. 39, where they explain their reasons for choosing a much broader definition.) The term "resort to power" will be used to mean reliance on the ability to inflict deprivations, "resort to violence" as actual coercion by the use of physical force.

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meeting of the minds. But the question arises whether to start off with the quest and struggle for power does not mean tying up the horse at its tail.

Normally, power is a means to other ends and not an end in itself. Where it becomes an end, as it does in the case of the "mad Caesars," one is faced with what Toynbee would call an "enormity." Therefore, to treat the quest for power, positively or negatively, outside the context of ends and purposes which it is expected to serve, robs it of any intelligible meaning and, by the way, also makes it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness. It is as if an economist, in developing economic theory, were to concentrate on the accumulation and expenditure of money. He could not avoid painting a picture of a world of misers or spendthrifts, as the political scientist on the power level can see little but a world of insatiably power-hungry or unconditionally power-hostile political actors.[16]

One gets a very different picture, as the further discussion should show, if one considers first the values and purposes for the sake of which policy-makers seek to accumulate or use national power, as they may also seek alternative or supplementary means.

This suggests beginning with a "theory of ends" and proceeding from there to the analysis of the quest for power as it develops in conjunction with and under the impact of the ends it is meant to promote. It must be kept in mind, however, that one is not dealing with a simple cause-and-effect relationship. The degree to which power is available or attainable frequently affects the choice of ends. Prudent policy-makers will keep their ends and aspirations safely within the power which their country possesses or is ready and willing to muster.[17] Statesmen with a respect for moral principles, or under pressure from people who have such

[16] Some political scientists would exclude by definition from what they call "political" anything but the problems of power. But the consequence is that a "foreign policy" must then be called political in one respect and nonpolitical in all others, the latter including all policy ends other than power itself.

[17] Walter Lippmann has consistently advocated such prudence. "The thesis of this book," he says in reference to his *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, 1943), "is that a foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power. The constant preoccupation of the true statesman is to achieve and maintain this balance."

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respect, may hesitate to pursue goals which demand the sacrifice of these principles or of other values in the process of power accumulation or use.[18]

There is little reason to expect that all actors on the international stage will orientate themselves uniformly toward one and the same goal, whether it be peace, security, or "power as an end in itself." However, the possibility will have to be considered that they may be operating under some form of "compulsion" which may force them in the long run to fall in line with each other.

States are not single-purpose organizations like hospitals, golf clubs, or banking establishments.[19] At one and the same time people expect from them not only external security, but such widely differing things as colonial conquest, better control over foreign markets, freedom for the individual, and international lawfulness. Between goals such as these, relatively scarce means must be parceled out in order of preference and by a constant process of weighing, comparing, and computing of values. Because policy-makers, like all men, seek to maximize value in accordance with ever-fluctuating value patterns, one would anticipate great variation in their choice unless something compelled them to conform.[20]

The number of conceivable ends is much larger than is indicated by broad categories such as "security," "aggrandizement,"

[18] For some of the ethical problems involved, see my article on "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," *World Politics*, I, No. 2 (January 1949), pp. 175-95.

[19] In speaking of the actors on the international stage, I shall use the term "states" as a means of abbreviation. The real actors are aggregates of decision-makers acting in the name of states or nations, including in a varied order of influence such persons as statesmen, legislators, lobbyists, and common citizens. There are also, today, as there were in medieval times, actors other than states, like the Cominform, the Vatican, the United Nations, or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which one could not afford to ignore in any complete theory of international politics. One might call them subnational, transnational, and supernational centers of influence and often of power.

[20] As Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan put it in *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950): "No generalizations can be made a priori concerning the scale of values of all groups and individuals. What the values are in a given situation must in principle be separately determined for each case." Though they state earlier that a certain element of invariance must be assumed to "make a political science possible," they cannot be pleading for the assumption that all actors uniformly prefer one single value, such as power. For they also say (p. 57) that: "It is impossible to assign a universally dominant role to some value or other."

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or "international order." Policy-makers must decide whether a specific increment of security is worth the specific additional deprivations which its attainment through power requires. However, for purposes of analysis it is permissible to limit the discussion to a few representative types of goals. It need only be kept in mind that these typical bundles of related ends are not sharply divided from one another and that no actor is likely to be found pursuing a single type of objectives all the time. He may be out for security today, for conquest tomorrow.

The goals of foreign policy can be classified under the three headings of "goals of national self-extension," "goals of national self-preservation," and "goals of national self-abnegation." For actors other than states, corresponding categories would have to be chosen.[21]

The term "self-extension" is not used here in a derogatory sense, although some goals which belong in this category may deserve moral condemnation. It is meant to cover all policy objectives expressing a demand for values not already enjoyed, and thus a demand for a change of the status quo. The objectives may vary widely. The aim may be more "power as an end in itself" or domination over other peoples or territorial expansion; but it may also represent a quest for the return of lost territory, or the redress of legitimate grievances, such as termination of unjust

[21] There will be little room in the following to discuss the factors that account for the choice of goals by the decision-makers. There is need for much more study of these factors. Growing awareness that policy cannot arise except through choices and decisions of individuals has led recently to a tendency to stress the psychological factor. But it is probable that the understanding of national foreign policies, as well as any long-run predictions concerning such policies, will be found to depend on knowledge of antecedents to action that are more general and more constant than the psychological traits and predispositions of frequently changing individuals, or even of groups, elites, and nations. To give an illustration, the pressures which the Soviet Government has placed in recent years on Turkey could have been predicted, even at the time when Moscow disclaimed any future concern with Constantinople and the Straits, on the basis of a geopolitical and historical analysis of the environment in which the Kremlin acts today and acted in Czarist days. Spykman's prediction of 1942 (*op.cit.*, p. 469) that "a modern, vitalized and militarized China . . . is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean," which sounded almost blasphemous to some of his critics when it was made, could not have been made if it had depended on the knowledge of the future political fortunes, the psychology, and the doctrine of one who was then a little-known Communist agitator with the name of Mao Tse-tung.

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discriminations, the emancipation from foreign control or imposition on others of an ideology or way of life.[22]

Self-preservation is meant to stand for all demands pointing toward the maintenance, protection, or defense of the existing distribution of values, usually called the status quo. The term "self-preservation" is not without ambiguity. The national "self" which states seek to preserve can undergo a wide variety of interpretations. It may be considered to include only national independence and the territorial integrity of the homeland; or it may be held to embrace a whole catalogue of "vital interests," from safety belts and influence zones to investments and nationals abroad. Another variable makes the notion of self-preservation even more elusive and therefore often convenient as a cloak for other purposes. To preserve possessions does not merely mean to defend them when they are actually under attack. Status quo powers regularly demand that the threat of such attack be reduced at least to the point of giving them a reasonable sense of security.

Thus, the quest for security—the preservation goal *par excellence*—points beyond mere maintenance and defense.[23] It can become so ambitious as to transform itself into a goal of unlimited self-extension. A country pursuing the mirage of absolute security could not stop at less than world domination today.[24] A change to self-extension in the name of security often

[22] The literature on the causes of imperialism is extensive. Studies have also been made bearing on such problems as the relationship between dictatorship and expansionist foreign policies; but one would wish studies like that of Edmond N. Cahn (*The Sense of Injustice*, New York, 1949) to be extended to the international field. For where is the "sense of injustice" more "alive with movement and warmth" (p. 13) and where is the "human animal" more "disposed to fight injustice" (p. 25) than in international relations? Status quo countries will continue to live in a fool's paradise if they fail to understand the deep and manifold causes which account for demands for change and self-extension even through violence.

[23] I am employing the term "security" as it is used in the everyday language of statesmen to signify not "high value expectancy" generally—as Lasswell and Kaplan define the term (*op.cit.*, p. 61)—but high expectancy of value *preservation*. The two authors may have had the same thing in mind, because they specify that security means a realistic expectancy of *maintaining* influence. One would not say that Nazi Germany either came to be or came to feel more secure as her expectancy of successful self-*extension* through conquest of territory increased.

[24] The degree of security-mindedness of different countries and of groups within countries depends on many circumstances which would be worth studying. Looking at the United States and France in recent times, it would seem as if countries become more

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occurs at the close of a war. Victims of attack who were entirely satisfied before hostilities started are rarely content, if victorious, to return to the *status quo ante*.

Self-abnegation, finally, is meant to include all goals transcending—if not sacrificing—the "national interest," in any meaningful sense of the term. It is the goal of those who place a higher value on such ends as international solidarity, lawfulness, rectitude, or peace than even on national security and self-preservation. It is also the goal of individuals, groups, or regimes who at the expense of the nation as a whole use their influence within the decision-making process to promote what might be called "subnational" interests.

This may appear to be a category which only a Utopian could expect to find in international politics, at least as far as idealistic self-abnegation is concerned. How could any nation dare indulge in altruistic pursuits—or allow its interests to be sacrificed to interest of a group—and yet hope to survive? While the discussion of compulsion and penalties must be further postponed, it is worth pointing out, nevertheless, that the United States was powerful enough in 1918 to permit Woodrow Wilson to indulge in self-abnegation goals without much harm to American interests and that little Denmark, too weak to seek self-preservation through power, limited its foreign policy largely to humanitarian causes and yet in the end survived Hitler's conquest. There is also the case of governments like that of Communist Czechoslovakia which for the sake of party doctrine and power are ready to promote the transnational cause of world communism, though it mean sacrificing all but the outward appearances of national sovereignty and independence. Highest devotion to national interests and aspirations, even if spread more widely over the globe today than ever, is not the only possible attitude of actors

ambitious in their desire for security either for having enjoyed a high degree of it over a long period or for having had much and recent experience with the sad consequences of insecurity. James Burnham in *The Struggle for the World* (New York, 1947) argues that in the atomic age, there can be no security short of world empire, with only two candidates for such empire available today. "In the course of the decision," he says, "both of the present antagonists may . . . be destroyed. But one of them must be" (pp. 134 f.).

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in international affairs. Exponents of world government are not necessarily Utopians for hoping that peoples and governments some day will commit an act of radical national self-abnegation and abdicate as sovereign entities in favor of a world state.

Cases in which self-abnegation goals have precedence over national self-preservation may be rare in an era in which nationalism and the ethics of patriotism continue unabated.[25] This does not preclude the possibility, however, that where influential groups of participants in the decision-making process place high value on a universal cause such as peace, pressures exerted by these groups may affect the course of foreign policy. It may lead to a more modest interpretation of the national interest, to more concern for the interests of other nations, to more concessions for the sake of peace, or to more restraint in the use of power and violence. Whether the nation will profit or suffer in the end from the success of such "internationalist," "humanitarian," or "pacifist" pressures depends on the circumstances of the case; whichever it does, the abnegation goals will have proved themselves a reality.

Now let us suppose that a government has picked its objective or objectives and has also decided to rely on the accumulation and use of power as the chief means of reaching its goal. We can then ask ourselves what will determine the scope of its quest for power. Would it not stand to reason—provided the government in question was acting rationally—that it would seek to preserve or acquire as much power as appeared adequate to assure the success of its policy? It would not aim at a higher level of power, because every increment adds to the burdens the country has to bear, cuts down on the chances of attaining other

[25] As Hermann Goering is reported to have said, cynically (see G. M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship*, New York, 1950, p. 117): "Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is to tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism. . . ."

According to Charles A. Beard (*The Idea of National Interest*, New York, 1943), the interest of the nation as a whole, if it can be defined at all, is constantly being sacrificed to the interests of groups which are powerful enough to have their special interests pass for the "national interest." If he were right, most countries would be engaged most of the time, involuntarily, in a process of national self-abnegation—and still survive.

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objectives, and tends to provoke counteraction. To seek less than adequate power would mean giving up the chance of attaining one's goal.

Because adequacy is a matter of subjective estimates, the factors which influence these estimates are of major interest. Two countries with the same goals and acting under similar circumstances may differ widely in their views on adequacy of power. But this need not invalidate some general theses concerning the relationship between the main categories of policy goals and the quest for power.

Goals of national self-abnegation—provided they are not set by subnational groups parading their interests as the "national interest"—call for the approval and support of more than a single nation. Accumulation, show, or use of national power are likely to defeat rather than to promote such ends. Nations pursuing ends that fall into this category—including the end of eliminating "power politics"!—will tend to play down their own national power or to reduce it. "Disarmament by example" pursued by Britain prior to 1932 was a way of trying to promote world peace by a policy of self-abnegation.

Obviously, cases will be rare in which for the sake of goals of self-abnegation a nation refuses to resort to power even when the inner core of the national self comes under serious threat of attack. This means that under stress self-preservation usually gains the upper hand. However, even then idealistic pressures at home in favor of self-denying policies may persist and either delay or reduce the effort to enhance defensive national power.

Statesmen and peoples who hold—or profess to hold—strong beliefs in universal causes, religious or ideological, are not always found to minimize reliance on national power. On the contrary, striking cases have become only too familiar in this age of revolutionary and ideological strife in which goals appearing to be of a self-transcending kind have revealed themselves as the most ambitious goals of self-extension. Whenever a nation goes out on a "crusade" for some universal cause, claiming to have a mission of imposing its ideas and institutions on others, there is

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practically no limit to the enhancement of national power it deems necessary. National power is looked upon or advertised here as the chosen instrument with which to bring salvation to mankind.

Goals of self-extension generally place an extremely high premium on the resort to power as a means. The chances of bringing about any major change of the international status quo by means other than power or even violence are slim indeed. Because it is also true that self-extension is often sought passionately if not fanatically and by actors of various sort and motivation, the tendency is toward frequent and intensive quests for enhanced power by nations belonging to this category. No phenomenon in international politics calls for more study and attention.

Adequate power, in this instance, means power deemed adequate to overcome the power of resistance put up by those who desire to preserve things which they possess and cherish. Where such resistance is expected to be feeble, as it is when the demand is directed against weak or complacent and isolated countries, the nation seeking self-extension may be expected to be satisfied with far less than the maximum power for which it has potentialities. However, in view of the fact that other and stronger countries, as a rule, are awake to their interest in preserving well beyond their own borders the established distribution of values, resistance to change is usually not easy to break. It may be so forbidding as to deter countries from making the attempt. Thus, fervently "revisionist" Hungary after 1919 was sufficiently impressed by the power and resolution of the Little Entente not to attempt to regain her lost territories by means of power. The whole idea of the balance of power as a guarantor of peace rests on the assumption that the costs of adequate power for self-extension may at a certain point become excessive or prohibitive.

Many a "satisfied" country would better be called a country "resigned to non-extension," as can be seen whenever easy opportunities for gain present themselves. Not many belligerents, even if they were victims of attack when the war started, fail to

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come forth with "historic claims" and strategic demands once they are victorious. It would be exaggerated, however, to say that self-extension will always take place where no resistance is expected, or where no serious costs are involved. While Switzerland may stand alone in having refused to consider an increase of territory, even as a gift, it is well known how consistently influential groups in the United States Senate, and in the American public at large, have opposed territorial annexations.

Because of the fact that self-extension almost invariably calls for additional power, countries of the type discussed here tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to violence. Herein lies the significant kernel of truth in the idealist theory of aggression.[26] Cases are conceivable, of course, in which the initiative rests with a country concerned with self-preservation which starts enhancing its defensive power for fear of an imagined threat; the resort to violence, too, may be the preventive act of a nation that believes itself to be menaced by an attack on its own values or those of its friends.[27] If two countries are both eager to gain advantages at each other's expense, or are both haunted by fears and suspicions, it may be difficult to decide where the initiative lay and where the first move was made that led to a race for higher levels of power and ultimately to war.

Turning, finally, to the goals of self-preservation, they will be found to be most elusive when it comes to setting up general hypotheses concerning their effect on the quest for power. Depending on the circumstances, countries in this category may run the whole gamut from a frantic concern with the enhancement of power at one extreme to complete indifference to power at the other. Britain offers an excellent example of a swing of the pendulum from complacency under Baldwin and Chamberlain to spectacular and heroic total mobilization of power under Churchill.

[26] See also Strausz-Hupé and Possony, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

[27] ". . . a government with no appetite whatsoever," writes W. T. R. Fox ("Atomic Energy and International Relations," in *Technology and International Relations*, ed. by W. F. Ogburn, Chicago, 1949, p. 118), "may start a conflict if its leaders feel sure that the opponent has for a long time been unscrupulously trading on their general unwillingness to start a war."

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The reason why self-preservation calls forth such a variety of attitudes toward power lies in the fact that countries which are satisfied to let things stand as they are have no immediate incentive for valuing power or for wishing to enhance it. Whether they become interested in power at all—and the extent to which they do—depends on the actions which they expect from others. It is a responsive interest which takes its cue from the threats, real or imagined, directed at things possessed and valued. If policy is rationally decided, the quest for power here increases and decreases in proportion to these external threats.

One can bring out the peculiarities of this responsive attitude most clearly if one starts out by postulating a situation in which all of the major actors are assumed to be concerned with nothing but self-preservation. In the mid-twenties, when the "revisionist" nations were still impotent, this situation was closely approximated. Under such conditions, policy-makers are inclined toward keeping the costs of power at a minimum and toward avoiding any move which might provoke a race for power from which, after all, they have nothing to gain. If there was no reason to fear that one or more within the group might switch to goals of self-extension, and particularly if there was no danger of dissatisfied and potentially strong countries outside the group regaining actual power, the estimates of what constitutes adequacy would drop very low. The unguarded border between Canada and this country serves as a striking reminder of the indifference to power in the relations between two nonextension-seeking and nondistrustful neighbors.[28]

The conditions postulated here describe a configuration in which peace strategies such as the idealist school advocated in the twenties would have an excellent chance of success, provided no country feared the early ascendancy of a presently impotent and dissatisfied nation. All would be interested in disarmament to the lowest level compatible with internal security, in the promotion of mutual confidence and understanding, and in the

[28] W. T. R. Fox points out that "One state's security is not necessarily every other state's insecurity. . . . Greater security . . . is an objective toward which it is at least conceivable that all states can move simultaneously" (*The Super-Powers*, p. 11).

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collective organization of "watchfulness." Only hysteria could produce a race for power within a group of countries intent upon self-preservation. The chances are that the high degree of security which they would believe to be enjoying would lull them into a state of such indifference toward power that they might be overtaken by a self-extension seeking outsider. So slow is the "security dilemma" in catching up with those who are content with mere security!

History does not indicate that conditions of all-round satisfaction are either frequent or persistent. They certainly are not in our age, which among other ways of creating dissatisfaction has produced a surprising contempt for the art of satisfying defeated enemies. As a consequence, threats to the established order are almost constantly forcing those who seek preservation of cherished values to muster power of resistance if they wish to assure the success of their defensive objective. In this sense, one can say that their quest for power is the result of external "compulsion."

However, this "compulsion" is not some kind of mechanical force which would rob the actors of their freedom of choice. No decision-maker is forced by anything except his own value preferences or his conscience to defend by means of power either national independence or any other threatened values. There are plenty of Europeans today—and there may be European governments tomorrow—who prefer to risk their country's freedom and institutions rather than embark on a policy of armed resistance which they consider hopeless or too costly. What the penalties are for not ceding to the "compulsion" is another question.

Those who interpret international politics as being essentially a struggle for survival, similar to the "survival of the fittest" in business competition or in the Darwinian world of competing animal species, are thereby suggesting that the penalty consists in the loss of independent existence. This has been true in some instances; but there is plenty of historical evidence to show that a threat to "existence," of great powers at least, has occurred only in the exceptional though cataclysmic eruptions of revo-

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lutionary or imperialist ardor characteristic of a Napoleon or a Hitler.[29] In our era such eruptions have become not only frequent, but capable of spreading out over the entire globe and of drawing all nations into a single struggle for survival. There have been other times—and they cover much of the maligned history of European "power politics"—when the demands for self-extension, though ubiquitous as far as the major powers of the time were concerned, have remained limited in scope. Even if successful, the penalties on the loser rarely ranged beyond such deprivations as the loss of a strip of territory or the shift of a neighboring country to a less friendly dynasty. Whether such limitation was imposed solely by the lack of means for more ambitious self-extension, or whether it also expressed a prudent and conservative spirit on the part of the decision-makers, cannot be discussed here. In any case, the contrast with the "struggles for survival" of an age of revolutionary and total wars is striking.

Even when the penalty is not annihilation—and defeat today, as in remote ages, may actually mean physical extermination—countries usually feel compelled by their judgment and conscience not to allow possessions they value to go by default. They may enhance and use their power in defense of everything from prestige and colonies to free institutions and moral principles. The loss of values for which a people is ready to fight and die becomes a "compelling" penalty. "Collective security," as practiced recently, can be understood as an effort not only to equal in scope and speed the power drive of the "initiators," but to bring the "free peoples" to a point where they will identify their "selves" with the entire non-Communist world and its institutions and feel compelled to fight for the preservation of their larger "selves."

In the preceding pages I have suggested an approach to international politics which differs from that of both the idealist and the realist school by the emphasis it places on policy goals and the functional relationship existing between these goals and the quest for power. It would be tempting to compare the results

[29] See Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, p. 107, on the difference between "the great international conflicts" and the "secondary conflicts."

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to which one is led by this approach with the results attained through that of the two traditional schools of thought, especially in matters pertaining to policy. I can only intimate some of the differences here, leaving the consequences for a theory of peace strategy to be treated in detail on a later occasion.

The idealist school is correct in stressing the value which men in general place on peace and in insisting that such evaluations can affect the decisions of policy-makers. Whether of their own volition or under pressures from more peace-minded groups of the population, statesmen under certain circumstances will desist from pressing national demands through means of power or will limit their demands. Realists would not be so eager—as was Machiavelli himself—to impress their governments with the "necessity" of playing the game of power politics as consistently as their opponents, were it not for fear that these governments might act otherwise.

However, the idealists refuse to recognize that while peace-loving peoples wish for peace, they also wish to preserve what in the past they as individual nations have acquired or helped to establish. When their valued possessions come to include a wide circle of values reaching far beyond the national boundaries, as they do in the days of ideological or religious conflict, the occasions for power competition and violence are further enhanced.

Idealists are right in stressing that policy goals transcending the "national interest"—as traditionally interpreted—and affinities transcending national boundaries not only exist, but can be promoted by suitable policies. Nations defending common values and interests may come to form such bonds of friendship that their relationship ceases to be merely that of a temporary and expedient alliance in a balancing of power process; in the end they may merge or federate. However, if this process of amalgamation—clearly not compatible with the image of a world of billiard balls—takes place, as it usually does, in the context of a common conflict with an "out-group," such national self-abnegation within the "in-group" does not diminish the intensity of

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power politics in the world at large; it may increase it. Thus, if the "Free World" or the North Atlantic group of powers or Western Europe were drawn ever more closely together and learned to act as an organized community in accord with commonly accepted laws, it would still depend on the intensity of the East-West struggle how deeply the nations of the world were engaged in "power politics."

The extent to which there is a struggle for power is decided, then, by what might be called the "relationship of major tension," not by the attitude which nations not engaged in conflict take toward each other. In the same sense, it can be said that the degree of power competition and the expectation of violence rest not upon the behavior of countries concerned with self-preservation, but upon that of the "initiator." Idealist optimism in regard to the elimination of "power politics" is out of place, therefore, as long as the trend toward major tensions and toward the eruption of new and ambitious demands for self-extension is not reversed.

The drastic change which has taken place over the last fifteen odd years in the attitude toward peace strategy of the idealist school itself bears witness to the deterioration in the prospects for enduring peace. While earlier the emphasis was on conciliation and disarmament, it has come to be placed almost exclusively on "force behind the law" and "enforcement of peace." This means a swing to the realist view that counterpower and counterforce alone—though it be the collective power and force of the peace-loving community acting under the rules of an international organization—can safeguard the peace. This is the old idea of the balance of power, if within a new institutional frame. The change of attitude has gone so far that other means of peace strategy, such as the negotiation of concessions to satisfy demands of potential "initiators," are now often condemned without qualification as "imperialist deals," "appeasement," or "rewards for aggression." This is not said in a critical vein. The idealist school may prove itself realistic in recognizing that we are caught at present in a situation of such extreme tension and

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incompatibility of goals that anything except the display of adequate defensive force on our part will merely serve to encourage offensive resort to violence on the part of others.

The realist school has merited its name for having appreciated the role which the quest for power plays in international politics, though it has devoted little attention to the policy goals from which this quest for power springs. It has recognized that a multi-state system—a term which still properly designates the outstanding feature of contemporary international politics—is heavily slanted toward struggles for power. Lying somewhere within a continuum which stretches from the pole of an "all-out struggle for power" to the pole of an "all-round indifference to power," the actual world tends to be pulled more strongly toward the former. This is true, whether the realist *a priori* assumptions concerning a universal human hunger for power or of a "security dilemma" arising from *la condition humaine* are correct or not. The main reason lies in the ever-recurring new incentives to demands for change and the equally strong incentives to throw power in the path of such change. By a curious irony, the same readiness to resist through power which is the prerequisite of any competition for power may, if strong, quick-moving, and determined enough, prevent the struggle from degenerating into violence. This is what the realists have in mind when placing their hopes for peace on the balance of power.

It is quite possible that most of the great drives toward national and revolutionary self-extension which at intervals have thrown the world into struggles of sheer survival could not have been prevented by any means available to man. One can hardly escape a sense of fatalism if one asks oneself retrospectively whether the rise and aggressions of a Hitler could have been avoided. But this does not mean—as realist thought would seem to imply—that no influence can be brought to bear on policy-makers which would serve the interests of peace. Anything that bears on their value patterns and preferences, on their estimates of gains and deprivations, or on the scope of their identifications will, in principle, be able to affect the course of policy upon which they decide to embark.

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It may be Utopian to expect that the causes accounting for resorts to power and power competition could ever be wholly eliminated—as it is Utopian to believe that defensive counterforce could be consistently held at sufficient strength to prevent the actual resort to violence; but there need be no resigned acceptance of the "enormity" of a continuous all-round struggle for survival. Through suitable policies, pressures, and appeals designed to attack the causes of intensive drives for enhanced power, the pulls toward the pole of all-round indifference to power can be strengthened. The main task of those engaged in developing a realistic theory of peace strategy is to discover policies and practices which offer most promise of turning nations away from goals that point toward power competition and violence.

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THE CRISIS OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE

By MARIO EINAUDI

THE French elections of June 1951 and the serious difficulties experienced by the victorious constitutional parties in the formation of a government call attention once more to the problems of a parliamentary system in a multiparty state, and underline the urgency of a redefinition of the roles of parties and government within a constitutional democracy. These developments also draw attention to the basic constitutional problems which affect the political stability of France, and thereby weaken the Western community. With an occasional glance at parallel Italian developments, this article will first analyze the new electoral law and the election returns before proceeding to a discussion of the constitutional issues that contribute to the deepening crisis of the Fourth Republic.

The End of Proportional Representation

In the immediate postwar period, proportional representation appeared as the answer both to the ideal requirements of political justice and to the practical exigencies of party interests. In the eyes of Western European politicians, this was the only electoral device that would safeguard the supremacy of party machines. Any other system would have endangered the survival of the party structure and weakened the dominant position of party leaders. This was also the time of the new political brotherhood of the Resistance. All parties were equal and all were entitled to a proportionately equal share of the spoils. All were to join together in the tasks of government and any electoral system was wicked by definition if it made possible the annihilation of a political party in terms of parliamentary representation.

The universal acceptance of proportional representation in postwar Europe was the culmination of a long trend which started after World War I. It represented the formal translation

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into electoral rules of the political fact that the era of the mass parties had arrived and that this was the best formula to guarantee their survival. Within a short time, however, the idea of the equality and brotherhood of all mass parties proved to be a myth and was ended in 1947 with the expulsion of the Communists from the cabinet. And a parliamentary majority capable of performing without excessive uncertainties the normal tasks of government proved attractive even in countries in which the intrusion of party life into the spheres of government and administration is accepted as a normal practice.

Both France and Italy began in 1950 the search for an electoral formula that would combine proportional representation and the majority system. Proportional representation could not be thrown overboard altogether without loss of face, and a few, apart from the Communists, clung to it as a matter of principle. But it had proved unworkable, especially in France, and had above all permitted an anticonstitutional party to gain a strong constitutional foothold from which it had to be dislodged. The majority system could not be embraced openly, for it carried with it a remembrance of *anciens régimes* which the politicians of the fourth French republic and of the first Italian republic had committed themselves to bury without recall. But it had the enormous advantage of making it possible for the party which succeeded in getting a majority, or even a mere plurality, on its side to work unhampered at the business of government.

After painful and long debates which made the electoral law one of the major issues of the last two years, a solution was found along not dissimilar lines in both France and Italy. The French law, applied for the first time in the national elections of June 17, 1951, maintains in principle proportional representation and keeps intact the electoral colleges created in 1945-1946. But, except for Paris,[1] it provides that national parties (that is, parties running lists of candidates under an identical *étiquette*

[1] Proportional representation was kept in Paris, essentially because the Third Force, which was responsible for the new law, knew that both the Communists and the De Gaullists were so strong in Paris that there was no chance for any Third Force alliance to obtain a majority. Under the circumstances, as a matter of expediency if not of principle, it was better to leave proportional representation untouched.

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in at least thirty departments) can reach electoral alliances among themselves, on a departmental basis. If such an alliance (or any list by itself) wins a majority of the votes cast, it wins all the seats in a given department. The seats thus won are then divided by proportional representation among the allied parties. Should any list or alliance of lists fail to obtain a majority, proportional representation is applied.[2]

The purpose of this hybrid system was the elimination of the Communists' representation in parliament, that is, the achievement at the institutional level of what was still impossible at the political level. No one could hope to get rid of the Communist party in France, but it might be possible to eliminate the Communist parliamentary group in the National Assembly and deny at least one platform to communism. Since the Communists could not, even if they wanted to, enter into any electoral alliance that would conceivably give them a majority in any one department, it might be possible for non-Communist parties to ally themselves throughout France and deny all representation to the Communist vote. But the stubborn isolation of the RPF (in only half a dozen departments did the De Gaullist forces enter into alliances with other parties) increased the probable area of application of proportional representation. Everything considered, the three parties mainly responsible for the new system—the Radical Socialists, the MRP, and the Socialists—did not do too badly in spite of this unexpected difficulty from the right. For General de Gaulle's intransigence proved too much for many important rightist groups to accept. The Independent Peasants and the Moderates refused to follow the RPF and joined hands with the Third Force in a large number of departments. In forty departments, the allied lists of the Third Force and of the independent right obtained the necessary majority and secured all the seats.[3] Without the support of the right, the parlia-

[2] The new Italian law, to be used only in municipal and provincial elections, provides in essence that two-thirds of the seats in any electoral college go to the list, or alliance of lists, obtaining a plurality of the votes cast, with the remaining one-third distributed by proportional representation among all other lists. Allied lists, in case of victory, divide the seats among themselves by proportional representation.

[3] Whenever a group of allied lists obtained a majority of votes, the new French electoral system came close to the old *scrutin d'arrondissement* with two ballots, with

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mentary representation of the Third Force would today be far smaller than it is. More than anything else, this indicates the extent to which the Third Force has become the hostage of the right and the extraordinarily difficult situation in which the Socialists find themselves.

The Electoral Returns Analyzed

Both the parties committed to a revolutionary change in the institutions of the Fourth Republic suffered a setback. The Communist party lost half a million votes. The RPF did less well than expected. But with 4,100,000 votes (or 21.7 per cent of the total), De Gaulle's movement emerged as the second strongest party in France and, with 121 deputies in the National Assembly, as the strongest parliamentary group. It achieved this success in spite of its complete intransigence with regard to other parties and by aiming its attacks primarily at the Third Force (two-thirds of its vote came from Third Force parties, especially the MRP). In the east, the RPF appeared as a conservative rural movement dedicated to the restoration of the traditional values to which a Catholic antirepublican electorate is still attached. In the large cities, however, where its strength was greatest, the RPF played a revolutionary game, heavily slanted to the left and appealing strongly to the workers, some of whom even left the ranks of the Communist party to vote for the General.

Those who did so must have acted in the belief that the economic promises of De Gaulle are more real than those of the Communists. Yet the RPF continues to present its "association" program in the nebulous terms it has used from the beginning. Capital and labor are to be brought together by a recognition

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the important difference that most of the power had shifted to the party machines deciding upon the alliances before the elections. The new system turned out to be a compromise between the old and the new. In a little less than half of the departments, the majority principle operated, and in a little more than half, proportional representation. Under the old majority system in 1936, 44 per cent of the votes were not represented in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1946 with proportional representation, only 9 per cent were left unrepresented. In 1951, the percentage went back to 24. The greatest sufferers were, as expected, the Communists, as 1,400,000 Communist voters, or nearly 30 per cent of the total Communist vote, were unable to elect a single deputy. Less important losses were sustained by the De Gaullists, who wasted only 600,000 votes, or 15 per cent of their total.

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that: (1) profits must belong to all those who have contributed in common to their creation; (2) the authority of the "chief of the enterprise," with respect to both direction and management, must not be placed in doubt; (3) the association is founded upon a contract that unifies the interests of the participants and not merely mediates between antagonists. In an effort to give substance to these generalities, the RPF has introduced in the new National Assembly a bill that authorizes all economic enterprises to enter into "association" contracts provided a majority of those affected approve, with a view to the establishment of profit-sharing to the extent deemed desirable in each particular instance. While there is no ceiling on the percentage of profits to be distributed among the workers and other categories of employees, the "chief of the enterprise" has discretionary power to decide not to apply the profit-sharing clauses of the contract whenever desirable in the interests of the enterprise. Payments are then to be made in shares possessing only subordinate rights in comparison to the shares belonging to the stockholders. In every enterprise with an association agreement, a management council presided over by the "chief of the enterprise" and with members representing both capital and labor is appointed. Such a council, however, has purely advisory functions and meets only at stated intervals and not as a continuing body. While all nationalized industries must, according to the bill, enter into such agreement within one year, there is no compulsion for private enterprises. Those who do enter into association agreements can deduct from their net taxable income the sums paid out under the profit-sharing plans.

Even in its proposed legislative form, this is a vague and dubious program. It underscores heavily the legal concept of "enterprise chief" which, as such, does not exist today. It gives to the "chief" the power to withhold the benefits that are presumably to accrue to the workers and permits him to satisfy their claims with shares of inferior quality. Even under the most favorable assumptions, it does not seem to give the workers a much more substantial "status" than could be obtained through one of the

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collective agreements which General de Gaulle is anxious to discard.[4] As he fights for the cumbersome machinery of the "association" plan, General de Gaulle dismisses almost with contempt the Schuman Treaty and refuses to say whether the RPF parliamentary group will vote for its ratification. Thus General de Gaulle seems to share with the Communists a predilection for obsolete corporative and nationalistic plans and a reluctance to accept truly revolutionary programs such as the European Coal and Steel Community. His approval of European unity stems more from a grandiose vision of the leading role that can be played by a strong France in a traditional concert of European powers, than from a humble realization of the weakness of all the separate units of the European community and of the need for a methodic functional approach seeking to surmount one by one the basic obstacles that have so far made union impossible.

General de Gaulle seems to be on sounder ground when dealing with constitutional problems, even though the spirit with which his proposals are advanced may not be that of constitutionalism. The RPF campaigned in favor of an executive power responsible to parliament but deriving its authority from the chief of state, and of a parliament that could be dissolved at will by the chief of state. There is in France widespread dissatisfaction with the mortgage that parties have established over the life and deeds of governments, and up to that point General de Gaulle's proposals will find a favorable echo. But by cutting the link that binds government to parliament and by saying that the executive must be the expression of the will of the chief of state, he will elicit the fear of dictatorship. It may be true, as it is argued, that De Gaulle is not a fascist in the sense of being committed to a totalitarian system bent upon aggressive warfare; that what separates him from the democratic elements of French society is only a difference in proposed political and con-

[4] For a much more careful presentation and defense of the "community of interests" approach to the reform of industrial enterprises, see Georges Lasserre, *Rapport sur la Réforme de l'Entreprise*. The report was rejected by the Economic Council, to which it had been presented on March 22, 1950. For the text, cf. *Avis et Rapports du C. E., Journal Officiel*, March 24, 1950, pp. 174-97.

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stitutional methods of solving difficulties which are generally recognized; and again that some "dialogue" is still possible with him, while what separates the Communists from everybody else is a gulf across which no understanding is possible. But all this does not make a democrat of De Gaulle, nor does it render his views acceptable to the majority of Frenchmen who rejected the RPF together with the Communist party.[5]

The Communist party loss of votes (from 5.5 to 5 millions in 1951, or from 28.6 to 26.5 per cent of the total votes cast) was a harder blow than its loss of 78 deputies (from 181 to 103). For while the loss of deputies could be explained on the basis of electoral "trickery," even Duclos had to admit that the loss of votes was the result of an *entassement* of the party. The retreat was more pronounced in some southern rural areas, where socialism or radical socialism again appeared as a more reliable type of left through which the peasants could express their anxieties and the determination to retain their ownership of the lands won "only" in 1789 from "clerical reaction." But the losses were general and they do certainly indicate the beginnings of recovery and hope in France. Even though running under the fetching label of "List of Republican Resistant and Anti-Fascist Union for National Independence, Bread, Liberty, and Peace," the Communists were alone in France.[6]

[5] This rejection was not achieved by a very great margin, for 48.2 per cent of the French voters voted either for Gaullism or communism, and the more comfortable majority enjoyed by the republican parties in the National Assembly (391 deputies against 235 for the Communists and Gaullists together) is due only to the operation of the electoral law. It should also be noted that the new electoral law produced a National Assembly oriented to the right, while 53.3 per cent of the votes were given to parties of the left: 26.5 per cent to the Communists, 14.5 per cent to the Socialists, and 12.3 per cent to the MRP (stripped of its conservative element and reduced to less than half its 1946 strength, the MRP should be classified as a party of the left).

[6] They were not alone in Italy. The Socialist company the Italian Communists were able to keep, as well as the more difficult economic circumstances of the country, explain the increase in "Popular Front" vote in the Italian local elections of May and June 1951. In the provinces where elections were held (and they included two-thirds of the country), the Popular Front vote increased from 31 to 36.9 per cent. But in north and central Italy, the increase was entirely due to an increase in the Socialist and so-called independent votes within the Popular Front. By comparison with 1948, the Communist vote alone decreased fractionally everywhere (2 per cent in Tuscany and Emilia, 12 per cent in Piedmont). This indicates that within the Popular Front a shift has occurred between 1948 and 1951 away from the Communists and toward the Socialists. In the elections of 1951, out of every 100 Popular Front votes, the Communists received an average of only 57 votes, as against about 63 in 1948. The Communist

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French socialism did not benefit from the discomfiture of the Communist party. The decline that had already started in 1946 continued and 700,000 additional votes were lost (from 3.4 to 2.8 millions, or from 17.9 to 14.5 per cent), even though, thanks to the electoral law, the Socialist parliamentary strength increased from 102 to 107 deputies. The loss was due to a shift toward Gaullism on the part of many small artisans and lower middle class members, and to a return to radical socialism where the Radical Socialist party did not enter candidates in 1946 (as, for instance, in Maine-et-Loire). But there must also have been increased abstentions, especially among orthodox party members dissatisfied with the views of such a representative Socialist as Jules Moch. When Moch declared before the elections that instead of the increasing concentration of wealth and the increasing proletarization of the working classes prophesied by Marx, France had witnessed, thanks to technology, a decentralization of economic power, and when he added that the condemned commercial, industrial, and agricultural middle classes of the nineteenth century had come back to life and were gaining in strength, and that socialism therefore had to take into account these realities instead of obsolete marxist dogmas, he underlined the inherent conflict of democratic socialism, caught between an allegiance to too rigid traditions and a desire to evolve in the direction of a democratic labor movement on the British pattern. What has survived after the elections is a Socialist party not daring to give up marxism and laicism, but condemned to collaborate with a stronger right, if it wants to continue to be a government party.

The widely expected Christian Democratic loss of strength characterized both French and Italian[7] elections. Christian de-

vote was less than one-half, or barely one-half, of the total Popular Front vote in Veneto and Liguria and was between 55 and 60 per cent in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Tuscany. Only in the south did the relative strength of communism within the Popular Front increase.

[7] The losses of Christian democracy in Italy were less severe than in France because of the lack of as strong an attraction as General de Gaulle, but they were serious enough to cause many people to wonder whether the Christian Democratic party had not lost the opportunity it gained with its decisive 1948 victory. The party's losses were due to dissatisfaction with the concrete achievements of the government since 1948 and with the repeated interventions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and of Catholic Action

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mocracy, which had since the end of the war offered shelter to so many refugees from the right, was reduced to a more nearly normal strength. But in spite of its heavy loss of votes (from 5.1 to 2.4 million votes, or from 26.4 to 12.3 per cent of the total vote), the MRP will still be able to assert itself in the new National Assembly (94 deputies against 145 at the latest count in the old Assembly) and will continue to be an important progressive movement of Christian inspiration built on slimmer but better-defined foundations. South of the Bordeaux-Lyon line, the RPF did not make any significant inroads into Christian democracy and the MRP did maintain its strength substantially untouched along the Loire and the Rhone, in Belfort and in Savoie. These are strong positions and compensate for the transfer to the RPF of two-thirds of its votes in Paris and in other industrial centers.

The MRP, however, finds itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, its electoral support has come from some of the more faithful Catholic circles of France who feel that the party must fight without compromise for public support of the free church schools. Thus, the MRP is today less able to maneuver on the school question than a year ago. It has also to live down the open, if cautious, endorsement received from the official Vatican organ, for ecclesiastical parties are never welcome in France.[8] On the other hand, the more conservative supporters of 1946 have left the party and joined the RPF. Thus in the economic and social fields, the party is bound to follow policies that are more to the left than the policies it has supported in the past. The dilemma

in the political struggle, as well as to the inability of the strangely silent and inactive Christian Democratic left to arouse any serious hopes in the progressive and reformist intentions of the party. Lombardy remained the main fortress of Christian democracy, and in this most highly developed Italian region the loss of votes was small. In the pagan and impoverished south, the decline reached 40 per cent and indicated the ease with which the voters can be swayed from one church to another. As a whole the party was still able to obtain 39 per cent of the vote, which is more than three times what the MRP got in France.

[8] The *Osservatore Romano*, on May 25, 1951, wrote that "it would certainly be painful to see a part of the Catholic electorate choose, as against the Popular Republicans who are in spite of their shortcomings firmly committed to a well-defined program deserving of support for the sincere effort it shows of leading France toward a better future, a vague transformism of the right which fatally might [sic] slide down into intransigence."

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then is this: while at the economic level the MRP is tied more firmly than ever to the Socialists, it is more strongly opposed to them than ever on the educational issue.

The right-center did not derive any advantages from the weakening of Christian democracy, as the chief gainers were the De Gaullists. But while radicals and conservatives polled the same number of votes they had polled at the previous elections, that is, 25 per cent of the total, they increased their National Assembly representation, thanks to the electoral system (the Radical Socialists and UDSR from 62 to 88 deputies, the Peasants and Independents from 81 to 91). The Radical Socialists and Independents have therefore been given a decisive parliamentary role and they may very well claim the right to lead the new government of France.

The Role of Political Parties

It has been customary in the past to consider an election as a healing crisis within the political process. Under the theory of constitutionalism, general elections are the supreme court of appeal in the political sphere and are intended to identify the majority and to give popular sanction to a program. After they are over, there is general relaxation and contentment, even on the part of the defeated, because the struggle is finished and for a short while at least government can proceed on a steady and meaningful course.

This is still generally true of the United States and Great Britain. It has been less and less true of France and Italy. The 1951 elections have revealed in its full intensity the political crisis of the two countries. Far from having induced a spirit of compromise or succeeded in finding a majority and a clear guide to action, the French elections have multiplied the difficulties that beset the formation of a government, while in Italy the Christian Democratic cabinet had to resign within a few days of its "victory" at the local polls. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists, who both in France and Italy had found it possible to work side by side from 1944 to 1950, find it increasingly difficult to form again a government coalition in the summer of 1951.

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Without any change at all in the factual situation, the school issue which French Socialists and Christian Democrats had earlier set aside, or decided to face on the basis of expediency, becomes an insoluble conflict of principle. It is as if the party leaders of the Fourth Republic, having drawn up a frightening balance sheet of their past records, had determined, regardless of expediency, to stand rigidly by their party programs since those records have been so bad. While one may give them credit for their intention to redeem their pledges, one cannot say that the procedures selected to achieve this noble purpose are satisfactory.

There is an almost universal agreement in France today on the need of something which is generally described as a "policy of social justice." De Gaulle is for it. The organ of the conservative bourgeoisie, *Le Figaro*, is for it. The organ of the Paris Bourse, *La Vie Française*, is for it. The Dominican monthly, *La Vie Intellectuelle*, pleads eloquently for it. The Socialists and Christian Democrats want it and so does Herriot. As *Le Monde* writes:

> Everything must yield to the ideals of social justice and civic spirit. These two concepts are a modern translation of that concept of virtue without which Montesquieu did not believe democracy was possible. They translate themselves less into concrete propositions than in a certain spirit. Capitalism cannot hope to survive if it does not understand that its mission is not only technical but also moral and that it is its duty to share in the movements which lead societies to an improvement of the material condition of the workers and to an extension of their sense of responsibility. And all citizens, from the most modest to the most powerful, cannot believe that their cherished freedom will be safeguarded unless they bring to their relationships with the community a minimum of intelligence and of disinterested labor. . . . England has kept its independence because of its spirit of sacrifice. It is impossible to ask a Latin country to maintain for long such a spirit of abnegation, but we have the duty to remember the seriousness of the times in which we live.

Yet in spite of the unanimity of views and of the pressure of circumstances, France has been unable to devise a sensible wage policy, which is the first condition of social justice. So-called democratic parties are engaged in an endless and bitter dispute concerning a sliding wage scale which has been one of the roots of the difficulties attending the formation of a new French government after the elections—a dispute about a policy which the

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greatest example of "capitalistic power" in the world, the General Motors Corporation, accepted a long time ago as a normal feature of a time of crisis.

Thus it would appear that European political parties are suited to express the generic purposes of social justice, while not at all capable of translating those purposes into concrete legislation. This is particularly true in countries where politics "are usually a matter less of getting things done than of expounding the theoretical bases of the things one would like to do."[9] The elections of 1951 have raised more acutely than ever the problem of the boundary line between party politics and government.

In principle, two major alternatives can be envisaged. Under the first, a political party will consider itself in the main as an instrument to create and focus public discussion on issues of national interest, and will try to win over to its side enough popular support to obtain political power. Once this goal has been achieved, the party, as a national organization, will be satisfied with leaving the responsibility of government to those of its elected deputies who have been chosen to carry out the tasks of government. This attitude carries with it the acceptance of a certain restraint, of a belief that a distinction must be made between party interests and government responsibilities. The area of politics is that of discussion, the area of government that of decision-making and execution, and the two are to be kept separate. This position proceeds from a conviction that an intelligent division of labor and a correct understanding of the exigencies of community life require that those in the legislative and executive who are entrusted with the tasks of government be left free to proceed in accordance with the evaluation which, on any given problem, they reach from the vantage point of the national interest and with the information which only the government can have available. While debate is essential, it is recognized that at a certain point debate must cease, to be replaced by action. Action, furthermore, should be of a continuous character and not subjected to the harassing and distracting procedure of having to

[9] W. Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left*, London, 1949, p. 185.

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look to party opinion for approval. Control over government action is to be exercised only through constitutional processes.

Under the other alternative, no clear boundary line, or no boundary line at all, exists between party politics and government. Politics merge into government, producing an endless stream of debate, of a highly interesting variety at times, but without visible results in terms of governmental action. Political parties gain control not only of the preliminary phase of the process by which nations arrive at certain decisions, but of the middle phase, too (with the party claiming to control its elected representatives in parliament), and of the final phase as well (with the party claiming to control the actions of the executive). Political debate, parliamentary deliberation, and cabinet action all become part of a single process in which nonelected party leaders without any constitutional responsibilities insist on playing at all times the decisive role.

In parliamentary countries, the scheme of political power is roughly as follows:

a) the political parties, as represented by the rank and file and by the local leaders;

b) the national directorates of political parties, claiming in effect supreme power and responsibility for the management of party affairs and, in countries having adopted the system of proportional representation, demanding the exclusive right of choice of all those entitled to run in a national election;

c) the parliamentary groups organized in the legislative assemblies and made up of those politicians whom the directorates of political parties have succeeded in getting elected by the people;

d) the cabinet.

Among the various layers of this hierarchy, certain relationships are both necessary and proper. Thus (a) will try to influence (b) and vice versa. The base will try to control the leaders and the leaders will try to lead, the latter being done with increasing thoroughness and intemperance in the great mass parties of the modern state where the oligarchic power of the leaders has had no difficulty in asserting and in entrenching itself. Sim-

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ilarly, there will be close ties between (c) and (d), as when, for instance, the Socialist deputies in the National Assembly exercise an over-all control over the behavior of the Socialist deputies who are members of the cabinet. The difficulties begin when (b) tries to control (c) and even (d). The essential distinction between the alternatives under discussion occurs when (c) and (d) are able, within their terms of office and of their legitimate jurisdiction, to assert their independence from (a) and (b). Those who favor an unbroken line between (a) and (d), with (b) occupying a dominant position, maintain that only in this way can the people take part in the process of government. They are not dismayed by the fact that it is precisely in Great Britain where (a) and (b) do not seriously attempt to undermine the authority and the independence of (c) and (d) that the greatest democratic and popular progress has been achieved.

Needless to say, the "no boundary line" practice prevails in France and Italy. Granted that coalition governments, made necessary by the multiparty system, require a greater amount of continuous adjustment among the coalition allies than non-coalition governments, and that France and Italy have always been suspicious of government, and that political parties reflect popular attitudes when they exact a measure of control over it that would not be admitted in countries where the steady application of the hand of government is felt to be both normal and desirable. For there must be no failure to see the defense of politics over government as part of the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. In Italy, where fascism never tired of expressing its contempt for the oratory of democracy, the virtues attributed to the primacy of politics are derived from the well-grounded suspicion that loss of freedom follows when experts and administrators take over and shut off the sources of debate. But the result is that the slogan *politique d'abord*, which should mean that the political skills of the statesman have greater weight than the technical skills of the expert or the partisan views of the particularist, has come to mean that political debate should take precedence at all times, and down to the bitter end, over concrete and fruitful executive and administrative action.

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The core of the French crisis, as far as this particular issue is concerned, is that while deputies are elected by the entire community, they often become, once elected, the prisoners of professional groups of party leaders that are small and unrepresentative. This is true today of more than two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly. A process of liberation would restore to the Assembly its full freedom and power and rescue it from the obliteration to which openly the Communists and the De Gaullists, but no less effectively, if unwittingly, all other parties, are condemning it. In turn, this would make for the greater dignity and influence of the executive system, a necessity which the current crisis underlines even more strongly, and create the conditions of successful constitutional change.

The Constitution, Parliament, and Government

Constitutional reform was made the central theme of Edouard Herriot's speech after his re-election to the presidency of the new National Assembly. Herriot stressed two points: the unnecessary difficulty which stands in the way of the formation of a cabinet, and the unsatisfactory relationship between the two parliamentary assemblies. The first difficulty is, of course, the result of a constitutional theory which assumes the right of parliament not only to control the cabinet and to force its resignation, but also to preside over its formation. Conceivably, it may be feasible to dispose of it by amending the clause of Article 45 of the Constitution which now requires the prime minister designate to obtain a vote of confidence from the absolute majority of the Assembly before he can proceed to form his government. Upon this stumbling block many efforts have failed that might otherwise have succeeded in producing a government.

Far more complicated appears the issue of a change in the present balance of power between the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic. As things stand now, it is even improper to speak of a balance since, constitutionally, almost all effective power is in the hands of the Assembly. In spite of some confusion of thought on the matter, no one appears to wish a

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restoration of the parity which existed under the Third Republic between the Chamber and the Senate. At one extreme, Duclos does not want to see any change. At the other, Palewski, speaking for the RPF, indulges in the kind of double talk in which the De Gaullists specialize and suggests that while he is anxious to give a "plenitude of legislative powers" to the Council of the Republic, he wants to keep "a monopoly of decision" for the National Assembly. If it is unprofitable to look for constitutional enlightenment from anticonstitutional parties, not much light is provided by the center parties either. What the MRP and the Radical Socialists appear to have in mind is a strengthening of the behind-the-scene procedures which have already increased the prestige of the Council of the Republic. There would be a slight measure of constitutional revision to give members of the Council of the Republic the right to introduce bills, which only members of the Assembly now have. But the main effort would be concentrated upon the establishment of joint Assembly-Council committees to provide a continuous combined effort of the two houses in the drafting of legislative measures. While reserving to the National Assembly the public prestige of monopolistic dispenser of legislative wisdom, the Council of the Republic would be given a substantial role to play in the formative committee stages.

But more important than these efforts toward a more profitable working relationship between the two legislative bodies appears the concern to establish a sounder basis for the relationship between the cabinet and the legislative bodies. This is to a large extent a matter not of constitutional revision, but of correct organization of the work of legislative assemblies and of a change in the outlook of members of legislative assemblies toward government and the responsibilities of executive power. There is, of course, nothing novel in the tactics of harassment, in the suspicion and hostility with which parliamentary assemblies deal with the executive. The House of Commons has been able to accept a self-denying discipline of humility which has led to what many continentals would consider the paradox of its increase in

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power. But as a rule, from the Congress in Washington to the National Assembly in Paris and the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, the elected representatives of the people are forever trying to assume burdens which are not theirs and to treat with contempt and defiance the legislative proposals that come from their respective governments. Normal difficulties are made infinitely worse by the application of the "no boundary line" philosophy of government, especially in countries where the executive has few independent resources of its own.

There is at least a semblance of recognition of this problem in France today, and from the very first the new National Assembly has been presented with a number of tentative suggestions intended to speed up and to organize the legislative process. The RPF would like to cut up the National Assembly into a number of "sections," each working on a given area of legislative problems. Once a section has completed its work on a bill, it would present its conclusions to the entire Assembly which would vote upon it without debate. The MRP is offering a more complicated plan. Two new bodies would come between the standing committees and the National Assembly. First, a co-ordination and selection committee whose task it would be to reconcile parallel legislative proposals and to eliminate those without any clear merit. Second, a legislative committee of sixty, representative of the full Assembly, to examine and debate all bills as they emerge from the standing committees. The bills would reach the National Assembly only after the legislative committee was ready with a report, and then there would be no article by article discussion, but only general declarations of vote by party leaders and an Assembly vote on the entire bill. M. de Menthon, the parliamentary leader of the MRP, goes even further. He takes his cue from a provision of Article 72 of the Italian Constitution authorizing the setting-up of special committees with full legislative powers, to which can be referred for discussion and final approval bills that are thus altogether removed from the jurisdiction of the whole Parliament. If some such device were to be adopted to relieve the pressure of legislative work on the As-

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sembly and to shift to legislative committees the discussion and final approval of minor and technical measures, smaller parliaments would, in effect, be set up within the larger one.

It is probable that, upon closer examination, not much encouragement will be derived from this parliament-within-parliament technique. Article 72 has not made any visible difference in the speed or efficiency of the legislative work of the Italian Parliament. One is even tempted to agree with the opinions of Jacques Duclos, the French Communist leader, when he says that it is impossible to solve upon a purely technical level a difficulty which is, above all, of a political nature. France has already seen at first hand the inadequacy of complicated technical plans intended to provide the ideal solution to difficult problems, but remaining a dead letter because the spirit is missing that would give them life. The laws of 1946 and 1951 set up in most elaborate fashion an Economic Council, one of whose major constitutional tasks is that of rendering sound economic advice to the National Assembly. When this advice has been tendered, it has seldom made any impression on a legislative body jealous of its powers and fearful that any wise counsel might be said to come from the outside.

Most likely, no real solution can be found by a mere increase in committees inside the National Assembly or by a shifting of responsibilities from the Assembly to the proposed subassemblies. For the difficulty lies, as indicated above, in the attitudes of parties toward parliaments and governments, and of parliaments toward governments. And as long as parliament is unwilling to recognize the legislative, planning, and budgetary leadership of the cabinet and is unwilling to see itself forced to reach a final decision on major legislative issues when the government asks for a showdown, so long will the present paralysis continue.

The particular issues related to the legislative process are most clearly presented by François Goguel when he writes:

> Our parliamentary procedure seems to be faulty essentially at two points: on the one hand, debates do not take place on government bills, but on the bills as elaborated by the Assembly committees; on the other hand, debates do not open when the government wishes, but when the

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committees are ready and when it is agreeable to the Assembly. As a result, it is impossible to find out who is responsible when an important matter is left unsettled. With reference, for instance, to the bills on the reorganization of the army, the government feels it has done its duty when it has sent them to the Assembly; the committee, having failed to obtain further details as requested, and having therefore not sent its report to the Assembly, feels that it has no further responsibility in the matter; as for the Assembly itself, since it has not been able to start debate on the bill in the absence of a committee report, it does not feel any sense of guilt. The remedy to this state of affairs . . . consists in providing a distinction between the legislative role of parliament and its role of political control. The first should be exercised upon the initiative of the government, . . . for no parliamentary committee today can have available the documentation and the administrative competence necessary to draft a bill. . . . The legislative role of committees should be suppressed entirely. Government bills should be examined in a first reading by a general and frequently renewed committee selected by lot, and in a second reading by the Assembly itself. The debates should always be on the government text of the bill, with full right of amendment. . . . The legislative order of the day should be fixed by the government which is responsible before the assembly and which, because of this responsibility, has a right to compel parliament to pronounce itself on the business submitted to it.[10]

To sum up, the French political system must look for change in a variety of directions:

There is first the area of formal constitutional revision. Article 20 should be amended at least to the extent of granting equal power of legislative initiative to the Council of the Republic and to assert its right of discussion of National Assembly proposals under conditions less humiliating than at present. This could be done without changing Article 13, which asserts the legislative supremacy of the National Assembly. The investiture of the prime minister designate by an absolute majority vote of the Assembly contained in Article 45 should be abolished. The prime minister chosen by the President of the Republic will then be able to form a full cabinet and seek a vote of confidence from the National Assembly under circumstances that will make the chance of survival of the cabinet a better one, since parties will be morally bound to support a government in which their own

[10] See, on these issues and on the crisis of democracy in France, François Goguel, "La Démocratie en France," *Christianisme Social* (December 1950 and January-February 1951).

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men are already functioning as ministers. Finally, the complicated and unrealistic terms which, in Articles 51 and 52, surround and follow the dissolution of the National Assembly should be abolished altogether, to be replaced by a simpler grant of dissolution powers to the executive.

On a second parallel line, the parliamentary assemblies themselves should revise their internal regulations and mutual relationships and enforce the discipline of parliamentary work which is necessary. It may be impossible to transform the Council of the Republic into the old Senate, but it is not difficult, unless pride and the spirit of monopoly interfere, for the National Assembly to use, by means of joint committees, the skills of the Council. This, indeed, has already been happening, but both an open admission and a systematization of the process would be greatly desirable.

Last, but most important, is the essentially political problem of the reassessment of the duties and powers of each branch of government within the democratic framework. It is not a matter here of formal amendments or of the setting-up of much novel machinery. What is required is a more mature vision of the nature of the political process and of the sphere that must be allotted to the various organs of the government. The plea of the totalitarian fascists for efficiency and speed always results in the setting-up of technical assemblies which, when they work at all, become the prey of narrow interests and end up by permitting the dictatorial machine to function without hindrance or control. At the other end, the pleas in favor of an allegedly democratic intervention of the masses and of their self-appointed and demagogic chiefs throughout the course of the constitutional process leads to paralysis, since in a free community the executive refuses to proceed as a dictatorial elite would. The solution proper to a constitutional democracy is to arrive at a careful discrimination between the different functions that have to be exercised at the institutional level of a political society: of general legislative guidance, of executive leadership, of planning.

France must move in this direction, if her present malady is

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not to become the final proof of the decadence of Europe. It is a tragic and paradoxical irony that France should be the country to suffer most from the maladjustments of political power when, of all the countries of continental Europe, it has produced the most in men and ideals since the war. France has shown great daring in her plans of modernization and equipment. France has led Europe in offering revolutionary proposals of integration and unity. And France has the men who, devoted to the ideals of the common welfare, of public duty, and of Western culture, can guide the country in the future to a measure of performance far greater than in the past, provided only that some fairly modest beginnings are made toward the acceptance of a political system which, while not yielding too much of the bohemian nonchalance which is the rightful heritage of a Latin country, will still admit a few of the essentials in the management of a modern state.

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THE CONCEPT OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOVIET POLICY-MAKING

By RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

THE analysis of any human concept is infinitely and inevitably complicated by the mental processes of the original user and the investigator. Dedication to objectivity by the analyst can usually prevent only the more obvious, and not always the most important, psycho-cultural pressures which condition or determine both the content and the method of the analysis, to say nothing of its purpose and material. In turn, the concept under examination, even though it is necessarily rendered an object isolate for intensive review, remains and must be treated as essentially a living precipitate of the entire environment in which it was born and nourished.

"Objectivity" itself is such a concept, and current Soviet attacks on "bourgeois objectivity" should caution those rash persons who consider Soviet ideas and actions from the myopic viewpoint that objectivity is always the midpoint between unhappy extremes. It is, perhaps, fortunate that the policy-formulating focus on decision-making is currently so strongly impressed upon scholarly enterprise, reminding scientific seekers for truth that man does not live in, or totally by, the prophylaxis of the laboratory.

The degree to which language is the passive instrument of its employers or the unconscious tyrant of their thought process is a disputed issue; what cannot be disputed by the serious student of social relations, and particularly of comparative intercultural conceptions, is that language does bear a significant role in relation to thought patterns. It is essential, in analyzing a "foreign" conception, to realize that lack of explicit reference to a specific word-symbol need not reflect a lack of cognizance of this process, or of thinking which implicitly, even if unconsciously (mentally and semantically), employs the concept.

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The question of choice of materials for the present study was particularly difficult in view of the realization that terminological differences or even apparent conceptual gaps are not necessarily indications of difference or agreement; that ideas may assume very different garbs or formulations; and that published writings may not always reflect ideas or motivations, even when there is no conscious effort to conceal them. Accordingly, an extensive perusal of several million words of Soviet expression, including both random and selected expressions by the leaders and the press, was funneled under examination. The selected writings comprised the most important writings and speeches of Lenin and Stalin, including the reports to Party Congresses. The general sources were the Soviet histories, works on diplomacy, and military writings. An effort was made to obtain balanced representation between various periods of Soviet history.

Soviet Concepts of the Balance of Power

This analysis should commence with an investigation of the precise Soviet terminology used in discussing the "balance of power," with reference to index terms logically anticipated. Careful attention has been paid to the context of expressions, shades of meaning revealing possibly important nuances.

"Power" has come to be recognized, or accepted, as a dominant factor in Western political science. Its meaning is confused, but to attempt the inherently admirable task of unraveling the tangled threads of thought would only render us here the disservice of erroneously simplifying this complex and varicolored Western conception. It combines physical, moral, spiritual influence and other forms, and almost always combines an amalgam of content irreducible to one common denominator such as "military force" or "authority" or even "force." This very vagueness and broadness of meaning is very significant.

The Russian language has no term of equal connotation; the implications of this simple fact are vast. Seven fundamental Russian meanings of "power" are listed and defined below, and although each has direct English translations other than "power,"

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it must be kept in mind that there is no single all-embracing term equivalent to our word "power."[1]

(1) *Vlast'* is defined by the Ushakov dictionary as "the right and ability to submit something to someone"; or as "dominion," "authority," "rule," or "power." It is used in the famous slogan, "All Power to the Soviets."

(2) The words *moshch'*, *moguchest'*, and *moguchestvo* mean "power" in the sense of might, potency, and powerfulness.

(3) *Derzhava* expresses "power" in the sense of sovereignty, and is used in the phrase "The Great Powers."

(4) *Polnomochie* means "power" in the sense of delegated complete authority, as to a diplomat for negotiating settlement of a particular issue.

(5) *Sposobnost'* means "power" in the sense of talent, ability, or capability.

(6) *Voiska* is used to express the specific restricted meaning of troops or military "forces."

(7) *Sila,* the most general term, means "elemental force," "strength," or "vigor." It is used in such discrepant phrases as "water-power," "force of gravity," and "the armed forces."

The equivalents in Russian for the expression "balance of power" all use the last of these terms, *sila,* in the plural. Thus "power" in this expression is in Russian rendered as "forces," with an implication of physical measurability, or measurability expressible in equivalence to physical "forces."

(1) The direct equivalent of the term "balance" is the word *ravnovesie,* which means "balance" or "equilibrium." The Ushakov dictionary defines a "political balance" [*politicheskoe ravnovesie*] as: "a comparative stability of the general relation of forces in the political struggle; for example, in the struggle of parties, governments."

(2) To express the idea of manipulative balancing, the act and process, the verbs *uravnovesit'* and *uravnoveshivat'* are used, the

[1] The fundamental reason for this is the absence of an analytical framework of political science, as we know it, based on a study of power. Leninism-Stalinism, while acutely conscious of influence and power, is restricted in its open analysis of politics to generalizations of the Marxian social-economic philosophy; this is another story.

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resultant equilibrium being *uravnoveshennost'* and the state of counterpoised or neutralized balance being *uravnoveshivannie.*

(3) The English use of "balance" in the phrase "balance of power" to mean a preponderance is always expressed unambiguously by the Russian term *pereves,* meaning an "imbalance."

"Balance" in the distended meaning of "distribution" is expressed in these other terms in Russian:

(1) *Sootnoshenie* means "relation," "correlation," "connection," or "relationship." (The term *otnoshenie* expresses "relation" towards or regarding something.)

(2) *Rasstanovka* means "arrangement," "alignment," or "distribution."

(3) *Gruppirovka* or "grouping," and *peregruppirovka* or "regrouping," sometimes express this conception.

Sootnoshenie sil, the "relation of forces," is the central Soviet concept for regarding political phenomena.[2] This expresses the equivalent of an interpretation of the "balance of power," defining "balance" as distribution or relation, and defining "power" as quantitative forces. If "power" was meant to refer to a sovereign nation, *derzhava* would have been used; if military force, *voiska* would have been used; if general "might," *moshch'* would be expected; but the nonethical, implicitly quantitative term *sil,* meaning "of forces," is always used in expressions meaning equilibrium, imbalance, relation, and distribution.

The term *ravnovesie sil,* "balance of forces," is always used to describe the relation of forces in an equilibrium relation, and only this situation.[3] This naturally occurs rarely, in comparison to the number of instances where the relation is not seen as pure counterpoise.

Similarly, *pereves sil* is used to express all instances of imbalance, and only such instances.

These Russian equivalents always express their respective meanings of "balance," as equilibrium, relation or distribution, or "imbalance," unambiguously.

[2] The terms *rasstanovka sil,* "alignment of forces," and *gruppirovka sil,* "grouping of forces," convey substantially the same meaning but are less frequently used.

[3] See again the Ushakov definition of a "political balance" cited above.

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For this study the author has examined two hundred and fifty instances of the terms defined above. It is interesting to note the relative frequency of different equivalents to the various meanings of "balance of power" in English. Out of the 250 instances examined, 136 were the phrase "relation of forces" [*sootnoshenie sil*], 87 were other expressions of general distribution of forces, 17 were "equilibrium" (all *ravnovesie*), and 10 were "preponderance" (all *pereves*). We shall cite illustrations from Stalin's writings.

(1) The relation of forces:

> . . . at the present stage of development and with the present conditions of the relation of forces [*sootnoshenie sil*], the intensification of the class struggle and strengthening of the resistance of the capitalist elements in town and country is taking place.[4]

(2) The alignment (distribution) of forces:

> From the history of Europe we know that every time when treaties are concluded concerning the alignment of forces [*rasstanovka sil*] for a new war, these treaties are called peace treaties.[5]

(3) The equilibrium of forces:

> Lenin regarded the Manifesto of October 17 [1905] as an expression of a certain temporary equilibrium of forces [*ravnovesie sil*]; the proletariat and the peasantry, having wrung the manifesto from the tsar, were still not strong enough to overthrow tsardom, whereas tsardom was no longer able to rule by the old methods alone. . . .[6]

(4) An imbalance of forces:

> [Stalin is discussing an alleged struggle over markets between the USA and UK within the imperialist camp.] The overbalance of forces [*pereves sil*] in this struggle—and it is a definite overbalance—is on the side of the USA.[7]

"Power" has no direct Russian equivalent, however, in the general ambiguous meaning in which it is used in "balance of power" in Western political parlance and analysis. Its Russian equivalent in this phrase is more restricted in scope, but not

[4] Stalin, "On the Right Deviation in the V.K.P. (B.)," *Sochineniia* (Collected Works), Moscow, 1949, XII, 35.

[5] Stalin, "Speech at the XIV Congress of the V.K.P. (B.)," *ibid.*, VII, 274.

[6] Stalin, *History of the C.P.S.U. (B.), Short Course*, New York, International Publishers, 1939, pp. 78-79. (Russian original checked.)

[7] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, XII, 248. The English translation (London, Modern Books, 1930) translated this phrase as "balance of power."

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more definite in meaning, and while implicitly excluding certain meanings sometimes intended in the English expression, it is limited only by vague boundaries of an apparent quantitative nuance.

For further investigation of this concept in its many meanings and aspects, it is necessary to look to the context of the political environment of thought and deed in which its role is cast.

"Relation of forces" is the generally inclusive term in the distributional sense (equilibrium and imbalance being particular forms of alignment or relation), and hence it is the general concept which we are considering at present. Expressions of, or the absence of expressions of, other connotations of "balance of power" will be specifically referred to in the discussion.

The Relation of Forces in Policy Formulation

The Soviet elite, and some other claimants to Marxian "science," have always contended that the calculation of the relation of class forces is the basic scientific analysis which guides policy-making. Lenin once said that it was "the main point in Marxism and Marxian tactics."[8] On another occasion he remarked:

> We, Marxists, have always been proud of the fact that by a strict calculation of the mass forces and mutual class relations we have determined the expediency of this or that form of struggle.[9]

Again he said that "adopting a serious attitude toward the defense of the country means . . . strictly calculating the relation of forces."[10] To cite but one more statement of Lenin's, he wrote theoretically that:

> The fundamental task of proletarian tactics was defined by Marx in strict conformity with the general principles of his materialist-dialectical outlook. Nothing but an objective account of the totality of all the mutual relationships of all the classes of a given society without exception, and consequently an account of the mutual relationships between it and other societies, can serve as the basis for the correct tactics of the advanced class.[11]

[8] Lenin, *Selected Works*, New York, International Publishers, n.d., VII, 353.
[9] Lenin, *Sochineniia* (Collected Works), 2d ed., Moscow, 1929, XXII, 265.
[10] Lenin, *Selected Works*, VII, 354. See also *ibid.*, X, 104-5.
[11] Lenin, "Karl Marx," *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, New York, International Publishers, 1935, p. 29.

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Many similar statements by Bolshevik leaders, especially in the earlier years of the regime, could be cited.

It should be noted that expediential action on the basis of the calculation of the relation of forces is permissible, and mandatory, for *tactical* actions only, and does not affect the ultimate strategy or aims of Soviet Communism. As the Program of the Communist International stated:

> In determining its line of *tactics*, each Communist Party must take into account the concrete internal and external situation, the relation of class forces. . . .[12]

Within this tactical scope, great flexibility is required.

> Tactics permit maneuvering, tacking, the transition from certain methods of struggle to others, alternate attacks and retreats on the basis of an exact calculation of forces.[13]

There can be but one correct "line" or policy at any given time on any given matter, that which is determined by a correct calculation of the relation of forces obtaining in the particular situation. Any deviation from this correct line is very dangerous, because it misleads errant supporters "objectively" into becoming opponents.

There are two kinds of deviation: (1) underestimation of the hostile forces (with its extreme of failure to calculate them and assumption of their nonexistence), or (2) overestimation of the hostile forces (with its extreme of failure to calculate them and assumption that they are too strong to be dealt with). Stalin stated this explicitly in a speech in 1928, when he declared:

> Where does the danger of the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation in our party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism. . . . Where does the danger of the "Left" (Trotskyite) deviation in our party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism. . . .[14]

The "Left" deviation is termed "adventurism," and the Right deviation is called "opportunism" (or in certain contexts *khvos-*

[12] In *Strategy and Tactics of the Proletarian Revolution*, New York, International Publishers, 1936, p. 65.

[13] VI. Sorin, *Partiia i Oppozitsiia* (The Party and the Opposition), Moscow, 1925, p. 42. See also pp. 13, 51, 64 and 71.

[14] Stalin, *Leninism*, New York, International Publishers, 1942, pp. 82-83.

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tism or "tailism," when it connotes lagging behind events). Adventurism is taking an unwarranted risk without duly considering the strength of the hostile "forces," while opportunism is overlooking and not seizing a gain or advance which the objective relation of forces permits.[15] Both fail to calculate accurately the relation of forces and thus stray from the sole correct "line." In the Stalinist epoch, this ceases to have much political meaning, since no one is permitted to express himself sufficiently ever to attempt this calculation—except the sanctified top leadership—and deviationism has become merely any expression other than that laid down by the Party line.

Thus we see that: (1) The Soviet view is that "the calculation of the relation of forces" in any given situation is the Marxian mode of determining policy, and carries an ethical compulsion to act accordingly.

(2) This calculation imparts a very "realistic" character to policy decisions based upon it. Advance, retreat, defense are all decided in terms of relative capabilities (at least theoretically) and flexibility is permissible, indeed required.

All decisions based on this calculation are tactical, expedient, and do *not* affect ultimate aims or intentions (at least consciously).

A calculation of the prevailing relation of forces would appear to be a more "scientific" method of policy determination than sheer intuition, but whence its Marxian essence? The concentration upon "class" hostility and its extension to Soviet vs. anti-Soviet (or counter-Soviet) hostility is apparently derived from Marxism. But granting that Marxian thinking may determine, or influence the determination of, the hostile units the relation between which is being calculated, it simply does not define the "forces" or provide an algebra of decision-making which scientifically decides the opportuneness of action. The "forces" seem to be anything which affects freedom of action in advancing one's dominion by reducing that of the presumed enemy, and hence may be defined as the capabilities of struggle, physical and moral.

[15] See Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XII, 198 and 265, for examples of adventurism.

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Two problems remain unsolved: who is to calculate and ultimately judge the correctness of calculation, and by what specific criteria is the relation of forces to be determined precisely enough to be "scientific" and not subject to the fallibility of the calculator?

Theoretically, any intelligent and informed sincere Marxist would seem to be an adequate medium for translating the Marxian calculation into decisions; after all, the Marxists disdain non-Marxian "socialism" or utopianism precisely because it lacks this scientific apprehension of the dialectic inherent in nature, far above any mortal abilities. In fact, however, this has not proved the case. Persons who considered themselves sincere and genuine Marxists continued to disagree on matters theoretically soluble by "scientific calculation" as long as freedom to disagree was permitted. Bukharin, Trotsky, and Lenin were of a roughly equal level of intellectual ability, and each considered himself to be a totally sincere and dedicated Bolshevik, and yet they each adopted different views on the question of accepting the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The only escape from this dilemma was in each branding the others a non-Marxist on this particular calculation; and this was done. Lenin's view, the most realistic, won out and seemed justified by later events (success is especially important in Bolshevik policy, since there can be but one correct line at any time), and many of the others later "capitulated" and declared their failure to calculate the relation of forces (not their *incorrect* calculation, which would seem logical, but their total failure to calculate, despite their statements of calculation at the time). This is but one, although an outstanding, instance of total disagreement among Marxist calculators.

By March 1921 "fractions," or organized expressions of dissidence within the Bolshevik Party, were prohibited. The "majority" decisions of the Central Committee (and its Politburo) were correct and binding on all Party members. Non-Party participation in decision-making had, of course, been liquidated much earlier (in March 1918). Freedom of discussion, clarification of the relation of forces on any matter under discussion,

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was permitted, and theoretically has never been further limited. In practice, the rise of Stalin to complete power, culminating in 1930 and underlined by the blood purges of 1936 to 1938, has been attended by the eradication of any permissibility to disagree, even before decisions, with the Politburo calculation of the relation of forces.

It is therefore apparent that the Marxian "scientific" character of the calculation of the relation of forces is quite limited to the degree of fallibility of the calculator, who assumes his calculations to be the only correct ones, or at any rate rationalizes them as such. The former Bolshevik preparedness to recognize mistakes has been toned down to an inaudible murmur in current Soviet ideology. But denial of errors does not negate their existence. Such profound miscalculations as the anticipation of easy success in the Finnish campaign in 1939-1940 are clear indications of the fallibility of the master calculator (whether he be Stalin, a very small group, or the collective Politburo is not a matter of concern here). This again raises the question of the criteria of calculation.

Bolshevik ideology, even in its era of "frankness" before 1930, did not make explicit any criteria for calculation because there were no clear-cut indices for decision-making.[16] What was the criterion, and probably remains so in its modified form, is the general Marxian "world-view," with its many presumptions and presumed conclusions. This will be discussed later.

Several points concerning the criteria of calculation may be distinguished:

(1) Soviet ideology, while extolling the scientific, Marxian calculation of the relation of forces as the determination of policy, does not even imply what the criteria for calculating or for defining the forces are.

(2) Presumably the most able and sincere Bolshevik (genuine Marxist) can best calculate; but even this is not made explicit.

(3) Differences in calculation are not permissible, because

[16] There was an implicit recognition of limited ability to calculate. As Lenin several times remarked, "There is no battle in this world where all probabilities are known beforehand" (Lenin, *Zvezda* [The Star], April 1, 1912).

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there is always only one correct decision or line; they are not admissible, because this calculation is claimed as infallible Marxian "science."

(4) In practice, the matter is not discussed at all, and may or may not be the language of the Politburo. It is probable, however, that it remains so, because its general and undefined nature imposes no necessary limitations upon the freedom of the expediential policy-maker. For this reason, it remains the current language of the press and public pronouncements of the top political elite (Politburo). Its almost incidental use by the latter strongly suggests its currency in their calculations.

(5) The calculation of the relation of forces is a most convenient means for internally and externally rationalizing the interpretation of Marxian ideology in pure "power" terms of political expediency. It assumes maximization of advance, permits honorable retreat or a temporary "equilibrium," and does not limit freedom of action in any way, since only the top political elite is permitted to calculate, and yet permits subjectively genuine or consciously sham restatement of loyalty to the old Marxian symbols.

There are relatively few explicit references in Communist, or generally in Marxist, writings which illuminate the practical question of the degree of alterability or manipulability of the relation of forces. Certain historical actions are said to be impelled by the dialectic, due to economic conditions which exist, but inevitability and proletarian policy-making are rarely focused together.

One clear statement of this issue (arising from a debate of policy formulation) was a statement by Bukharin at the Seventh Party Congress in March 1918, debating "peace" with the Central Powers. His statement was not challenged by Lenin or Bukharin's other opponents, who presumably thought it was unwarranted, but who did not attack the correctness of the theoretical point with its wide practical implication. Bukharin stated:

> Comrade Zinoviev stands on a completely fatalistic point of view. He says that now the real relation of forces is unpleasant, and nothing

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more. On that he is ready to quiet down, and proposes to others to do likewise. This position is absolutely inadmissible. Revolutionary Marxists have never said that the real relation of forces is such and such; our task in the capacity of realistic politicians consists in the fact that we constantly strive to change the relation of actual forces.[17]

The statement by Zinoviev to which Bukharin alludes is an example of the "fatalistic" view of inevitability. Zinoviev had said:

No one can say how long this breathing spell will last. It seems to me that it is clear only that this peace, acquired by us at Brest, appears as a more or less exact photograph of that relation of force which exists in the world arena. . . .[18]

Soviet thought has clearly adopted the view that the relation of forces is manipulable to a certain ill-defined extent; the "balance of power" is not deterministic, but it is conditioning, and limits the freedom of policy-making to decisions made in accordance with a strict calculation both of the existing relation, and of the capabilities needed to cause a favorable shift from the extant relation. The degree of freedom depends upon the fluidity or rigidity of the opposed forces. Conscious, planned alteration of the relation of forces is obtainable only by great effort. As Professor Leonov remarked, concerning the recent war:

In order to alter radically the relation of forces on the Soviet-German front to the advantage of the Soviet state, a tremendous straining [*napriazhenie*] of all forces of the country, the mobilization of all possibilities of our economy, was required.[19]

This military context shows clearly the Soviet conception of the manipulability of the relation of forces. As Major General Talensky of the General Staff has written:

Stalinist strategy demonstrated a method of actively altering the relation of forces. There was no example in history of such consequent weakening of the forces of the enemy and growing of one's own forces as was effected by our High Command, secured by the wonderful victory of the Red Army. . . . Active defense created a change in the relation of forces. . . .[20]

[17] Bukharin, in *Sedmoi S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii* (Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party), Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, pp. 122-23.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[19] Leonov, *Moral'nyi Faktor V Sovremënnykh Voinakh* (The Morale Factor in Contemporary Wars), Voenizdat, MVS, Moscow, 1946, pp. 105-6.

[20] Talensky, *Bol'shevik*, No. 10-11 (May-June 1944), p. 14. This has been frequently stated.

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The idea of manipulating the "forces" in such a manner as to remain a detached "balancer," which is equivalent to a special mode of utilizing contradictions in the enemy camp, is found in Soviet thought, and recognized by them as a principle of bourgeois diplomacy as well. Thus it was said concerning French motives in favoring a "greater Poland" in 1919, "The French imperialists wished to create a counterweight to Germany and to Soviet Russia," and also that Germany had at Versailles utilized the contradictions among the Allies.[21] And in 1939 Stalin interpreted British and French foreign policy as follows:

> The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness . . . to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength . . . and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.[22]

This remained the great Soviet fear of Western action, at least even down to the opening of the second front, and the Western Allies were severely attacked on this account.

However, this same tactic is laudatory in Soviet policy. As Stalin said in a speech to the Central Committee in 1925:

> If war were to commence, then we must not sit by with idle hands—we must enter, but enter last. And we must enter for the purpose of throwing the decisive weight into the scales, weight which can turn the balance.[23]

Another aspect of the manipulability of the relation of forces is the question of actualizing potentialities. Stalin has shown a particular interest in distinguishing between potentialities (or "opportunities"—the Russian word *vozhmoznosty* may be rendered either way) and actualities. For example, in ending the N.E.P., Stalin once used this distinction to explain (or rationalize) his policy. He declared:

> Lenin does not say that N.E.P. gives us socialism ready made. Lenin merely says that N.E.P. guarantees the *possibility* of building the foundations of socialist economy. There is a great difference between

[21] Vladimir Potëmkin, *Istoriia Diplomatii* (The History of Diplomacy), Vol. III, Moscow, 1945, pp. 35, 45, and 48.

[22] Stalin, *Leninism*, p. 440.

[23] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, VII, 14.

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> the *possibility* of building socialism and the *actual building of socialism.* Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes that the country be electrified and industry, agriculture and transport placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale production, as a condition for the final victory of socialism.[24]

In reviewing Soviet conceptions of the manipulability of the relation of forces, three points should be noted.

(1) The "balance of power" as the relation of forces is not considered to be totally deterministic in Soviet policy-making. It does not deny the need for further decision by the leadership. This has the corollary effect of permitting the extolling of leaders who presumably make decisions of genius, without necessarily destroying the Marxian myth.

(2) The relation of forces is the basis for all decision-making, nonetheless, and is therefore strongly conditioning. Although it does not eliminate the need for decisions made by the calculator, it presents him with the material for calculation, and is the picture of reality which he interprets for policy decision. As we have noted, it may be so general in nature that the calculator, in fact, has considerable freedom and little guidance.

(3) Stalin's distinction between "potentialities" and "actualities" has usually been used merely to rationalize some policy shift which Stalin has favored. It does not alter the general conception of the manipulability of the relation of forces, since calculation includes both actual and anticipated alignments of forces (in accordance with Marxian "dynamic dialectical movement," and in accordance with common political sense).

The Relation of Forces in Soviet Strategy

The relation of forces is the determining basis for advance or retreat, offense or defense, limited only by the finite manipulable opportunities. The close relation between Soviet military and political doctrines makes general statements on strategy almost interchangeable. As one Soviet general has written:

[24] Stalin, *Leninism*, pp. 81-82; italics Stalin's.

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> Strategy points the aims of the armed forces. . . . these aims must be realistic. They must correspond to the relation of forces. . . .[25]

And as another Soviet general declared:

> The strength of Stalinist strategy consists in its basis on the correct calculation of the real relation of opportunities, forces, tendencies, regarding them not as static, but dynamic, in development. Precisely that realistic calculation of all the operating factors secures the effectiveness of Stalinist strategy, setting its decisive aims.[26]

The relation of forces in strategic decision-making is the estimated balance of relative capabilities at any moment of calculation. As a Soviet military manual stated:

> The relation of forces is clarified by the comparison of one's own forces and capabilities with the forces and probable capabilities of the enemy.[27]

This over-all estimation of the situation is usual in all armies;[28] its systematic use in political affairs is not usual, since international politics are not ordinarily viewed as pure conflict, and in this the Soviet case is distinctive.

The relation of forces is the criterion determining advance or retreat in any situation—and no situation is viewed as static.

In case of a favorable relation of forces, one where the Soviets have the capability for effective advance, advance is mandatory, with the single reservation that this be viewed strategically (that sometimes potential tactical gains must not be realized because they are strategically inadvisable).[29] This stress on "advance" in the Bolshevik code of operations, and in present Soviet policy and actions, is of supreme importance. Not only is advance *permissible* where possible, but *required*. Advantages proffered by the favorable relation of forces must be seized.[30]

In case of defense, in an unfavorable relation of forces, the

[25] Major General M. Galatinov, *Strategicheskaia Tsel'* (The Strategic Objective), an excerpt from a Soviet publication of 1943 or later, pp. 128-29.

[26] Major General N. Talensky, *Bol'shevik*, No. 3 (1946), pp. 28-29.

[27] *Obshchaia Taktika* (General Tactics), Voenizdat, NKO, Moscow, 1940, I, 16.

[28] See Clausewitz (*On War*, New York, Modern Library, 1943, p. 14) for a comparative statement that "the objective nature of war makes it a calculation of probabilities."

[29] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, V, 166-68.

[30] See Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, 1951, pp. 66-72, for a valuable discussion of advance in Soviet doctrine. This book is the best study of the political code of the Soviet leadership.

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alteration of the relation to permit the assumption of the offensive is required. Again, to quote a Soviet general:

> In strategic defense one of the combatants, as a rule, faces an unfavorable relation of forces. . . . The fundamental aim of strategic defense in this situation consists of securing the conditions for an alteration of the relation of forces to the advantage of the combatant, to prepare the necessary prerequisites for the transition to offensive action, for the seizure of the strategic initiative.[31]

In cases of an adverse relation of forces, retreat may even be required as the temporary strategy. This same source has stated:

> Naturally *the unfavorable relation of forces* for us in the first period of the Great Fatherland War *necessitated the retreat* of our troops into the depth of their territory, losing space.[32]

Retreat is undertaken (aside from minor local "ambush" withdrawals or withdrawals from "probing" [*proba sil*] to determine the relation of forces) only as the necessary consequence of an adverse shift in the relation of forces. The first such instance in Soviet Russia occurred almost immediately, and after bitter internal dispute Lenin's view of necessary retreat (by acceptance of the German proffered Treaty of Brest-Litovsk) prevailed. In this intra-Party debate Lenin declared:

> And adopting a serious attitude towards defense of the country means preparing thoroughly for it, and *strictly calculating the relation of forces.* If our forces are obviously small, the best means of defense is *retreat into the interior of the country.* Whoever regards this as an artificial formula, made up to suit the needs of the moment, is advised to read old Clausewitz, one of the greatest authorities on military matters, concerning the lessons of history in this connection. The "Left Communists" [i.e., those opposing the peace of Brest-Litovsk], however, do not give the slightest indication that they understand the significance of the question of *the relation of forces.* [33]

As he explained, "I want to concede space to the momentary victor, in order to gain time"; "We must not tie our hands in one strategic maneuver. All depends on the relation of forces. . . ."[34]

Stalin too has fully recognized this. As he put it, "Retreat under certain unfavorable conditions is as legitimate a form of

[31] Major General Talensky, in *Voennaia Mysl'* (Military Thought), No. 6 (June 1946), pp. 3-4.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 7. [33] Lenin, *Selected Works*, VII, 358; italics mine.
[34] Lenin, in *Sedmoi S'ezd*, pp. 126 and 129.

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warfare as the offensive."[35] In *Foundations of Leninism* Stalin spoke of:

> . . . A proper retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable [*neizbezhno*], when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to ward off a blow. . . .[36]

Again, in his *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, Stalin declared, in relation to political and military strategy, the need to be able to retreat properly as well as to advance.[37]

The Relation of Forces in World Politics

The Soviet world-view of international politics is based on the Marxian idea of a basic and inevitable conflict between exploiters and exploited. Originally conceived in terms of class struggle, the October Revolution lent a new territorial dimension to the struggle, and the acquisition of a "proletarian motherland" shifted conflict from internal subversion to external war. The "class" struggle remained theoretically primary, but it was soon reformulated in new terms. Stalin was among the first to do so, in a little known article in *Izvestiia* on February 22, 1919, in which he stated: "The world has decisively and unalterably split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism."[38]

Struggle was clearly apparent. First the German war had to be liquidated, then the foreign intervention and the Civil War. By a series of circumstances, the Bolshevik regime emerged in control of a vast part of the Russian Empire, and at "peace" with the rest of the world. As an early Soviet historian termed this, "a certain equilibrium [*ravnovesie*] settled between the Soviet Union and the capitalist encirclement."[39] This same writer continued:

> But by its [the Soviet regime's] very existence, the struggle is maintained. The fundamental contradiction remains. The decaying capital-

[35] Stalin, in *Bol'shevik*, No. 3 (February 1947), p. 6.
[36] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, VI, 160. [37] Stalin, *History of the C.P.S.U. (B.)*, pp. 89-96.
[38] Stalin, "Two Camps," *Sochineniia*, IV, 232.
[39] Tanin, *Mezdunarodnia Politika SSSR, 1917-1924* (International Politics of the USSR, 1917-1924), Moscow, 1925, p. 5.

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ist encirclement strives to contaminate the healthy Communist kernel. But the Communist kernel is able by its own growth to cast down the decaying surroundings, and by itself to fill up the whole encirclement, the entire globe. Thus the struggle is maintained. Only it has taken new economic-diplomatic forms in the place of wars. And so—until a certain time . . .[40]

Stalin himself formulated this explanation officially at the Fourteenth Party Congress, reviewing the preceding period.

The most fundamental, novel, most decisive and most pervasive of all events for this period in the realm of foreign relations was that between our country which is building socialism and the countries of the capitalist world. There has been established a certain temporary balance of forces [*ravnovesie sil*]—a balance which is defined by the current streak [*sic*] of "peaceful coexistence" between the land of the Soviets and the countries of capitalism. That which we once considered as a short breathing spell after the war [Brest peace] has extended itself into a whole period of breathing space. From this has come this certain balance of forces [*ravnovesie sil*] and this period of "peaceful coexistence" between the world of the bourgeoisie and the world of the proletariat.[41]

The entire idea of "peaceful coexistence" is thus "a temporary equilibrium in the relation of forces." This is clearly expressed in numerous later statements of coexistence, which never refer to permanent coexistence. As Stalin wrote in the *History of the C.P.S.U. (B.)* in 1938: "To destroy the danger of foreign capitalist intervention the capitalist encirclement would have to be destroyed."[42]

The relation of forces between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world is the basic determinant of Soviet foreign policy.

The foreign political situation of the Soviet Union has always been defined by its economic, political, and military might, and the relation of forces between the world of Socialism and the world of capitalism.[43]

Since World War II, the theme emphasized is less "capitalist encirclement" than "two camps,"[44] socialism (the U.S.S.R. and

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 5. The closing ellipsis is an emphasis of Tanin's.

[41] Stalin, "Political Report of the Central Committee, 18 December [1925]," *Sochineniia*, VII, 261-62.

[42] Stalin, *History of the C.P.S.U. (B.)*, p. 274.

[43] I. M. Lemin, *Bor'ba Dvukh Napravlenii v Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenihakh* (The Struggle of the Two Tendencies in International Relations), Moscow, 1947, p. 12.

[44] Several formulations are used: two "camps" [*lageri*], "directions" [*napravlenii*], "tendencies" [*tendentsii*], "courses" [*kursi*], "systems" [*sistemi*], "worlds" [*miri*]. "Camps," "systems," and "worlds" are all frequent.

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its satellites) and capitalism (the free world). *Bol'shevik*, in an editorial in 1946, stated that: "The historic victory over Hitler Germany and its accomplices has altered the relation of forces in the international arena . . . ,"[45] a theme often repeated since that time.

The possibility of peaceful coexistence has been restated, but the great danger of war has been even more strongly stressed, and both Molotov and Mikoyan have declared that the inevitable coming world conflict will spell "the liquidation of the whole system of world imperialism."[46]

Thus we see that the expectations of the Soviet leaders—at least, as responsibly expressed to their public—are for war, and for war victorious for "socialism," that is, their Soviet power. This public claim of total world victory may proceed from a conviction that in another war one side is bound to destroy the other, even if it weakens itself greatly in the process, and that world power is distributed in a bipolar pattern (a development "foreseen" by, and compatible with, their ideology). Even if they entertain highly classified and probably internalized doubts as to the real outcome, they must of course mobilize morale. Moreover, the suffering of the Russian people in the recent conflict, and continued consumer and political deprivations, doubtless make the preview of genuine peace in the measurable future (i.e., after one more great world war) a useful, perhaps necessary, promise. This promise is supplemented, in case "the war" is not *soon* forthcoming, by promising that Communism can be achieved even in the face of continued capitalist existence abroad,[47] although it is very doubtful that the Soviet leaders would actually play their ace of presenting the future paradise, in view of long to be expected (and demanded) severe deprivations and low standard of living.

In this discussion, we have been presenting the Soviet concept

[45] *Bol'shevik*, No. 11-12 (June 1946), p. 1.

[46] Molotov, *Bol'shevik*, No. 24 (December 1949), p. 21; and Mikoyan, *Pravda*, March 11, 1950, p. 4. See also Major General N. Talensky, in *Bol'shevik*, No. 11 (June 1951), p. 36: "If the imperialists succeed in unleashing a third world war, it will bring the destruction not of individual capitalist states, but of the entire world capitalism."

[47] Shvernik, *Bol'shevik*, No. 24 (December 1949), p. 93.

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of temporary balance between the Soviet Union and the capitalist encirclement. Soviet ideas and explanations have therefore necessarily been set forth uncritically. It seems advisable, however, to look for a moment at the probabilities and possibilities of actual Soviet adherence to or deviation from this theory in operative thinking and policy formulation. Probabilities are the most definite conclusions it is possible to draw, since no one save the Politburo could confirm or deny them, if indeed even they could.

The history of Soviet diplomacy is readily explicable in the general terms of their claimed ideology. The fears of capitalist encirclement as expounded above, the techniques of utilizing contradictions in the hostile camp, and above all the sharp delimitation between the Soviet Union and all the rest of the world are eloquently expressed in the policies of the Soviet Union. Peace is the genuine desire of those who believe they are on the materially weaker side of a precarious equilibrium; and this need not contradict the long-range aim of destroying the hostile counters in the world scale. The world has seen only too clearly that formal "peace" may be co-ordinate with Communist subversion, coups, and in latter days satellite aggression—all while the Soviet Union ardently champions, and for the time genuinely seeks, world peace.

Capitalist encirclement and the international equilibrium of forces between it and the Soviet state became the emphasis of Soviet ideology because of its relevance to the situation (in Soviet inner eyes); as with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in general, those elements of it which do correspond to power relations and political situations of the Soviet state are intensified and accepted, while those elements which are not readily manipulable (unconsciously) by the political leadership tend to shrivel up into inoperative liturgy. That this is not good Marxism is all the more fortunate for the Soviet leaders (although they most probably do not face the issue, and sincerely would deny that their alterations, conscious and not, are "un-Marxian"), for it tends to make of Soviet operative ideology a more realistic and

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viable (although not necessarily a more "correct" or justified) policy.

Be this as it may, there is no doubt that from the level of the Central Committee down, the ideology as expressed in the concepts and ideas under consideration is mandatory and "operative." In technical lines—military, industrial, and others—it may be less stressed than popularly, but even here it is the operative fundament.

Whether the top leaders really "believe" in capitalist encirclement or not, their policy is always expressed in terms of calculation about it and action on this basis, and hence at the least it serves as a clear indication of interests.

Implied in much of what has been stated is the Soviet emphasis on advance, using all opportunities to further their power. This is sanctioned by their ideology, so there is no deterrent to complete political expediency. Maneuver, retreat, pause—all are tactics in the general strategy of advance.

As we have seen, the calculated relation of forces determines the limitation of advance. One expression of this, in addition to the numerous explicit references to the relation of forces in this exact context, is "active" or "presently effective" hostility [*nalichie vrazhdebnosti*] as the temporarily unalterable residue of active opposition, requiring a temporary cession of the advance. Thus, in the terms of one Soviet writer, "Soviet foreign policy soberly calculates the presently effective hostility of the capitalist encirclement to the U.S.S.R."[48] History, however, is considered to be dynamic, so that this situation fluctuates—in recent years, to the advantage of the Soviet power. That the Soviet Union has greatly increased in its relative and absolute power serves to intensify conviction in illusory ideas as to the source of this change and nature of the opponent's decline. This should not be construed to suggest that they fail to appreciate the cold bases of forces, and of propaganda, which are the real source of their own strength; quite on the contrary, they are "forces" to be calculated and maximized.

[48] G. Alexandrov, *et al*, *Politicheski Slovar'* (Political Dictionary), Moscow, 1940, p. 93.

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From this conclusion, it necessarily follows that any balance of power must be temporary, insofar as Soviet aims are concerned.[49] It cannot be part of the goal, because the goal is clearly universal "monolithic" control. Although a balance of power [*ravnovesie sil*] may be sought tactically, it cannot be sought as an ultimate aim. This is also true concerning any distribution-balance of power [*sootnoshenie sil*], since the foe must be totally annihilated.

Thus we see that the balance of power between the two opposed systems, socialism (the U.S.S.R. and satellites) and capitalism (all others, especially the U.S. and U.K.), may be sought as a temporary expedient, and similarly (if not as a corollary) peace. But just as the balance (*ravnovesie* or *sootnoshenie*) is necessarily of a temporary nature, so also is its by-product peace.

The term *bor'ba za mir*, the "struggle for peace,"[50] has been a consistent Soviet cry from the Peace of Brest-Litovsk to the Stockholm appeal, but as the Soviet leaders themselves have consistently reiterated, it is peace sought not as an end, but as a means to build the ("socialist") might of the U.S.S.R. Lasting peace is a "goal," but is conceived (or permissibly expressed) only as one of the advantages to be achieved by universal Communism victorious. The *bor'ba za mir* was born of the tactical necessity of survival in an age when the dogma was "world revolution." It was later transformed into an ideological "tenet" for the purpose of converting or confirming attitudes at home and abroad; it never contradicted the aim of annihilating nonsocialist rule everywhere (standards of "socialist" orthodoxy being defined by Moscow), but was used for its psychological appeal to calm, self-confidence, self-justification, and in contrast to less careful statements of the "enemy."

"Containment" as a mode of opposing this Soviet advance is undoubtedly correct. Although practical measures advanced

[49] This reflects the Marxian idea that the dialectic of history is dynamic and constantly in flux, thus denying any "static" balance. While Soviet ideology does *not* express these terms, it may or may not be influenced by the earlier ideological considerations expressed in this explanation.

[50] The word *mir* means both "peace" and "world" in Russian, so that appropriately this stock phrase also means "struggle for the world."

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under this label may or may not be effective measures of containment,[51] the basic conception of stopping the otherwise continuing Soviet advance by "effective hostility" [*nalichie vrazhdebnosti*] does demonstrate a correct appreciation of Soviet ideas of advance, "balanced forces," and retreat. A realization of this fact is crucial to an understanding of the Soviet world-view of international politics.

Recapitulation: Soviet Conceptions of the Balance of Power

In the absence of any comprehensive Western analysis of the concept of the balance of power, the Soviet conception cannot be strictly compared here. In this recapitulation, the Soviet view is recast in terms of five basic perspectives on the balance of power:

(1) The "balance" as distribution of power.
(2) The manipulability of power.
(3) The balance of power in policy formulation.
(4) The ethical perspective.
(5) The perspective of duration expectations.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The English-language term "balance of power" is used to refer to four different meanings of distribution. Soviet thinking likewise encompasses these same four meanings, but using different terms.

(1) A general relation or distribution of power is expressed by the terms *sootnoshenie sil, rasstanovka sil, gruppirovka sil,* or *peregruppirovka sil.* It may in context sometimes denote a preponderance (by reference to a "favorable" or "unfavorable" *sootnoshenie sil*), but continues always to express a general distribution of forces.

(2) An equilibrium of two equal units is always a *ravnovesie sil.* This true "balance" is always considered as temporary, and usually is explicitly stated to be such. Politically, this means that

[51] Current policy debates over what *constitutes* containment are not a subject appropriate to this discussion; but consideration of the *idea* of containment most certainly is.

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a maximization of advance (or minimization of retreat) has been effected, and that for the time being a static situation prevails.

(3) The idea of an equilibrium of two equal units, with a detached mobile balance, is not frequent, but is used to describe situations where an "active neutrality" (i.e., neutrality as a positive policy of calculated advantage) will permit later decisive commission, as in the period from 1939 to 1941. The more usual idea in Western thought, that the balancer (e.g., Great Britain in the nineteenth century) should remain uncommitted indefinitely (unless threatened) to maximize gains by continual pressure on the two "balanced" counters, is not seen in Soviet thought. The detached balancer, as well as the "equilibrium," are only temporary measures in the appropriate situation, and not permanent goals or expectations.

(4) A favorable imbalance (preponderance) of power is always a *pereves sil*, and of course represents a situation of advantage requiring further advance. Thus it is more than likely that the Soviet leadership, convinced as they seem to be (at least in public statements since 1947) that a great *pereves sil* has redounded to their "camp" since the war, consider that a "potentiality" [*vozmozhnost'*] for advance exists, and must therefore be actualized. Hence the aggression (by coup, occupation, and satellite attack) in Eastern Europe and Asia in the period since the war. This advance is not only explicable in terms of their conception of the balance of power, but could have been predicted by anyone who correctly understood this conception.

A favorable imbalance means a potentiality for advance, and if the Soviets feel they hold this advantage (locally or universally) they will advance; if they conclude that the enemy holds such a *pereves*, and see evidence that he is actualizing his potentiality, they will retreat. Hence American policy should calculate in Soviet terms as well as its own, to make the maximum use of situations where the Soviets can be "contained" or forced to retreat.

THE MANIPULABILITY OF POWER

From another perspective, the "balance of power" may be viewed in terms of degree of manipulability of the world and its

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contents and events. In Soviet writing, statements both of manipulability and of inevitability are found. But it seems fairly clear that from an operative standpoint, the Marxian expectation of inevitable victory does not affect policy formulation strongly. In the short run, where policy decisions are made, the Soviet approach is a manipulable view of politics. This is limited by the requirement of a "calculation of the relation of forces," but ambiguity about the forces involved and the criteria of calculation makes it in effect a purely expediential *Realpolitik*.

Thus inevitability in goal-expectations, and probably to a limited degree in defining the forces calculated, does not interfere with an extremely high degree of permissible manipulability of policy alternatives.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN POLICY FORMULATION

It is at this point that the author's own conceptions of a "balance of power" would be most likely to be felt. To limit this incursion, we shall examine the Soviet conception *as they believe it to exist* and *as they pursue it as a policy aim,* in accordance with the author's conviction that the Soviet conception is false, and warranted only to the degree that it creates its fantasies as fact in the process of acting on their presumed existence.

It is perhaps the supreme tragedy of our time that the Soviet misapprehension of the world in which they live is, indeed, tending necessarily to create as fact this (original) misapprehension. Briefly sketched, the official and general attitudes of the West immediately following the recent war were that peace and lessened hostility with "Russia" would naturally follow the defeat of the common foe. On this assumption, large concessions were granted to the Soviet Union in view of their great losses in the common struggle, and as "proof" that the West was quite ready to co-operate in the establishment of a common peace of the then "united nations."

The Soviet view of this phenomenon could only have been that they were actualizing their "potentiality" [*vozmozhnost'*] in the gigantic *pereves sil* which had come to them vis-à-vis "the capitalist (rest of the) world." When they faced moderate opposition

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from the West in their consolidation process in Western Europe, this was to be expected (and even, finally, very strong language and feeble action were indeed very "moderate" opposition). No "effective hostility" [*nalichie vrazhdebnosti*] was met until the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Berlin airlift, and Korean war.

Meanwhile the Western world had been rudely jolted by the more crude "advances" of the Soviet Union, notably the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the invasion of Southern Korea. What was their reaction? A series of countermeasures were naturally instituted where feasible, the Truman Doctrine being the first explicit one.

The Soviet reaction was that this merely met their expectations; had not their supposition been that the West would initiate "Truman Doctrines," etc., when and where it could? The actual appearance of these *counter-Soviet* measures were thus seen as the originally anticipated *anti-Soviet* actions, and utilization of all potentialities for advance seemed confirmed as the correct policy.

Thus the Soviet conception of the "balance of power," and Western failure (officially and popularly) to understand the Soviet conception, led to the creation of two poised hostile camps, only now settling into a "temporary balance," where all opportunities for advance are vanishing between the "iron curtain" and "strategic lines of containment." Its duration depends upon the shifting "relation of forces" available for the conclusive struggle, and more important, upon Soviet conviction as to this *sootnoshenie sil.*

THE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

The "balance of power" may also be viewed from an ethical perspective, superimposed on those previously discussed. The Soviet view does not premise exclusive alternatives of (1) ethically correct, (2) nonethical or expedient, or (3) unethical, i.e., wrong.[52]

[52] Alfred Vagts, in a stimulating article on "The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea" (*World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1948), has contended that the balance of power as something sought, ethically desirable, is peculiar to countries which have experienced the Renaissance, and hence not shared by successive Russian elites.

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The Soviet ethos excludes the third of these in relation to any balance or balancing, and fuses the other two. All actions which are expedient to maximize advance or minimize retreat (not solely in geographical or military terms), i.e., to advance the Party-power, are ethically not only permissible, but required.[53]

THE PERSPECTIVE OF DURATION EXPECTATIONS

The meaning and content of a "balance of power" are pervaded by conscious or presumed expectations of duration. The Soviet conception excludes any balance (as equilibrium, relation, or process) as permanent; any equilibrium or relation is indefinitely temporary.

No time limits are set on the "inevitable" historical processes, and indeed such would be incompatible with their conception of calculated policy.

This is very important to Western policy-making, since over the course of an extended period of time, Soviet conceptions may "mellow" and change with new leaders, or internal resistance may effect indirectly an alteration of policy focus.[54] This cannot be taken as more than a possibility, however, a *potentiality* which counter-Soviet determination must actualize.

[53] The author is indebted to Nathan Leites for this formulation, although the content here demonstrated is mine.

[54] See X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25 (July 1947), pp. 566-82.

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By PAUL E. ZINNER*

I

IN February 1948 few people in Czechoslovakia could size up the full implications of the Communist coup. The bulk of non-Communist public opinion was, to say the least, bewildered by the rapidity of events and confused about the real issues involved. Its attitude reflected this state of mind. The political parties to which it traditionally owed allegiance collapsed overnight. Their duly elected leaders were immediately muzzled. President Benes, on whom in the final analysis the total burden of stopping the Communist onslaught rested, and from whom the nation would normally expect its cue, gave none, unless his passive acceptance of the *fait accompli* with which he was presented were to be construed as a sign for the people to do likewise.

If non-Communist opinion was neutralized, the Communists were, of course, jubilant at the turn of events. They could count on the support of the vast majority of the workers and of a considerable segment of the intelligentsia who shared a strong socialist bias and who seemed to have accepted the issues without reservation as the Communists had presented them, i.e., as a showdown for a choice between "socialism" and "reactionary capitalism."

The upshot of all this was to smooth the transition from the pre-Communist to the Communist phase of Czechoslovakia's national existence. Disturbances and dislocations were minimized. The Communist regime was able to harness the energies and know-how of virtually all bourgeois technicians and experts. To be sure, there were immediate purges in the public administration and in industrial management and a stream of refugees soon began to trickle across the frontier. But the number of people

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uprooted in the first wave of shock following the coup was in the hundreds or low thousands and the total effect on the life of the nation was negligible.

The smoothness of the transition was unquestionably a major Communist achievement. Lest it be overestimated, several facts should be kept in mind: first, much of Czechoslovakia's economy had already been nationalized; second, the Communists had had three years in which to gain experience in the public administration and to consolidate their control of key power positions in and out of the government; third, the threat of Soviet interference was a powerful deterrent to the manifestations of overt opposition. The ease with which the Communists gained power nevertheless reflected the success of their policy during the three-year period preceding it.

Between 1945 and 1948 the Communists displayed amazing versatility in attempting to forge a majority opinion around their Party. Soft-pedaling orthodox revolutionary aims, they professed adherence to a democratic, evolutionary line of approach with strong nationalist and pan-Slavist overtones. They exploited the persistent fear of a revival of German strength, and turned to their advantage both existing apprehensions about Soviet intervention and the strong residue of friendship toward Russia. Finally, in contrast with traditional practices, they strove to give their party a mass basis, opening it to all comers without heed to ideological considerations. The Communists did not achieve the ultimate objective of their policy, hence the necessity for a coup, but its real flaws became apparent only after the coup and then only gradually. They stemmed from the fact that the opinion the Communists forged around themselves lacked any semblance of monolithism—organizational or ideological—and as the Party proceeded to implement more rigid and orthodox Stalinist practices it was bound successively to disillusion and alienate various of its groups of supporters. Indeed, the development of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia can be viewed as a dual process of tightening controls and growing tension between a narrowing nucleus of Communists and an ever-growing stratum of the population.

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II

A transition free of convulsive outbursts was a luxury never enjoyed by the Russian Communists and only remotely approximated in the other satellite countries. The Communist regime upon coming to power could concentrate all its energies on the two major tasks facing it: the consolidation and development of the economic bases of "socialism," and the inculcation of the Party and eventually the whole population with the "proper" Communist spirit. This is not to say that numerous changes in the institutional structure of the country did not have to be made. Nor is it to belittle the importance of the government's campaign to bring organized religious bodies under its influence.

By and large, however, given the unlimited power and the technical know-how the Communists had at their disposal, the transformation of physical and legal institutions was a comparatively easy matter. The government's struggle against the Catholic Church, of course, deserves detailed treatment for which there is no room here. It is sufficient to state that the relatively weak position of the Catholic Church in the Czech lands—despite a gain in prestige during the war—facilitated the government's task by reducing the danger of serious upheavals.

III

The vehicle designed to speed the reconstruction and development of Czechoslovakia's economy along "socialist" lines has been the Five Year Plan (FYP) worked out in final form after the coup and put into effect on January 1, 1949.[1] The FYP in its original conception envisaged the expansion of Czechoslovakia's industrial productivity by about 57 per cent over the 1948 rate of production, which in turn was in various industrial branches about equal to or slightly higher than the standard (1937) prewar index. It called for a transfer of focus in industrial production from light and consumer goods to heavy industry and within the light industries from the production of luxury items to that of commercial and capital goods. It outlined a program

[1] For details, see *Prvni Ceskoslovensky Petilety Plan* (The First Czechoslovak Five Year Plan), Czechoslovak Ministry of Information, Prague, 1948.

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doubling the production of heavy machinery of all kinds, and increasing the manufacture of iron and steel and rolled products by 49 per cent.

To attain these goals an over-all investment schedule of 339 billion Kcs ($6.7 billion) was drawn up. This involved an annual outlay of about 33 per cent of the estimated 1948 national income in investment. Much of it was earmarked for plant expansion in heavy industry. Light and consumer industries were expected to increase production primarily through more efficient utilization of existing machinery and greater labor productivity. The productivity of labor throughout all industries was to rise by about 32 per cent in the five-year period, and 482,000 workers were to be added to the country's industrial labor force. Of these, 170,000 were to be diverted to the mining, heavy machinery, and chemical industries. Agriculture was expected to yield 100,000 workers as a result of greater mechanization and rationalization of agricultural production, i.e., collectivization. Another 65,000 workers were to be acquired by a thorough pruning of swollen administrative staffs. The rest were to come from the ranks of women, youth, and possibly foreign labor.

In the field of agriculture the FYP called for a general reduction in acreage devoted to cereal crops and a transfer to vegetable and commercial crops, as well as livestock breeding. It outlined a vast mechanization program, leaving no doubt as to the ultimate aims of the regime.

The Communist leadership had no illusions about the sacrifices the fulfillment of the FYP would require. Antonin Zapotocky, the Prime Minister of the new cabinet, made this clear in a speech before the National Assembly on October 7, 1948, in which he "wanted to dispel . . . any fond illusions that a raise in the standard of living is a necessary corollary of, or should even precede the fulfillment of the plan." "The contrary is true," said he, "it will first be necessary to . . . rebuild [and increase] industrial and agricultural production, [and] to attain greater technical perfection. . . . The most important task of the FYP therefore will be the widest possible mobilization of labor and the raising of labor productivity. . . . We will continue to empha-

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size and repeat this until we convince, and re-educate . . . and force everyone . . . to act accordingly."[2] If the regime was resolved to extract the necessary sacrifices from the people, it was also cognizant of the fact that the first FYP would not be "a final plan that would universally remove all . . . shortages." But at the same time it continued to pay lip service to increased living standards as an avowed aim, and a certainty in the foreseeable future. It did so although it knew, and on occasion admitted, that the expansion of Czechoslovakia's heavy industries was designed more for the benefit of the Soviet Union and the other satellite nations than for the comfort and well-being of the Czech and Slovak people.

With the passage of time, references to the priority of Czechoslovakia's allies over its own people have become far more explicit. By the fall of 1950, government spokesmen left little doubt in their listeners' minds that any thought of improving Czechoslovak living standards would be frowned on by the Soviet Union. As they put it, great divergencies in living standards among neighboring people were "dangerous," and no Communist could wish to stoop to "capitalistic practices of exploitation" in the sense of using his country's greater industrial development as a bargaining point in trade relations with other People's Democracies.[3] Concurrently production targets, especially in heavy industry, have been continually revised upward. According to latest plans revealed in February 1951, the original targets of the FYP have been raised by about 80 per cent.

To attain its goals, the regime has exerted steady pressure on the workers to increase productivity. The Czechoslovak working class has found itself progressively engulfed by the Soviet pattern of working conditions and practices, including piece rates, speed-up, socialist competition, counterplanning, and "voluntary" overtime and holiday contributions in labor. An extensive system of long-term work brigades has also been put in practice. White-collar workers and teachers, students, and people in general with some time on their hands are encouraged to enlist in such brigades. They are usually assigned to work on projects for which

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 7 ff. [3] *Rude Pravo*, October 10, 1950.

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no permanent labor can be obtained in sufficient quantity. According to official sources almost half the labor force in mines is made up of long-term (3 to 6 months) brigades.

The reaction of the workers to these methods has been unenthusiastic. Since production goals are continually juggled and figures are given in percentages only, it is impossible to determine to what extent actual production targets are being fulfilled. Nevertheless, even the guarded comments of officials reveal a lag in labor productivity. They also testify to the difficulties met in procuring sufficient labor, especially for mining, and for the chemical and heavy machinery industries in which the greatest expansion is to take place.[4] There is no noticeable rush to participate in socialist competition. In May 1949 only 11 per cent of all workers were engaged in it. A year later the figure increased to about 15 per cent. The same holds true of shock workers, who numbered 65,000 in June 1949 and 70,000 a year later, a disappointingly low figure for the regime.[5] Comments by Czech trade-union leaders have disclosed a variety of techniques used by workers to circumvent increased production norms. A favorite method seems to be to let individual rate-busters collect greater pay rather than to raise shop norms commensurately.[6] This requires the collusion of the local trade-union and party organization responsible for the verification of norms, but since these consist mostly of workers, no great difficulty along this line has been experienced to date. Pressure from the top, however, is steadily mounting, and the limited resources of the workers cannot for long effectively stave off all the impositions made on them.

To offset some of the detrimental features of its economic and labor policy, the regime has consciously fostered a fairly wide system of individual promotions from the bench to administrative positions. Promotions to plant management are quite common, and a central school has been set up to train specially chosen workers for top administrative jobs in nationalized industries.

[4] *Rude Pravo*, September 17, 1950.

[5] See comments by CP Secretary General Rudolf Slansky at the Communist Congress in May 1949 (*Rude Pravo*, May 27, 1949); also *Rude Pravo*, September 17, 1950.

[6] *Rude Pravo*, October 19, 1950.

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Its first class of 38 graduated in the fall of 1950. Officers in the police and the armed forces are recruited from the ranks of workers. About 1,000 to 1,500 young workers are chosen yearly to attend accelerated high school courses in preparation for university study. The overwhelming majority reportedly makes the grade and is actually sent on to study in an institute of higher learning.

Essentially, this amounts to the institution of a system of individual incentives, while the aspirations of the working class as a whole remain unfulfilled. It is questionable whether these measures allay the general disappointment experienced by the working class over the failure of the regime to meet socialist expectations. That open opposition has not manifested itself is largely due to the absence of appropriate channels for successful resistance. Although only one in three workers is a member of the Communist Party, the trade-union apparatus is solidly under Communist control, and no chances are being taken with trade-union deviationism. The resignation in June 1950 of Antonin Zapotocky from the chairmanship of the Central Trade Union Council, which he headed since its inception in 1945, may serve as an example. The official reason for his resignation was a new government ruling prohibiting any person from holding a position in the public administration along with a trade-union post, and Zapotocky happens to be Prime Minister. The real reason for his resignation may be sought in the popularity he enjoyed among workers and his strong union bias which often led him, especially before the coup, to uphold essentially trade-union viewpoints in the Party's high councils. His successor, Frantisek Zupka, is comparatively unknown. He is a Slovak with no ties in the Czech lands where the trade unions are strongest. He has risen to prominence since the coup, presumably on the strength of his loyalty to Moscow.

IV

Organization of the Party machine for the discharge of duties incumbent on it as a result of its ruling position and inculcation of the membership with the "proper" Communist spirit have

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proved to be tasks of great complexity that have not been effectively solved. For this the Party's own recruiting policy both before and after the coup bears considerable responsibility.

In May 1945 when Czechoslovakia was liberated, there were probably some 50,000 battle-hardened Communists in the country, and around them an efficient network of local cells was built. Two months later the Communist Party claimed 597,000 members, about 100,000 more than the Russian CP acquired in four years after it gained power. By April 1946 membership stood at 1,220,000. A mild purge caused it to drop to 1,000,000. Late in 1947 another recruiting drive got under way, aiming to carry the Party over the top in the general elections scheduled for the spring of 1948. By January 1948 there were 1,310,000 Communists. Then the coup intervened, but recruitment did not stop. If anything, it gained in intensity and in six months another million people affiliated themselves with the Party. This figure includes former Social Democrats whose party was absorbed by the Communists.

With over 2,300,000 members, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was the largest in the world in proportion to population. One of every three citizens of voting age—18 years or older—was a member. The motives for joining, especially after the coup, must be sought largely in opportunism and a desire for protection, rather than in ideological affinity. The notion of protection influenced many representatives of the middle class; 200,000 white-collar workers alone joined. This notion, if not fostered by the Communists, was not discouraged by them.

As a result of the influx of such vast numbers of new members, the Party's ideological and organizational foundations were seriously weakened. Its proletarian base was also upset, for workers who had represented 57 per cent of the total membership were now in a minority. The problems raised by these developments hardly need elaboration. For one thing, the "class enemy" had found sanctuary in the Party's councils. For another, it was shot through with careerists who used their membership card simply as a means for personal gains and profit, and passive camp followers who were reluctant actively to shoulder Party responsi-

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bilities. The task of ferreting out all undesirable elements became an undertaking of staggering proportions.

No effort was made to correct the mistake of indiscriminate recruiting until a meeting of the Central Committee in November 1948, when it was decided to stop the admission of new members and to create a Control Commission with responsibility for checking personnel and the fulfillment of the Central Committee's directives in the regional, district, and local Party organs and in the public administration. In May 1949, at the ninth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, further steps were outlined to remedy the existing situation. About 500,000 members were reduced to candidate status and a waiting period of one year for workers and two years for non-workers was decreed mandatory before admission to membership. Even the recruitment of new candidates was limited to shockworkers in order to improve the social composition of the Party. A new organization statute was adopted, listing among other things mandatory length of membership for various office holders, ranging from one year for members of district committees to three years for the chairman and first secretary of regional committees. Appropriate resolutions were passed, outlining a mammoth indoctrination program designed to raise the "marxist-leninist" consciousness of all members.[7] The outcome of these resolutions was the launching of a "Year of Party Education" in the fall of 1949. Within its framework 1,593,641 comrades, divided into 85,933 study groups, attended courses in the fundamentals of "marxism-leninism" several days a week for nine months. An additional 94,379 Communists attended similar courses on a somewhat higher level. The whole procedure is being repeated this year with a wider variety of courses—four to take care of all levels of "Communist consciousness"—and even broader participation. An idea of the nature of this indoctrination may be gained from the topical outline of the basic course. Broken down into one six-week and five four-week periods, it includes the following: the

[7] For an account of the Party Congress, see *Protokol IX. Sjezdu KSC* (Minutes of the IX Congress of the Czechoslovak CP), Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP, 1949.

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international situation and the struggle for peace; the means of struggle and the victory of workers and peasants in Russia; thirty years of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; the road of the village to socialism; the development of socialist industry; the structure of the Party and its organizational rules.[8]

Despite these efforts neither ideological conformity nor organizational efficiency appear to have improved measurably. This is especially true of Slovakia where the Party has been much weaker in all respects than in the Czech lands. The ninth Congress of the Slovak Communist Party in May 1950 brought serious charges of "national bourgeois deviationism" (see below) and revealed startling admissions of apathy in the operations of the district and regional committees, of cadres, and in the organization of indoctrination courses and their attendance. A newly developed reluctance to join the Party was also revealed by Stefan Bastovansky, the general secretary of the Slovak CP, who admitted that in a year only 522 applications for membership from shockworkers had been received.[9] The reluctance to join the Party may be explained by a realization of the ever-growing demands made on the time and for the unquestioning devotion of Communist functionaries and members. Membership in the Party has been revealed to be a burdensome duty beset with severe irritations, constraints, and occupational hazards.

Judging by the official pronouncements of Party leaders, the lower ranks have failed to show the proper zeal for the implementation of the Central Committee's directives, to which they have adhered more in form than in substance. But if this is true of the lower ranks, the central leadership has also given evidence of preference for issuing directives rather than following up their implementation. In short, the Party has failed to develop "bolshevik hardness." Its failure to do so may well have aroused Moscow's ire and caused it to demand more energetic action. The recently concluded purge in which 170,000 Communists were excluded from the Party, together with the disclosure of deviationism in high Party councils made by Klement Gottwald on

[8] *Rude Pravo*, September 16, 1950. [9] *Rude Pravo*, May 27, 1950.

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the third anniversary of the coup, probably constitute the response to the Kremlin's prodding.

V

Until the recent disclosure of deviationism, the Czechoslovak Party maintained a carefully fostered appearance of internal unity.

The Party Congress in 1949 failed to produce the customary criticism and self-criticism of higher officials. The Party as a whole approved of its past activities and celebrated its achievements. Its old stalwarts were without fail re-elected to the Central Committee. Before the Congress only two minor incidents, both without apparent repercussions, had marred intra-Party harmony. One involved Arnost Kolman, a university professor who spent the war in Moscow and was allegedly a leading ideological expert in the Party. In the fall of 1948 he reportedly accused the Communist leadership of nationalist deviation. The charge, if made, was silenced and Kolman was trundled off to Moscow. No more has been heard from or of him since. The other incident arose as a result of irregularities such as neglect of the principle of democratic centralism, of criticism and self-criticism in the regional secretariat of Karlovy Vary. For this the regional secretary and some of his assistants were removed.

Following the Congress, an isolated instance of dissension or potential dissension was indicated by the arrest of Vilem Novy, who until December 1949 had been the chief editor of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist central organ. More trouble came to light in the early spring of 1950 when a thorough purge in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade removed several high-ranking government officials. None of them, however, had been influential in high Party circles. The dismissal of Vladimir Clementis quickly followed. Subsequently, the Congress of the Slovak Communist Party held in May 1950 became the occasion for the first open charge of deviationism among high-ranking Communists. The charges essentially brought in the open a separatist trend among Slovak Communists. This, to be sure, had been Comintern policy in the 1930's, and was still a popular

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Communist slogan during World War II. After the war official Communist policy strongly favored far-reaching rights of self-determination for Slovakia. As the political tide, however, turned against them decisively in that province, the Communists abandoned this line of approach in favor of greater centralization of power in Prague. This trend has continued since the coup. Some Slovak comrades obviously were unable to follow the twists in the political line of the Party with sufficient alacrity. They failed to realize, as it was pointed out to them, that the focal point of "socialism" in Czechoslovakia was in the Czech lands and that, having to fear no exploitation from the Czech Communists, they were supposed to learn from them and follow them eagerly.[10] Although many Communists prominent in the hierarchy of the Slovak Party were included in the indictment, only three were originally mentioned by name, Clementis, Gustav Husak, former chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, and Laco Novomesky, former Commissioner of Education. These three were named because of their common bourgeois intellectual background, which made them more susceptible to underestimating the importance of the class struggle and the proletarian consciousness of the Communist Party.[11] Clementis was singled out for particular criticism for his "loss of faith in Stalin" in 1939 when he condemned the Soviet-German treaty and for his failure to present the Communists' separatist position in its proper light in the 1930's. (Obviously Clementis' "criminal" record is a long one, as is that of all Communists who fall from grace.) Husak's and Novomesky's recantations were accepted, Clementis' not. Neither was the self-criticism of Karol Smidke, another leading Communist who had fallen victim to the "bourgeois nationalist" aberration, deemed sufficient to exonerate him. Smidke had not been publicly charged because of his impeccable "working-class background, because he is a graduate of the Lenin school of Moscow, and because the Party invested so much in him."[12] His unsatisfactory self-criticism made it necessary to bring his name into the open. For a time Smidke had

[10] *Rude Pravo*, May 25, 1950.
[11] *Rude Pravo*, May 28, 1950.
[12] *Ibid.*

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been chairman of the Slovak Party. He led it during the period of the Slovak revolutionary rising against the Germans in 1944. Subsequently he was chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners. At his feet were laid ideological and organizational mistakes which accounted for the Party's poor showing at the polls in Slovakia in 1946. In him a scapegoat for organizational shortcomings, for the backwardness of cadres and other mistakes, was finally found.

Despite its implications, this outburst of criticism was still a regional affair, for the Slovak Party is a branch of the Czechoslovak CP. Its relation to the Czechoslovak CP is the same as that of a Union Republic Party to the CP of the Soviet Union. Moreover, all the accused with the exception of Clementis operated on a provincial level. The Party's central apparatus to all intents and purposes remained unblemished.

The shake-up in Slovakia, however, was accompanied by the first series of significant changes in the composition of the Prague cabinet since the coup. Alexei Cepicka, Gottwald's son-in-law, who had distinguished himself as the Party's ace trouble-shooter, was moved from the Ministry of Justice—which he had seen through the development of a new legal code modeled after the Soviet—to the post of National Defense. Simultaneously he also relinquished the post of Minister of Church Affairs, in which capacity he had been chiefly instrumental in extending government control over the various religious bodies in the country. General Ludvik Svoboda, the former Minister of National Defense, did not fall from grace. He was elevated to the ornamental position of vice premier. Cepicka's move, however, was proof that at last the regime would seriously try to bolster the political reliability of its armed forces. Until then little had been accomplished along this line. Characteristically, he soon ordered increased jurisdiction to political officers and outlined a program of political education.[13] He also appointed General Jaroslav Prochazka, a political officer, as his chief of staff. Cepicka's place in the Ministry of Church Affairs was taken by Zdenek Fierlinger,

[13] *Obrana Lidu*, June 15, 1950.

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while his position in the Ministry of Justice was filled by Stefan Rais, a comparative unknown who in 1949 had not even made the Central Committee. Rais, however, had a lengthy sojourn in the Soviet Union as an officer of the Czechoslovak Army during World War II, and had served as chief of Gottwald's chancery in the latter's capacity as President of the Republic for some time before his appointment. In May 1950 a new Ministry of National Security was created, separating police functions from the Ministry of Interior. To head the new Ministry, Ladislav Kopriva, former chairman of the cadre section of the Party's secretariat and a Moscow graduate of 1929 vintage, was appointed.[14] The separation of security functions from interior administration augured for increased reliance on police measures to maintain control and for close co-ordination of cadre and security functions in order to track down and remove the class enemy lurking everywhere in the Party and in the public administration.

In July 1950 the Party decreed its solemn intention to purge itself once again. In November 1950 the arrest of Ota Sling, regional secretary for Brno, Moravia, and a member of the Central Committee, was announced. In February 1951 Gottwald disclosed the expulsion from the Party and arrest of four deviationists, Clementis, Husak, Novomesky, and Marie Svermova. In view of charges previously leveled against them, the final liquidation of the three Slovaks is not surprising, although Clementis and Novomesky had been reinstated in fairly important positions after their rebuke and apparently had been given a chance to work their way back into the Party's favor. The implications of Marie Svermova's deviationist activities are far more serious. For Svermova, as chairman of the organization section of the Party secretariat, as one of the seven members of the secretariat which in addition to her included Gottwald, Slansky, Frank, Bares, Kopriva, and Bastovansky, operated on the highest Party levels. Her dismissal may have serious repercussions throughout the entire Communist apparatus.

[14] *Rude Pravo*, May 24, 1950.

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VI

The self-debasement of the Czechoslovak Communist Party raises anew the question of the substance of Communist solidarity and loyalty. What are the issues over which differences in the hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Party could have developed? Increasing Soviet control over day-to-day operations is a likely cause for dissatisfaction. To all intents and purposes, Czechoslovak Communist officials exercised more effective control in the country before the coup than after, for prior to the coup they enjoyed considerable latitude in the implementation of a policy whose broad lines only were determined by the Kremlin. They enjoyed the prerogatives of responsible positions in the public administration and the power at their discretion. After the coup the Czechoslovak Communists became subject to intimate and detailed supervision by Moscow's emissaries. Russian advisers began to penetrate the Ministries and the Army. Russian technicians appeared as advisers in plants and factories until even the semblance of independent decision-making by local Communists disappeared.

A facet of Moscow control peculiar to Czechoslovakia is the presence in Prague of a small but influential group of Communists of German origin. Some of these, to be sure, are Sudeten Germans, who had been affiliated with the Czech Party for a long time prior to 1938. Some, however, are more recent imports. Their names are seldom if ever mentioned in public. Their public appearances are equally rare. But men like Zikmund Stein, Bedrich Steiner, Bedrich Geminder, and Bruno Koehler occupy key positions in the Party apparatus. Koehler, for example, is now the head of the cadre section of the Party and Geminder is reportedly in charge of relations with foreign Communist parties. Despite the international flavor of Communism, the presence of these Germans in Prague is likely to elicit some resentment among the Czech comrades.

A more important and perhaps the decisive cause for friction, however, might be the economic fate of Czechoslovakia. That the Communist leadership was not impervious to its country's

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economic needs and interests was most strikingly demonstrated in July 1947 when it concurred without a dissenting vote in the cabinet's decision to send a representative to the preliminary Marshall Plan discussions in Paris. It was hardly through oversight that Gottwald failed to obtain Moscow's prior approval and committed a well-nigh unpardonable breach of Communist "etiquette" by presenting the Kremlin with a *fait accompli*. Immediately after the coup Communist spokesmen hastened to reassure their countrymen and perhaps themselves of the inability of the West to sustain an economic blockade or boycott against Czechoslovakia.[15] Somewhat later Antonin Gregor, the Minister of Foreign Trade, hopefully outlined the government's plan to balance its foreign trade with the West and East in a ratio of 55 to 45 per cent by the end of the FYP.[16] This meant a moderate percentage decline in trade with the West and a commensurate increase with the East. What the Czechs strove for was essentially a retention of material benefits derived from trade with the West, coupled with the security of long-term commitments with the East. Some might have gone so far as to perceive their country in the role of economic mediator between East and West. Whatever their expectations were, it is clear that they did not need to entertain roseate dreams of the future to be disappointed and shocked by the rate and extent of deterioration of their country's economic position. The volume of trade with the East rose far more sharply than had been anticipated. In 1950, the second year of the FYP, it already reached 53 per cent of the total foreign trade volume of Czechoslovakia. It had risen 33 per cent over the previous year and has shown no tendency to abate. On the contrary, the yearly contract negotiations with the USSR have brought ever greater demands on the services of Czechoslovak industries, and the monopoly of the USSR over Czechoslovakia's foreign trade by far transcends that of Germany before the war. Czechoslovakia is now totally dependent on the Soviet Union for loans, for the bulk of its raw materials, and for

[15] L. Frejka, *26, unor 1948 v Ceskoslovenskem hospodarstvi* (The Meaning of February 26, 1948, for the Czechoslovak Economy), Prague-Orbis, 1948, p. 64.

[16] *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin*, No. 12, March 18, 1948.

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much of its food. The USSR, holding the purse strings and the keys to the larder, as it were, is in a position to exploit Czechoslovakia at will, and according to appearances has not hesitated to do so. Czechoslovakia is being rapidly transformed into a vast specialized industrial machine that can control neither the purchase of its necessities nor the sale and distribution of its products. It is difficult to see how the bonds of Communist solidarity can bear the stress of continual one-sided sacrifice. The implementation of a policy obviously leading to national economic suicide must adversely affect the loyalty of all but a small minority of diehard Communist fanatics.

Indeed, under the circumstances, the surprising thing is that deviationism has been kept under cover until now. One plausible explanation is that enjoyment of the fruits of victory to some extent mitigated the severity of ensuing conditions and dulled the senses of many Communists to the realities engulfing them. Another possibility is that Gottwald has been personally responsible for preventing open rifts.

VII

The question arises as to what extent Gottwald's own position is jeopardized by current developments. His personal affirmation of loyalty to Moscow underlines the seriousness of the situation. It has long been rumored that his elevation to the Presidency of the Republic in 1948 represented a reduction of his influence in the Party. Available evidence, however, points to the contrary. He has continued to deliver the major policy speeches and programmatic announcements have come only from him. Moreover, a definite Gottwald myth is abuilding in Czechoslovakia. This is not only manifest in the lavish display of his pictures and the publication of his speeches as part of the theoretical treasure of Communism, but also in a carefully fostered notion of Gottwald as the "little white father" of Czechoslovakia. It is, of course, possible that the very development of a Gottwald "myth" has alienated Moscow.

There is no reason to believe that the present regime cannot ward off any internal threat of its existence through the use

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of more extensive and intensive police measures. But so long as the trend of developments remains unchanged, the ranks of its supporters are bound to dwindle.

The example of Czechoslovakia, which is not significantly different from the other Soviet satellites, illustrates once more the inability of the Soviet rulers to see, or their unwillingness to concede, the need of human beings and societies for some measure of autonomy. The type of rule spread over areas under Soviet influence tends to divest the people as a whole and individually of the possibility of self-government and self-determination. Continued disregard for this basic human desire is likely to play an important role in the eventual termination of the inglorious hegemony of the Kremlin and of the stooges loyal to it.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

POLITICIAN, PROPAGANDIST, PUBLIC:
NOTES ON THE SOVIET CONSENSUS

By DANIEL LERNER

Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951, pp. xv, 100. $3.00.*

Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. xviii, 379. $5.00.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950, pp. xviii, 297. $4.00.

THE compulsive politician yearns for an ordered society in which his autobiography will be externalized and the universal acceptation of reality will be identical with his own. The ambitious propagandist exerts himself to accomplish this ideal condition by renovating human interiors so that acceptation of the external world will be processed according to prescribed patterns. The restless public becomes aware of these fantasies which depict the Good Society as universalized optical illusion.

Assertions are heard that such a Good Society operated in some remote past, or that it ought to be reincarnated in the near future. While some confine themselves to judgments that Perfect Consensus is a Good Thing, others declare that it exists. They give circumstantial and imaginative accounts of how it operates, and the impression spreads among people with powerful predispositions to orderliness that the Good Society is on hand, usually in some distant land.

In our time the Soviet Union has often been construed as the living example of such perfectly tidy and efficient transfusion of concept, percept, and affect from elite to mass. This construction derives usually from selective quotation of the patristic texts of

* See also Percy E. Corbett, "The Casuistry of Dictatorship," *World Politics*, Vol. III, No. 4 (July 1951), pp. 539-44.

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Soviet Marxism, for the doctrinal writings of Lenin and Stalin are infused with the concept of "socialist consciousness." What this flexible phrase has come to designate is that state of identical sensibilities which guarantees perfect empathy in The Community under The Leader. The process presumably works through built-in mechanisms of perception and affection, whose parts are interchangeable from any one human machine to every other within The Community. According to the doctrine, a man equipped with a proper "socialist consciousness" will be unequipped to do wrong or even think wrong. All his reactions to stimuli will be conditioned to be "correct." The problem of statecraft becomes that of screening only the proper stimuli into the environment. The Leader and his surrogates become, during business hours, Controllers of Community Stimulation.

It may be that this picture of the Soviet Union as a perfect case of hermetic sealing against infection is overdrawn. Some students of human behavior have expressed skepticism on theoretical grounds. The human organism, they claim, is not capable of conversion into a flawless response-machine; some sand is always getting into the gears; behavior can only be "conditioned" (echoing Max Eastman in the ancient *Streit um Marx*) but not "determined." Other commentators, perhaps turning their wishes into horses, go even further. The Soviet Union is the very opposite of the Perfectly Consensual Society, they claim. It is riven by dissension between Leaders and Led. Instead of shared sensibilities, as between Elite and Mass, percept teeters and affect totters. The System is a sham and The Community dissolves, when one inspects beyond the façade, as swiftly as a Potemkin Village.

How one regards this question is not an altogether academic matter. If the Soviet Consensus is perfect, then the West seems in for inevitable defeat in the world political struggle. If the Soviet Consensus is a sham, then Western strategy would be wise to initiate a preventive war—to save itself the neural and fiscal costs of continuing crisis. Many people who convert only normal quotients of personal compulsiveness, ambition, and wish into

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political estimates may prefer to accept neither evaluation of the Soviet consensus. Such people may be skeptical of formal doctrine offered as a *description* of actual behavior—pointing out that Law is often broken, and that What Has Been Said does not always coincide with what is done. They may prefer, therefore, to make an evaluation of the Soviet System after consulting empirical descriptions of its operation.

Such descriptions are not easy to come by. The Soviet Union is not, whoever else may find Elysium there, a paradise for social researchers. Consequently, the flow of talk about the Soviet Consensus consists largely of assertions without verifiable references; statements of preferences rather than observations; and partial documentations (usually restatements of the patristic writings in different contexts). Such commentaries invariably raise the question whether the next bit of evidence would not undermine the conclusions.

There is cause for interest, therefore, in the publication of three studies which deal with key variables in the Soviet Consensus: The Leaders, The Transmission System, The Led. In *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, Dr. Leites outlines the rules for effective political conduct which presumably guide the top policy Leaders. Dr. Inkeles, in *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, describes the communication system through which the "socialist consciousness" is transmitted from Leaders to Led. *The Soviet Image of the United States* is Dr. Barghoorn's description of the sensibilities of the Soviet Led, mainly with reference to the beliefs they hold about a central object in the contemporary "socialist consciousness"—i.e., the United States.

What do these books add to our knowledge of the Soviet Consensus, and what further information do they show the need for?

I

The Operational Code of the Politburo is a striking and even illuminating title. The very notion that so close and powerful and secretive a group as the Politburo can be found out by investigating the common compulsions underlying its habitual

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conduct constitutes a fresh challenge to psychopolitical research. The title is, however, ambiguous. The study does not deal specifically with the Politburo, nor does it make clear to what degree (if at all) the code it schematizes is "operational" in practice.

An "operational code" may codify behavior in *practice* or behavior in *principle*. The ambiguity is confusing, but Dr. Leites restructures our expectations in his own first words. There we are told to expect "some of the findings of a still-continuing study of the political strategy of Bolshevism . . . based on the writings of Lenin and Stalin" (p. xi). We are dealing, therefore, not with the Politburo but with Bolshevism ("mainly with the relations between the Party and the outside world"). The "operational code" under analysis is not a central directive which actually governs behavior, but rather the "rules for effective political conduct" which are prescribed in the doctrinal texts. No attempt is made to demonstrate that the practices prescribed by these rules are actually enacted by The Leaders with sufficient regularity to justify their designation as operational in any other sense than "operational *in principle*." The prudent reader will carefully note Dr. Leites' precautions on this point, for inadequate differentiation between principles and practices is an ancient and recurrent source of error in human estimates.

Once its intention is clear, this particular reorganization of the patristic utterances does make an original and important contribution to our knowledge of The Leaders in the Soviet System. For if it does not give us grounds to decide whether the rules it presents are "operational" in practice, it does provide ample evidence that these rules form a "code." What Dr. Leites has accomplished is a masterful job of codification. This is an operation requiring not empirical observation, but logical analysis. Evidence, in such an operation, consists not in assertions about events which are verifiable, but rather in statements about statements which exhibit their psychological *coherence* within the logical universe that subsumes them. Dr. Leites has provided persuasive evidence of this type that there exists in the patristic texts a "code" of Bolshevik conduct.

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What is the importance of this finding? First, the existence of a Code is itself significant for the general theory of human behavior. While there are few competent scholars who would today maintain that behavior is random rather than conditioned, there are fewer still (aside from case-historians of pathologies) who have demonstrated that normal lives follow a "pattern" which can be described in explicit terms. Dr. Leites has here undertaken to show that a group of powerful men are expected to enact their lives according to a set of rules which can be codified. And further, that some of these rules are *learned* from sacred texts, while others are *intuitively derived* from the learned rules. Behavior actually governed by such a Code would be very different from the models which underlie the postulates of current schools of psychology in the West. Such behavior would minimize the interior psychic compulsions of the individual which are standard doctrine in Western personality theory, and would elevate the calculating mechanisms underlying human conduct which have not been celebrated in the West since Jeremy Bentham.

Dr. Leites is talking only about the Bolsheviks, of course, but what is feasible now for some men may one day be feasible for most men. Were it demonstrated that Bolsheviks behave according to the Code here formulated, we might then look forward to a late re-emergence of Rational Man. Two factors check optimism on this point: (a) It appears, from Dr. Leites' study, that the Soviet Leaders have no intention of diffusing the blessings of Rationality among the Soviet Led; (b) It has not yet been demonstrated that even the Soviet Leaders actually conduct themselves according to the Code. (It has been demonstrated only that the Code exists.)

Now, on common-sense grounds, we might infer that the Code must be practiced. After all, we know that these rules are given in the sacred texts, on which the Bolshevik Leaders have been raised. Further, many of these rules are compatible with what we know the Bolsheviks to have done on many occasions. To the extent that we give credence to the Code as operational in prac-

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tice, Dr. Leites makes his second important contribution: These rules should enable us to forecast more confidently what the Bolshevik Leaders will do in various future situations. For the characteristic style of the Code, we are told, is "all-or-none"; conduct is either correct or incorrect in any codified situation. Indeed, the first point of the Code is this: ". . . Bolshevik doctrine affirms that future developments are either inevitable or impossible. Intermediate probabilities are excluded" (p.1). A Code that demands such strict construction of its mandates greatly simplifies the forecasting of both the initiatives and responses of Bolshevik Leaders in any of the twenty situations Dr. Leites has ingeniously codified—*if* the conduct actually follows the Code. On this point, as the preface warns, the study must be handled carefully.

It should be very clear that Dr. Leites does not choose to use the term "prediction" in the sense normally assigned it by scientists today. That is, he does not refer to controlled data from a sample of cases which have been sorted by explicit criteria ("operational indexes") and tabulated by specific sets of conditions—on the basis of which propositions about future events can be constructed according to the conventions of probability logic and sampling statistics. Dr. Leites makes no explicit claim that the Code is relevant to predictability in this sense. His concern is rather with forecasting, which is based on plausibility rather than probability criteria and intuitive selection rather than controlled sampling of representative cases.

While forecasting (i.e., making the best estimates possible on the best information available) is an indispensable practice for political strategy, it would be mischievous to assign forecasts the same dignity that we properly give to scientific predictions. The only working basis for evaluating forecasts is their plausibility, and plausibility is a notoriously treacherous criterion—which too often makes seem likely what one likes. It cannot be assumed that even so conscientious a scholar as Dr. Leites, who is aware of the methodological dangers, can invariably avoid the pitfalls of the plausible.

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Consider, for example, the final chapter on "Deals." The major proposition is this:

> Any agreement between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of those groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the Party by them (p. 88).

This assertion would appear to bear directly on an issue of paramount importance in current world politics; and Dr. Leites does not hesitate to draw the political inference. After citing a selection of four quotations from Lenin in 1920-1921, he concludes (consistently with his theme):

> These attitudes imply that a "settlement" with the Western Powers—that is, an agreement sharply reducing the threat of mutual annihilation—is inconceivable to the Politburo, although arrangements with them, codifying the momentary relationships of forces, are always considered (p. 90).

Now, this reader shares the general political animus in this book and would agree that a permanent settlement between the Bolsheviks and the West seems unlikely in the visible future. But there is no convincing evidence in the Code (other than logical compatibility) to justify so sweeping a dismissal of the possibility of any "agreement sharply reducing the threat of mutual annihilation." The careful reader might well demand further elucidation of the Code, to see whether other dogma on deals is not equally compatible with the key operating principle: What, for example, does the Code disclose about the rules for "codifying the momentary relationships of forces" here passed over in a subordinate clause?

The responsible politician will want even more information before he acts on the forecast that agreement is "inconceivable to the Politburo." There have, after all, been periods of accommodation: Under which sections of the Code were the Politburocrats acting in these periods? Dr. Leites has pointed out that the Code contains many contrary and even contradictory rules for "correct" conduct: Which rules operate under which conditions?

Such a question returns us to the problem of actual behavior among the Bolsheviks, and thus lies beyond the limits of this inquiry. On such a question Dr. Leites is aware that what Lenin

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said in 1920-1921 is but one of many clues that must be assessed in estimating what Stalin may do in 1951-1952. He warns that "these suggestions are simply hypotheses and further research is needed to test them" (p. xv). Hence their formulation, syntactically, in assertive rather than hypothetical form should not obscure the need for investigation of actual courses of Bolshevik behavior before these rules are applied to the interpretation of current political realities.

In any such investigation it will be useful to have Dr. Leites' codebook in hand. While he has claimed only to tell us systematically what the Bolshevik texts have said disparately about the rationale for their doings, in making good this claim he has provided many brilliant leads for research into what they have done in practice. Such leads, when properly used, will be worth a lot.

II

As we turn from The Leaders to the communication system whereby their Code is transfused into the "socialist consciousness" of The Led, the central problem is this: What are the goals of Soviet communication? What effects upon the behavior of the population are sought through the diffusion of Soviet Enlightenment?

The Code of The Leaders, we recall, at one point suggested the prospect of a re-emergence of Rational Man in the world political scene. However, it appeared that the diffusion of Rationality was no part of the program of Soviet communication. Dr. Leites' formulation of one item in the Code bears directly on this point:

> All the actors on the world scene are "forced" into their parts through the pressure of historical developments. Only the Party, through its insight and dedication, acts freely (p. 1).

Insight is thus conceived as a liberating factor on the road to Rationality, but this commodity is not offered to The Led. It is on the list of monopoly items enjoyed only by Party members —the elite—not the mass.

What *is* offered to the mass? Dr. Inkeles specifies the five-point code of Soviet broadcasting: (1) to disseminate political information; (2) to elevate cultural appreciation; (3) to "rally the popu-

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lation"; (4) to assist the education authorities; (5) to provide "a positive and constructive means of relaxation" (p. 254). It is not easy to determine precisely (operationally) what these words mean, but it is clear that their referents differ from those customarily understood in the West. On the first point, the dissemination of political information, Comrade Tamarkin delivered the following pronouncement to an all-union conference in December 1934 (at which time he was Director of the Sector of Political Broadcasting):

> Political information . . . must mobilize the masses for the fulfillment of the tasks of socialist construction. . . . In order . . . to become a genuine loudspeaker for the Party addressing the millions of workers, political information must be outstanding in its loyalty to the Party's interests . . . and activity. *We reject all indifferent, "objective" information* (p. 265).

To reject "objective information" is to reject the only conception of information officially celebrated in Western communication systems. While Western objectivity is often honored in the breach, it remains the code and offenders are regarded as morally guilty. The Soviet Code reverses this condition—objectivity is regarded as criminal guilt:

> Soviet control of communications is not designed to facilitate or improve the free exchange of ideas among men. . . . *The Soviet state does not conceive of itself as a relatively impartial arbiter.* . . . The media are conceived of as tools or instruments for effecting the purposes of the party. Finally, Soviet control is absolute. There can be no competition for the message of the central authorities . . . (p. 318).

What, then, is this message—for the diffusion of which the vast and impressive system of Soviet communication has been laboriously constructed? Dr. Inkeles says:

> The message is simple enough in its essentials: work harder, trust the Party, hate the defined enemies of the regime within and without, and believe in the future. But in all its simplicity, the message must be repeated endlessly in a thousand contexts . . . (p. 320).

It is clear why so "simple" a message must be repeated "in a thousand contexts." For this message attempts nothing less than to structure the major set of percepts and affects which govern the political personality. Involved here are one's identifications

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(whom to "trust" and whom to "hate"), one's demands on Self and Others ("work harder"), and one's expectations ("believe in the future"). Nothing is said here of "insight," the liberating factor in the conduct of Soviet Leaders. The code for the Soviet Led apparently is organized rather around "dedication," and the Soviet communication system offers the masses prescribed definitions of their role rather than objective descriptions of the situation. In this way, the Controllers of Community Stimulation enact their function of diffusing the set of correct sensibilities which forms a "socialist consciousness."

Does the system work? Dr. Inkeles' verdict is temperate and tentative:

> Despite certain major flaws, it is an impressive apparatus, carefully thought out, conscientiously administered, and vigorously utilized. The difficulty lies not in the system of communication but in the *task which it is assigned.* For in comparing the content of Soviet communication materials with the actual conditions of Soviet life, one is compelled to ask how long a population can be expected to continue exchanging today's sacrifices for tomorrow's promises (p. 321).

Dr. Inkeles thus ranges himself, albeit more carefully than most, with those who judge the Soviet consensus to be a sham. But he leaves the case open for additional evidence, and even indicates one type of evidence needed by his reference to the "actual conditions of Soviet life." The Soviet Consensus can be judged a failure more safely when it has been demonstrated that there is no "pie now" to match the "pie in the sky" on which the Consensus presumably rests. It has been asserted loudly and often that there is no "pie now"—but not demonstrated. While the assertion undoubtedly serves useful purposes for current Western politics and propaganda, the judicious scholar will wait for demonstrative evidence (roughly of the order, say, of Manya Gordon's *Workers Before and After Lenin*) before he seals his scientific verdict.

Another type of evidence needed is not indicated by Dr. Inkeles, but is equally relevant. It should be demonstrated that not only is "pie now" absent, but *that the expectation of "pie tomorrow" is present.* While this may seem fantastic to persons

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infused with the patterns of desire that pervade Western culture, it is quite conceivable that the Soviet Led neither desire nor expect "pie tomorrow." It is quite conceivable that the diffusion of "socialist consciousness" has structured a personality for which "today's sacrifices" *are their own reward*—with no expectation of "tomorrow's promises"! Were this the case, then the Soviet Consensus would be no sham; for the sham lies only in the assumption that one sacrifices now only for greater personal net gains in the future.

Indeed, if the Soviet System were developing such a characterological type, which finds its personal satisfactions in sacrifices for the public good, then a new era of history *would be* in the making. We would be confronting a Perfectly Consensual Society which, among other things, would surely undermine the Western way of life. It is easy to dismiss such a notion as fantastic, but it would be more useful to investigate it as possible—for both the scientific and political consequences involved are grave, much too grave indeed to make us content with current personality theory and political polemic in the West as a substitute for verifiable observation and description of the East. What we need are systematic empirical studies of the content of expectations—and the influence of these expectations upon actions—among the Soviet Led. It is always important to study the Elite which makes the decisions today. But it would be folly to neglect the expectations of the Mass, which shape the decisions of tomorrow.

III

It is to such questions about identifications, expectations, and demands among the Soviet Led that Dr. Barghoorn turns his attention. His aim and method are modest, despite occasional losses of temper. What *The Soviet Image of the United States* offers is not a scientific reconstruction of mass imagery—but a discursive report based mainly on scrutiny of "the stream of communications by which the Soviet leaders seek to implant in the minds of peoples under their control the image of an America which seeks, they allege, to enslave or destroy them, and whose

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nefarious designs must therefore be foiled by all available and feasible means" (p. xiii).

Making allowances for its language, the book does summarize cogently the evolution of the image of America presented in Soviet communications since the years preceding World War II. Some of the topics are particularly well illuminated—e.g., "The Concept of the Coalition" (II), "The Kremlin and the Atom" (VIII). Others are less adequate—e.g., "Roots of Soviet Postwar Anti-Americanism" (VI).

The most valuable insights in the book come from the author's collation of his readings in Soviet communication content with his observations as a resident of the USSR. His opening sentence announces his conviction that attitudes among nations "present a bewildering and ever changing complex of myth and reality" (p. 3). By comparing what he read with what he saw, Dr. Barghoorn frequently makes vivid this "complex"—i.e., the psychically comfortable coexistence of logically incompatible items. He provides illustrative cases in which What Has Been Said (by The Leaders) does not coincide with what is believed or done (by The Led). He is particularly illuminating on differing perspectives between Russians and Americans, turning up the sort of useful insight which emerges from controlled introspection, viz:

> Americans sometimes fail to remember that language which strikes us as extremely belligerent may seem quite calm to a Soviet Russian. While I was in Moscow, I was often impressed by the capacity of Russians to endure from one another insults which in this country would almost certainly have led to violence. The Soviet Russians seem to have learned to inflict verbal damage upon an opponent without necessarily thinking in terms of physical combat (p. xviii).

Observations of this sort are well worth detailed investigation by systematic methods. The relation of insult to violence is an important cultural pattern, as is the "sublimation" of violence through verbalization. These are relevant matters of general scientific interest, and they acquire special piquancy when the patterns of violence under discussion are those of the nation regarded as Potential Enemy Number One.

Other such stimulating observations recur, particularly in the chapter which summarizes Dr. Barghoorn's personal experiences

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(XI). While enumerating characteristics attributed to Americans by many Russians, he cites cases. Americans are admired as "unaffected, sincere, without pretense." This "democratic American manner" is illustrated as follows:

> Twice during my stay in the USSR one American diplomat astonished and pleased employees of the American Embassy by occasionally taking the wheel of an embassy truck. The Soviet employees pointed out that physical and manual labor were separated by such a wide gap in the USSR that no Soviet official would do such a thing (p. 234).

Dr. Barghoorn does occasionally fall into the trap of "multiplying Little Willie stories," in the phrase one great methodologist used to describe the dangers of selective reminiscence as a method. But usually his cases are not pushed as demonstrative evidence, in which role they would be worthless. They are selected as illustrative, and as stimulative of further thought and investigation. For example, Dr. Barghoorn's list of plus-attributes ascribed to Americans by Russians included the adjectives "polite" and "cultured." Considering the usual American self-deprecation on these attributes, Dr. Barghoorn was struck by the assignment of such virtues to Americans. He reports:

> At first when I heard such statements they puzzled me. Later, however, I came to believe what Russians meant by American or European "politeness" was a degree of *respect for human beings as individuals* which did not exist in their own society. At the same time, the word "culture" as used by Soviets meant good manners, courtesy and poise. Thus, in Soviet terminology, a person is "cultured" if he does not push or shout in a crowded subway train or theater entrance. *Respect for personal property* was also included in this conception (p. 235).

This sort of insight is sufficiently important to justify—as these things go nowadays—an entire research project. Its purpose would be to discover how respect for human dignity and personal property are structured among Soviet Russians. If it is true that they find much to admire and envy in American conduct on these matters, and if sufficiently detailed operational evidence can be accumulated, such a project could more than justify its existence by a flood of manuals for American officials overseas, for psychological warfare operations, and for any future armies of occupation.

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What conclusion does Dr. Barghoorn draw from his study and experience of the Soviet Consensus? Are The Led infused with the correct "socialist consciousness" which welds them to The Leaders—or is the system a sham? He takes an approximate position alongside of Dr. Inkeles on this question, for he, too, is keenly aware of its complexity:

> This problem involves the attitudes of Soviet people not only toward the United States and the Western world in general, but also toward their own government and social and political system. This is so because in the totalitarian Soviet system dissent from or lack of enthusiasm for the official ideology tends, in the absence of domestic ideological competition, to focus on non-Soviet symbols, if knowledge of another way of life or system of thought becomes available (p. 229).

His general view is that the Soviet masses have *not* undergone the interior renovations which Bolshevik politicians yearn for and Bolshevik propagandists strain to accomplish. He suggests, further, that the Soviet Led are not as likely to renovate their own interiors as to transform (in some unspecified ways) the exterior environment in which they live. His chapter on this theme is entitled: "The Russian People: The Kremlin's Achilles' Heel."

Literary phrases, however, make pleasant reading but poor evidence. However agreeable the conjecture may be that the Soviet Consensus is a sham, and that the system is "bound to" collapse, the gravest error in political strategy is to treat gratifying conjectures as if they were demonstrated conclusions. Dr. Barghoorn, like the other authors we have discussed, has contributed a number of important insights and opened a variety of avenues for researches which promise fruitful results. These researches, however, have not yet been made; they remain to be made. Until they are made, prudence enjoins us to doubt most what we would most believe. In the interim, a central lesson of these three books should be clear: their contributions were made while the authors were observing Soviet behavior rather than expressing private preferences. This indicates why, at a time when exposés are flooding a market in which information is vitally needed, at least one reader is ready to exchange the best half-dozen confessionals in any year's crop for a single solid report of relevant observations.

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